BARRIENTOS et al v. CORECIVIC INC
Filing
285
ORDER denying Motion for Class Certification (ECF Nos. 213 & 238 ); denying Motion for Spoliation Sanctions (ECF Nos. 263 & 265 ); finding as moot the motions to exclude experts (ECF Nos. 215 , 239 , 247 , 248 , 253 , 254 ). Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 03/28/2023 (CCL)
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 1 of 18
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, et al., *
Plaintiffs,
*
vs.
*
CORECIVIC, INC.,
*
Defendant.
CASE NO. 4:18-CV-70 (CDL)
*
O R D E R
The Court has spent too much time considering the pending
motion
for
class
certification,
partly
because
it
has
been
vacillating on whether the claims in this case are appropriate for
class resolution.
Vacillation typically means that the party with
the burden of carrying the issue has failed to do so.
the case here.
And that is
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
carry their burden of establishing that this case should be
certified for class action purposes.
Their motion (ECF Nos. 213
& 238) is therefore denied.
DISCUSSION
A class action may only be certified if the party seeking
class certification satisfies, “through evidentiary proof,” all
the requirements specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
plus at least one of the requirements set forth in Rule 23(b).
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013); accord Fed. R.
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 2 of 18
Civ. P. 23.
‘adequately
Plaintiffs must also “demonstrate that the class is
defined
and
clearly
ascertainable.’”
Sellers
v.
Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 941 F.3d 1031, 1039 (11th Cir.
2019) (quoting Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304
(11th Cir. 2012)).
Plaintiffs have the burden to prove that the
class certification requirements are met.
Brown v. Electrolux
Home Prods., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016).
With
these standards in mind, the Court analyzes Plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification, starting with some factual background.
I.
Factual Background1
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
detains certain aliens while their removal proceedings are pending
“or for other reasons related to enforcement of the nation’s
immigration laws.”
Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269,
1272 (11th Cir. 2020).
Stewart County, Georgia detains aliens on
ICE’s behalf at Stewart Detention Center (“Stewart”), which is
operated by CoreCivic, Inc.
Plaintiffs
claim
that
CoreCivic
enlists
detainees
in
a
“voluntary work program” to provide cheap labor for operating
Stewart,
which
enables
CoreCivic
to
increase
its
profits.
Plaintiffs further assert that CoreCivic uses coercive tactics to
1
The Court spent considerable time studying the parties’ briefing, which
contains extensive factual details. The Court also carefully considered
the voluminous exhibits that the parties submitted. In this Order, the
Court has attempted to distill the facts to include only those that are
truly material.
2
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 3 of 18
force the detainees to keep working, including (1) a “deprivation
scheme” which threatens work program participants with serious
harm if they refuse to work and (2) a practice of physically
restraining work program participants who refuse to work.
The
Court will describe the voluntary work program, the “deprivation
scheme,” and the work program discipline policies.
CoreCivic must provide Stewart detainees an opportunity to
participate
in
a
voluntary
work
program.
Pls.’
Mot.
Class
Certification Ex. 13, 2016 ICE Detention Standards § 5.8(V)(A),
ECF No. 213-17 (“2016 ICE Standards”).
Stewart work program
participants serve as kitchen workers, laundry workers, barbers,
commissary workers, and in various other jobs.
Pls.’ Mot. Class
Certification Ex. 35, Stewart Detention Center Work/Program Plan
Guidelines at CCBVA0000118621, ECF No. 213-39.
The three named
Plaintiffs——Wilhen Hill Barrientos, Keysler Ramon Urbina Rojas,
and Gonzalo Bermudez Gutierrez—served as kitchen workers.
Most
detainees at Stewart do not participate in the work program.
In
2021, there were approximately 326 job openings for detainee
workers at Stewart, which has a design capacity of about 1,700
detainees.
Id.
