BRYANT v. HARRIS COUNTY GEORGIA et al
Filing
69
ORDER granting 33 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 34 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 59 Motion to Set Aside. Defendants' summary judgment motions are granted as to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, and those claims are remanded to the Superior Court of Harris County. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 02/05/2020 (CCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JOANN BRYANT,
*
Plaintiff,
*
vs.
*
CRYSTAL GAIL GARREN, et al.,
*
Defendants.
CASE NO. 4:18-CV-106 (CDL)
*
O R D E R
Larry Wayne Burden, Jr. was an inmate at the Harris County
Prison.
On
November
basketball
in
afterwards.
the
His
5,
2015,
prison
mother
Burden
yard.
brought
collapsed
Tragically,
this
while
he
wrongful
playing
died
death
soon
action,
alleging that the corrections officers on duty did not provide
adequate
aid
Plaintiff
to
asserts
Burden
her
after
claims
they
learned
pursuant
to
42
he
collapsed.1
U.S.C.
§
1983,
alleging that the corrections officers deprived Burden of his
rights
guaranteed
by
the
Eighth
Amendment
to
the
U.S.
Constitution. Plaintiff also claims that the Georgia Department
of
Corrections
and
Harris
County
are
liable
for
any
constitutional violations committed by the corrections officers.
And, she asserts various state law claims.
Defendants filed
summary judgment motions, and Plaintiff filed a motion to set
1
Plaintiff also claimed that an unidentified prison guard used
excessive force on Burden earlier in the day.
She abandoned that
claim, so Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on it.
aside the Court’s previous order dismissing her claims against
Harris County.
evidence
that
As discussed below, Plaintiff did not present
would
permit
a
jury
to
conclude
that
the
corrections officers violated Burden’s constitutional rights or
that any constitutional violation caused Burden’s death.
The
Court thus grants Defendants’ summary judgment motions (ECF Nos.
33 & 34) and denies Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order
dismissing her claims against Harris County (ECF No. 59).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).
Fed. R. Civ.
In determining whether a genuine dispute of material
fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
is
viewed
summary
in
the
judgment,
light
most
drawing
opposing party’s favor.
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
favorable
all
to
justifiable
the
party
opposing
inferences
in
the
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
A fact is material if it is relevant or
necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248.
A factual
dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record
reveals the following facts.
2
Burden
was
Correctional
prison.
a
state
Institution
The
Prison
is
inmate
(the
owned
housed
at
“Prison”),
and
the
a
operated
Harris
County
minimum-security
by
Harris
County.
Harris County houses up to 150 state inmates in the Prison for a
fee
pursuant
to
an
agreement
Corrections (“GDOC”).
with
the
Georgia
Department
of
Plaintiff admits that Prison employees are
hired by Harris County and are paid by Harris County.
On November 1, 2015, Burden, who was twenty-four years old,
complained to Corrections Officer Donald Barber of chest pain on
his right side.
Garren Dep. Ex. 37, Incident Report (Nov. 1,
2015), ECF No. 45 at 165.
Burden stated that he thought it was
because he drank so much coffee, and he asked for a medical
request form.
Id.
Barber reported the issue to his supervisor,
Crystal Garren, who told Barber to keep a close eye on Burden and
have him fill out a medical request form.
Id.
Barber checked on
Burden again, and Burden said it was a slight pain that “comes
and goes.”
Id.
Barber advised Burden to fill out the medical
request form and let officers know if the pain got any worse.
Id.
There is no evidence that any corrections officers except
Barber and Garren knew that Burden had reported chest pain.
And,
Plaintiff pointed to evidence that on November 3, 2015 Burden saw
a medical provider who doubted that Burden’s symptoms were heart
related and prescribed Tylenol and Omeprazole, a medication for
3
gastroesophageal reflux symptoms. Walker Dep. Ex. 9, Physician’s
Notes, ECF No. 47 at 258.
On November 5, 2015, Crystal Garren, Daniel Maddox, Donald
Walker,
Jeremy
McDowell,
Noel
Flowers,
and
Troy
Moore
(“Corrections Officer Defendants”) were on duty as corrections
officers at the Prison.2
Prison that day.
There were no medical personnel at the
Burden and other inmates from his cell dorm had
a recreation period in the Prison recreation yard, an open-air
yard within the interior of the prison.
with another inmate.
He collapsed.