Between
December
2008
and
December
2020,
approximately 32,000 detainees—nearly twenty percent of the total
population
during
that
period—participated
Washburn Decl. ¶ 37, ECF No. 250-4.
3
in
the
program.
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 4 of 18
In
keeping
with
ICE’s
rules,
Stewart
participants are paid at least $1 per day.
work
program
Their earnings are
deposited into their trust accounts. Detainees may save the money,
spend it in the commissary, or send it to friends or family.
Stewart
commissary
offers
phone
cards,
soft
drinks,
The
snacks,
condiments, limited groceries like tuna and ramen, personal care
items like shampoo and toothpaste, limited clothing like t-shirts
and underwear, and other items.
See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot. Class
Certification Ex. 89, 2015 Inventory Sales Report, ECF No. 21393.
To purchase items, a detainee must have money in his detainee
trust fund.
Detainees may receive funds from outside sources or
may earn money in the work program.2
Plaintiffs contend that the food, clothing, and hygiene items
Stewart provides to its detainees are so inadequate that detainees
would suffer serious harm if they could not earn funds through the
work
program
and
purchase
necessities
from
the
commissary.
Plaintiffs also allege that detainee workers are assigned to safer
housing than non-workers.
Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs
argue that some detainees are coerced to join the work program and
then become trapped in it.
Plaintiffs pointed to evidence of
2
Two of the named Plaintiffs received significant funds from outside
sources in addition to their work program earnings. Washburn Decl. ¶ 121
(stating that Hill Barrientos received $675 from outside sources and
$1,313 in work program earnings); id. ¶ 129 (stating that Urbina Rojas
received $1,580 from outside sources and $1,072 in work program
earnings).
4
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 5 of 18
common practices at Stewart which would permit a factfinder to
conclude
that
the
food
at
Stewart
was
inadequate
in
both
nutritional value and amount.
They also submitted evidence of
Stewart’s
the
practices
regarding
provision
of
clothing
and
hygiene items, laundering of clothes, and housing assignments,
though this evidence does not strongly support an inference that
detainees were exposed to serious harm based on these practices.
Plaintiffs assert that after detainees join the work program,
they are coerced to remain in the program because they are subject
to physical restraint if they refuse to work.
Work program
participants are “expected to be ready to report for work at the
required time and may not leave an assignment without permission.”
2016 ICE Standards § 5.8(V)(M).
They “may not evade attendance
and performance standards [or] encourage others to do so.”
Id.
Detainees may be removed from the work program because of unexcused
absences.
Pls.’ Mot. Class Certification Ex. 36, Stewart Detainee
Voluntary Work Program Policy § 19-100.4(H)(3), ECF No. 213-40;
Trinity
Servs.
Grp.
30(b)(6)
Dep.
419:3-5,
ECF
No.
233-1.
Detainees who are removed from the work program can no longer earn
money to purchase items at Stewart’s commissary.
Refusal to work may result in discipline in addition to
removal
from
the
“segregation,”
for
work
program,
refusing
to
including
work.
See
“lockdown”
Pls.’
Mot.
or
Class
Certification Ex. 38, SDC Detainee Handbook 35, ECF No. 213-42
5
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(permitting lockdown for even the lowest category of offenses,
like
“malingering”);
id.
at
33-34
(allowing
disciplinary
segregation for offenses like “encouraging others to participate
in a work stoppage or to refuse to work” and “refusing to obey the
order of a staff member or officer”); see also Pollock Dep. 148:23149:8, ECF No. 229 (assistant warden stating that when a single
detainee stopped working, that was a “work stoppage” that could
warrant discipline); Peterson Dep. 235:24-236:25, ECF No. 232
(explaining that a detainee saying “no work tomorrow” would not be
a “work stoppage” if the detainee just said it “to himself” but
might be a “work stoppage depending on the detainee and “who’s
around”).
restraint.
Both lockdown and segregation are forms of physical
See
Hill
Barrientos
Decl.
¶ 33,
ECF
No.