Burden played basketball
No corrections officers were
physically present in the recreation yard when Burden collapsed.
At approximately 11:37 a.m., Maddox was taking lunch bags and
juice to inmates in the yard.
the ground.3
He “then observed” Burden lying on
Walker Dep. Ex. 10, Incident Report (Nov. 5, 2015),
ECF No. 47 at 259.
Maddox rushed to Burden.
Maddox Dep. 49:20-
50:2, ECF No. 46 (stating that it took him about fifteen seconds
to get to Burden).
Moore, who was stationed in the Prison’s
2
Barber was not on duty and not at the Prison on November 5, 2015.
Plaintiff did not point to any evidence that Barber was subjectively
aware that Burden had a serious medical need or that Barber was
deliberately indifferent to such a need.
Accordingly, Barber is
entitled to summary judgment.
3 Defendants pointed to surveillance footage from which a jury could
conclude that Burden was still on his feet playing basketball at
11:39:04. Nelson Decl. Ex. 1, M2U00388 00:01, ECF No. 35; Barber Dep.
62:1-16, ECF No. 48 (viewing video and stating that Burden is the
player with the ball at 11:39); Walker Dep. 152:11-20, ECF No. 47
(viewing video and stating that Burden is still up at 11:39). But the
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
and a jury could conclude based on the incident report that Maddox saw
Burden on the ground at or shortly after 11:37 a.m. and that the time
stamp on the surveillance footage was slightly off.
4
control
room
with
Walker,
noticed
that
several
inmates
were
banging on a window between the yard and a hallway outside the
control room.
ground.
Moore went to the yard and saw Burden on the
He thought that Burden might have been knocked out while
playing basketball; he saw that Burden was breathing and that his
eyes were open, then shook him and asked him if he was okay.
Moore Dep. 68:3-69:3, ECF No. 55.
Moore
attended
started
to
moving
Burden.
inmates
Burden
off
did
questions, but he was still breathing.
approximately
11:39
a.m.,
Garren, over the radio.
Maddox
the
not
yard
respond
while
to
Maddox
Maddox’s
Maddox Dep. 50:10-23.
called
for
his
At
supervisor,
He also asked for 911 to be called.
Plaintiff admits that someone at the Prison called Harris County
911
at
11:41
dispatched
to
a.m.
the
and
that
Prison
emergency
at
11:42
medical
a.m.
personnel
Pl.’s
Resp.
were
to
Corrections Officer Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 27-28,
ECF No. 58-2.
Confusingly, though, Plaintiff also asserts that
911 was not called until 11:44 a.m.
Pl.’s Resp. to Corrections
Officer Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 3, ECF No. 58; Pl.’s Statement
of Material Facts in Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Mot. for
Summ. J. ¶ 24, ECF No. 58-1 (pointing to the incident report,
which states that Maddox was taking lunch to the inmates on the
yard at “approximately 1137 hours,” that Maddox “then observed”
Burden on the ground and called for help, that CPR began at
5
“approximately
1142
hours,”
and
that
911
was
called
“at
approximately 1144 hours”).
Garren,
Whittaker
Flowers,
ran
Maddox’s call.
to
the
McDowell,
recreation
and
prison
counselor
as
as
yard
soon
Barbara
Garren
got
Garren and Whittaker helped Maddox assess Burden
for injuries, McDowell helped clear inmates from the yard, and
Flowers retrieved a handheld video camera to record the incident
pursuant to Prison protocol.
Walker, who was still manning the
control room, notified the other officers that he had combat
life-saving training from his time in the Army, so McDowell went
to the control room and Walker rushed to the yard.
The officers
observed scrapes on Burden’s face and believed that Burden may
have hit his head on the ground when he collapsed.
Burden was
still breathing, although his breaths became gasps with fifteen
seconds or more between them.
Then, at approximately 11:42 a.m.,
when they realized that Burden had not taken a breath in about a
minute,
Walker
and
Whittaker
began
attempting
to
perform
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), including chest compressions
and mouth-to-mouth.
Plaintiff asserts that Whittaker did not
perform the chest compressions correctly.
Plaintiff argues that corrections officers “accused” Burden
of faking a serious medical condition, that the officers delayed
CPR until five minutes after Burden stopped breathing, and that
the officers’ “motivation in delaying CPR” was because “Burden
6
could have been faking his unresponsiveness.”