213-64
(explaining that detainees in lockdown are restricted to their
beds and must receive permission to use the bathroom); Pls.’ Mot.
Class Certification Ex. 119, Special Mgmt. Resident Policy § 10100.4(F), ECF No. 213-123 (describing segregation as restrictive
housing where detainees have very limited time outside their
cells).3
3
Stewart policies also permit CoreCivic to initiate criminal proceedings
against work program participants for offenses like encouraging a work
stoppage. Plaintiffs did not, however, clearly point to any evidence
that CoreCivic had a practice of initiating or threatening to initiate
legal proceedings for work stoppages.
Plaintiffs also argue that
detainees who refuse to work might be reclassified as a higher security
risk—with a corresponding change in uniform color that would give an
immigration judge a visual cue about CoreCivic’s evaluation of the
detainee’s security risk. But Plaintiffs did not point to any evidence
6
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The named Plaintiffs joined the work program to get extra
food, and they remained in the program to keep getting extra food
and to avoid discipline.
Urbina Rojas Decl. ¶¶ 17-19, 44, ECF No.
213-79; Bermudez Gutierrez Decl. ¶¶ 20, 37, ECF No. 213-57; Hill
Barrientos Decl. ¶¶ 12, 31.
II.
Analysis
Plaintiffs seek to certify two classes pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3): a Forced Labor Class and an Unjust
Enrichment Class.
Both classes include all civil immigration
detainees who participated in Stewart’s “volunteer work program.”
The Forced Labor Class’s claims are under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (“TVPA”,) 18 U.S.C. § 1589 et seq., and the Unjust
Enrichment Class’s claims are under Georgia unjust enrichment law.
All the claims are based on Plaintiffs’ assertion that the work
program
is
not
voluntary—that
CoreCivic
coerces
detainees
to
perform labor at Stewart by using or threatening serious harm and
physical restraint if work program participants refuse to work.
CoreCivic, on the other hand, contends that Plaintiffs cannot
establish causation on a class-wide basis, which would defeat
ascertainability, numerosity, commonality, and typicality.
that any Stewart detainee was ever reclassified to a higher security
risk category (or threatened with reclassification) based on refusal to
work. For these reasons, Plaintiffs did not establish that detainees
were subjected to a common practice under which they were threatened
with criminal legal action or harm to their immigration proceedings if
they refused to work in the work program.
7
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 8 of 18
Notwithstanding the complexity of the briefing, the issue is
relatively simple.
Are the claims of the putative class members
sufficiently common and typical such that litigating them together
as a certified class is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23?
When all the rhetoric and hyperbole is peeled away,
the essence of Plaintiffs’ claims is that CoreCivic created an
environment which had the effect of coercing putative class members
to participate in the work program, and then, upon signing up for
the program, the putative class members were trapped in the program
and unable to escape it.
While policies and practices may have
existed that applied to every putative class member who chose to
participate in the program, Plaintiffs fail to recognize that not
every putative class member is similarly situated with other class
members.
Before certifying a class, the Court must consider “how the
class will prove causation” and whether the elements of the
plaintiffs’ claims “will be subject to class-wide proof.”
Cordoba
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1273 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1358) (11th Cir.
2009)).
evidence,
If Plaintiffs cannot prove causation using class-wide
then
typicality,
that
creates
numerosity,
and
problems
superiority
with
ascertainability,
(because
it
is
not
possible to tell which putative class members suffered an injury
and thus have standing absent an individualized inquiry) and
8
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 9 of 18
predominance
(because
individualized
questions
of
causation
predominate over common issues).
Plaintiffs have not established that the critical issue of
causation
is
susceptible
to
circumstances presented here.
class-wide
proof
under
the
There is no dispute that the TVPA’s
forced labor provision requires a plaintiff to prove causation—
that the defendant knowingly procured labor “by means of” physical
restraint, serious harm, threats of physical restraint or serious
harm, or a scheme intended to threaten serious harm or physical
restraint.
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a).
claims
based
are
on
their
Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment
contention
that
participants were coerced to participate.
all
work
program
So, at its core, this
action is about whether the worker detainees decided to participate
and remain in the work program because CoreCivic would subject
them to some type of harm if they did not work.
that
class-wide
evidence
CoreCivic
knowingly
detainees
to
should
established
participate
in
the
be
a
Plaintiffs contend
sufficient
scheme
work
to
intended
program,
so
prove
to
that
coerce
class-wide
evidence can also prove that CoreCivic obtained the labor of all
detainee work program participants “by means of” that scheme.
The
Court is not convinced.
Plaintiffs simply did not point to sufficient evidence from
which the Court could reasonably conclude that every putative class
member agreed to participate in the Stewart work program because
9
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 10 of 18
he was coerced to do so—or that this issue is capable of classwide
resolution.
While
each
putative
member
may
have
been
subjected do the same conditions of confinement, the Court cannot
find based on the current record that all putative class members
perceived the conditions of confinement the same way or that those
conditions were the motivating factor for the putative class
member’s decision to join the work program.
The record in fact
indicates that 80% of the detainees chose not to participate in
the work program even though they were presumably subjected to the
same conditions as those who chose to participate in the program.
And two out of the three named Plaintiffs had sufficient personal
funds in their detainee trust accounts to purchase food at the
commissary,
which
belies
counsel’s
contention
that
they
were
coerced to join the work program because it was their only means
for purchasing food or other essential items from the commissary.
Accordingly,
the
Court
cannot
conclude
that
every
reasonable
detainee would have felt coerced to participate in the program.
Some may have felt that way and some may not have perceived the
conditions as coercive.
Those who found the conditions coercive
may have an individual claim, and those who did not may not have
such a claim.
That determination requires an individualized
assessment of each detainee’s situation, with individual issues
predominating over common ones.
10
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The claim that detainees were trapped in the work program
once they signed up for it suffers from the same commonality,
typicality, and predominance problems.
There are several reasons
why some putative class members may have wished to remain in the
program voluntarily—including earning funds to buy non-essential
items from the commissary and earning funds to save for use upon
release from the detention facility.
The Court cannot find based
on the current record that no reasonable detainee would have
remained in the program voluntarily or even that most reasonable
detainees continued to participate in the program because they
felt they had no choice given the conditions of confinement and
the potential discipline for refusal to work.
Evaluating these
issues requires an individualized assessment of each detainee’s
situation.
The Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden on these
issues.4
This case is different than a conditions of confinement case
in which the challenged conditions of confinement apply in the
same manner to each detainee and where causation can be inferred
from common class-wide evidence, with no individualized evidence
4
Plaintiffs point out that it is a violation of the TVPA to attempt to
procure labor by means of serious harm, physical restraint, or threats
of serious harm and physical restraint, so even if a detainee was not
subjectively coerced to provide labor, CoreCivic still attempted to
obtain his labor by coercive means. 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a). But 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a) only provides a civil remedy for an “individual who is a victim
of a violation” of the TVPA. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiffs did not
point to any authority that a person who is impervious to attempted
coercion is nonetheless a “victim” within the meaning of § 1595(a).
11
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 12 of 18
that could otherwise explain the class members’ conduct.
In
Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., for example, the Tenth Circuit found
that the detainees were subjected to a uniform policy under which
detainees were threatened with physical restraint or serious harm
if they refused to perform mandatory unpaid cleaning assignments.
882 F.3d 905, 916-17 (10th Cir. 2018).
The Tenth Circuit further
concluded that because the class members received notice of the
sanitation
policy’s
terms
(including
possible
sanctions
for
refusing to clean) and performed work when they were assigned to
do so, a clear inference was that the sanitation policy caused the
detainees to work.
Id. at 919-920.