Pl.’s Statement of
Facts in Resp. to GDOC Mot. for Summ. J. ¶¶ 4, 8-9, ECF No. 56-3;
Pl.’s Statement of Facts in Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’
Mot.
for
argument.
Summ.
J.
¶ 14.
The
record
does
not
support
this
First, the testimony Plaintiff cited for her argument
that the officers accused Burden of faking his unresponsiveness
and therefore delayed treatment does not support it.
Rather, the
officer was asked a question that assumed it took five minutes
for
officers
to
assess
the
situation
and
begin
CPR,
and
he
responded, “[W]e were still figuring out what happened. We didn’t
know if he was faking it. We didn’t know if he got punched. We
didn’t know if he had ran into the basketball hoop.
Nobody knew
what happened. We were still assessing the area. We had people
all over the yard. We was getting people off the yard.”
Dep. 88:10-19, ECF No. 52.
Flowers
Second, and more importantly, the
record simply does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that Burden
stopped breathing a minute after officers arrived to assess him,
but that five minutes went by before any of the officers began
attempting
Walker’s
CPR.
The
evidence
deposition—does
not
Plaintiffs
support
this
cited—page
assertion.
107
of
The
evidence does suggest that Burden collapsed at 11:37 a.m. and
that chest compressions started five minutes later.
106:24-107:21.
Walker Dep.
But it does not establish that Burden stopped
breathing five minutes before officers attempted to resuscitate
7
him, and Plaintiff did not point to any other evidence to support
this assertion.
As discussed above, Burden was still breathing
when officers responded to him, and Plaintiff admits that fact.
Pl.’s Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Statement of Material
Facts ¶ 22 (admitting that Burden was “taking deep breaths and
his eyes were open”).
Burden
began
“taking
Plaintiff also pointed to evidence that
in
very
slow
gasps
of
air”
and
that
corrections officers began CPR when they realized that Burden had
not taken a breath in about a minute. Incident Report (Nov. 5,
2015), ECF No. 47 at 259.
support
Plaintiff’s
assertion
In summary, the record does not
that
the
officers
intentionally
delayed CPR until five minutes after Burden stopped breathing.
Emergency medical personnel arrived between 11:45 a.m. and
11:49 a.m. and took over the response, and they departed with
Burden via ambulance between 11:51 a.m. and 11:55 a.m.
was pronounced dead at the hospital at 12:29 p.m.
Burden
The cause of
death was later determined to be cardiac dysrhythmia (irregular
heartbeat)
with
cardiomegaly
(enlarged
heart)
and
myocardial
fibrosis (impairment of heart muscle cells).
The Prison had an automated external defibrillator (“AED”)
in the control room, but no policy or directive on when to use
it.
Haden Dep. 212:25-213:14, ECF No. 44.
All the officers on
duty except Moore, who was a cadet in training at the time of
Burden’s death, had received training on how to use the AED.
8
McDowell
Dep.
50:19-20,
ECF
No.
49;
Moore
Dep.
17:23-18:11.
Under GDOC’s standard operating procedures that apply to county
prisons, the initial response of corrections officers “to urgent
or
emergent
medical
defibrillation
when
with
indicated,
personnel.”
may
Automated
immediate
include
External
First
Aid,
Defibrillator
notification
of
health
CPR,
(AED)
care
Lewis Dep. Ex. 2, GDOC Standard Operating Procedure
¶ VI.A.2,
personnel
are
potentially
a
an
and
VH31-0005
take
requests
on
life
ECF
site
No.
and
response
stretcher” to the location.
at
200.
corrections
threatening
“medical
53
medical
bag,
If
officers
emergency,
portable
oxygen,
no
healthcare
respond
they
to
a
“should”
AED,
and
a
Id. ¶ VI.B.2, ECF No. 53 at 201-02;
Lewis Dep. 67:16-20, ECF No. 53.
Moreover, according to GDOC’s
in-service training witness, GDOC officers are trained that if a
person stops breathing and does not respond when the officer taps
him, then the officer should immediately call for someone to get
an AED.
Raffield Dep. 29:19-30:19, ECF No. 43.
None of the
corrections officers on duty at the Prison on November 5, 2015
thought to retrieve the AED for use on Burden.
And, the Prison’s
AED was inoperable on November 5, 2015 because its batteries were
dead.