Significantly, the defendant
in Menocal did not point to any evidence to rebut the common
inference of causation.
Id. at 921; see also Owino v. CoreCivic,
Inc., 60 F.4th 437, 446 (9th Cir. 2022) (considering sanitation
policy similar to the one in Menocal and finding no abuse of
discretion where the district court concluded “that a factfinder
could reasonably draw a class-wide causation inference” from the
uniform policy). In contrast, here, Plaintiffs did not demonstrate
that the work program policies are uniformly coercive, such that
no reasonable detainee would join or remain in the Stewart work
program voluntarily, absent the potential for serious harm or
physical restraint.5
Thus, this is not a case like Menocal or
5
To rescue their motion for class certification, Plaintiffs may argue
that they are willing to assume the burden of proving at trial that the
12
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 13 of 18
Owino where there is no other reasonable explanation for the labor
other than coercion.
For these reasons, the claims asserted in
this action are best suited for individual and not class treatment.
The Court denies the motion for class certification.
THE OTHER PENDING MOTIONS
I.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Spoliation Sanctions
In addition to their class certification motion, Plaintiffs
filed
a
motion
for
spoliation
sanctions
because
a
CoreCivic
employee destroyed the detention files of Urbina Rojas and an
unknown
number
of
other
putative
class
members,
even
though
CoreCivic understood that it had an obligation to preserve such
documents.
As a sanction, Plaintiffs seek an adverse inference
jury instruction requiring the jury to presume that Urbina Rojas’s
testimony about his experience at Stewart is uncontroverted, plus
attorneys’ fees associated with the sanctions motion.
Spoliation
is
“the
destruction
or
failure
to
preserve
evidence that is necessary to contemplated or pending litigation.”
Bath v. Int’l Paper Co., 807 S.E.2d 64, 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)
(quoting Baxley v. Hakiel Indus., Inc., 647 S.E.2d 29, 30 (Ga.
2007)).
In this circuit, “federal law governs the imposition of
conditions of confinement and the conditions of continued participation
are so coercive that no reasonable detainee could resist the coercion.
But Plaintiffs did not rebut the evidence that through the years
approximately 80% of the detainees have chosen not to participate in the
program.
This evidence contradicts the assertion that no reasonable
detainee could resist the coercion caused by conditions of confinement
at Stewart.
13
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spoliation sanctions,” although Georgia law provides guidance that
the Court may consider. Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d
939, 944 (11th Cir. 2005).
Spoliation sanctions “are intended to
prevent unfair prejudice to litigants and to insure the integrity
of the discovery process.”
Id.
The Court has “broad discretion”
to impose sanctions for spoliation of evidence.
Id.
The most
severe sanctions, like adverse inference instructions to the jury,
“are reserved for exceptional cases, generally only those in which
the party lost or destroyed material evidence intentionally in bad
faith and thereby prejudiced the opposing party in an uncurable
way.”
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Koch, 812 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Ga.
2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phillips v.
Harmon, 774 S.E.2d 596, 606 (Ga. 2015)).
In
determining
spoliation,
the
whether
Court
may
a
sanction
consider
is
whether
warranted
Plaintiffs
for
were
prejudiced because of the destruction of the detention files,
whether the prejudice can be cured, the practical importance of
the evidence, whether CoreCivic acted in bad faith, and the
potential for abuse if sanctions are not granted.
at 945.
Flury, 427 F.3d
Here, CoreCivic admits that its employee deleted Urbina
Rojas’s detention file (and others) despite a litigation hold.
The record suggests that CoreCivic did not take adequate measures
to ensure that all relevant document custodians were aware of the
litigation hold and its requirements.
14
Plaintiffs contend that
Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 285 Filed 03/28/23 Page 15 of 18
Urbina Rojas’s detention file is central to his claim that he was
coerced to work in the Stewart work program because it should
contain evidence to corroborate his testimony that he was placed
in segregation when he refused to do work outside of his regular
duties.
CoreCivic’s
segregation placement.
discipline
log
does
not
include
this
If the discipline record were the only
evidence of Urbina Rojas’s segregation placement, Plaintiffs might
have a good argument for some type of spoliation sanction.
But
Urbina Rojas presented testimony that he was placed in segregation
for refusing to complete certain tasks.
It is difficult to see
how CoreCivic’s failure to preserve the detention file will result
in uncurable prejudice to Urbina Rojas, which suggests that the
practical importance of the evidence is low. So, even if CoreCivic
did wrongfully fail to preserve the detention file, the Court is
not convinced that the sanctions Urbina Rojas seeks are warranted
at this time.
The Court thus declines to impose spoliation
sanctions based on the destruction of Urbina Rojas’s detention
file.
The Court notes that if CoreCivic tries to suggest that
Urbina Rojas was not placed in segregation by pointing to the
discipline log, then the Court would likely permit the factfinder
to consider the fact that CoreCivic destroyed the detention file,
which would have contained documentation regarding any segregation
placement.
15
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Plaintiffs also did not establish how they were prejudiced by
CoreCivic’s failure to preserve the other detention files.
There
is no contention that Plaintiffs would be able to establish the
class certification requirements if they had access to the files.
Plaintiffs’ chief concern is that CoreCivic’s motion to exclude
one of their experts rested in part on his failure to consider
enough detainee grievances and disciplinary reports.
But, as
discussed below, the motions to exclude the experts are moot, and
the Court declines to impose spoliation sanctions based on the
failure to preserve the other detention files.
II.
The Parties’ Motions to Exclude Experts
The
parties
also
filed
motions
to
strike
the
proposed
testimony of three experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 590 U.S. 579 (1993).
First, CoreCivic seeks to strike Plaintiffs’ psychiatrist
expert, Dr. Pablo Stewart.
The Court reviewed the portions of Dr.
Stewart’s report that Plaintiffs rely on in their motion for class
certification. In those portions of his report, Dr. Stewart opines
that
Stewart’s
food
practices
might
coerce
some
detained
individuals to work, that segregation can cause psychological
harm, and that the transfer from worker housing to non-worker
housing could potentially result in harm.
The Court finds that
even if it were to admit Dr. Stewart’s opinions over CoreCivic’s
objections, his opinions do not demonstrate that causation can be
16
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established on a class-wide basis using common evidence or that
common
issues
predominate
over
individual
ones.
The
Court
terminates the motion to exclude Dr. Stewart (ECF Nos. 247 & 253)
Second,
CoreCivic
moves
expert, Steven Schwartz.
to
strike
Plaintiffs’
economist
Plaintiffs rely on Dr. Schwartz to
establish a class-wide damages model.
Because the Court concludes
that the issue of causation cannot be determined on a class-wide
basis, the Court finds that it need not consider whether Dr.
Schwartz class-wide damages model reliably measures the damages
suffered by the putative class members.
The Court terminates the
motion to exclude Dr. Schwartz (ECF Nos. 248 & 254).
Finally, Plaintiffs move to strike CoreCivic’s psychiatric
expert, Dr. Joseph Penn.
The Court did not consider Dr. Penn’s
opinion in ruling on the motion for class certification, so the
Court terminates the motion to exclude Dr. Penn (ECF Nos. 215 &
239) as moot.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
set
forth
above,
the
Court
finds
that
Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to prove that the class
certification requirements are met for the two classes they seek
to certify.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification (ECF Nos. 213 & 238).
The Court also denies
Plaintiffs’ motion for spoliation sanctions (ECF Nos. 263 & 265).
The motions to exclude experts (ECF Nos. 215, 239, 247, 248, 253,
17
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254) are terminated as moot.
Given the Court’s ruling on class
certification, the only claims remaining in this action are the
individual claims of the named Plaintiffs.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of March, 2023.
s/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
18
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