Walker Dep. 71:4-13.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
asserting
that
Defendants
violated
9
Burden’s
Eighth
Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.4
The Eighth
Amendment prohibits “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners” because it “constitutes the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
establish
a
constitutional
deliberate-indifference
“To
claim,
[Plaintiff] must demonstrate ‘(1) [that Burden had] a serious
medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that
need; and (3) causation between that indifference and [Burden’s]
injury.’” Taylor v. Hughes, 920 F.3d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th
Cir. 2009)).
There is no dispute that Burden had a serious medical need
when he collapsed and became unresponsive.
Corrections
Officer
Defendants
acted
To establish that the
with
deliberate
indifference, Plaintiff “must prove three things: (1) subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk;
(3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence.” Goebert v.
Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in
original) (quoting Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th
4
Plaintiff also invokes the Fourteenth Amendment.
Burden was a
convicted prisoner, so the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishments clause applies. The Court presumes that Plaintiff invokes
the Fourteenth Amendment because the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishments clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171,
1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Plaintiff does not appear to
assert an independent Fourteenth Amendment claim.
10
Cir. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2015)).
A prison guard
may be deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need if he
knows
that
fourteen
an
inmate
minutes
to
has
check
stopped
[the
breathing
inmate’s]
but
fails
condition,
“for
call
for
medical assistance, administer CPR or do anything else to help.”
Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1273.
Liability can also attach when a
prison official takes no action despite knowing that an inmate
reported
being
“all
busted
up”
from
a
car
wreck—even
hearing the inmate cry out in pain for several hours.
920 F.3d at 734.
after
Taylor,
And, a prison official may be deliberately
indifferent if he intentionally delays medical treatment despite
having reason to know that the delay could worsen the inmate’s
condition.
Goebert,
510
F.3d
at
1329
(jail
commander
was
deliberately indifferent when he intentionally delayed for one
day,
with
“no
good
reason,”
authorizing
medical
care
for
an
inmate with a serious medical need that was getting progressively
worse); accord Alsobrook v. Alvarado, 477 F. App’x 710, 713 (11th
Cir.
2012)
(per
curiam)
(corrections
officer
was
deliberately
indifferent because he refused to transport an inmate to medical
care for almost two hours even though the inmate was continuously
bleeding from a gash to his head).
Here, the Corrections Officer Defendants did not refuse to
seek medical treatment for Burden.
11
When Maddox found Burden
unresponsive but breathing, he immediately called his supervisor
for
help.
The
recreation yard.
supervisor
and
other
officers
ran
to
the
Walker told the other officers that he could
help because of his combat training, so he went to the yard to
help
while
McDowell
took
over
for
him
in
the
control
room.
Flowers followed Prison policy and got a camcorder to record the
response.
When they realized that Burden had not taken a breath
in about a minute, Walker and Whittaker began attempting CPR on
Burden
and
continued
until
the
paramedics
arrived,
though
Whittaker’s hand placement for the chest compressions was wrong.
Either four or seven minutes after Burden collapsed (one minute
before
or
two
minutes
after
officers
began
attempting
CPR),
Harris County 911 was called.
Plaintiff
does
not
appear
to
assert
that
any
of
these
responses evinces a deliberate indifference to Burden’s serious
medical need.
Rather, her argument focuses on the Corrections
Officer Defendants’ failure to use an AED on Burden.
According
to Plaintiff, Walker should have asked someone to retrieve the
AED while he was attempting CPR; McDowell should have summoned
someone to the control room to get the AED; and Flowers, Garren,
and Maddox should have gone to get the AED.5
5
Certainly, the
Plaintiff also argues that Moore should have gotten the AED. But she
did not rebut Defendants’ evidence that Moore, who was a cadet, had not
been trained on the AED and did not know that the Prison had one.
Thus, his failure to bring the AED to the yard could not be deliberate
indifference, and he is entitled to summary judgment.
12
failure to use the AED by all five corrections officers who had
been trained to use it could be evidence of their negligence, and
the
failure
of
the
Prison
to
adequately
maintain
batteries could likewise be evidence of negligence.
viewed
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
Plaintiff,
the
AED
But even
the
record
establishes that the officers summoned 911 shortly after Burden
collapsed and that jail personnel attempted to perform CPR on
Burden from the time they realized he had stopped breathing until
the paramedics arrived and took over attempting to resuscitate
Burden.
They were not consciously indifferent to the situation.
Negligent medical care does not violate the Constitution.
“In
the
medical
adequate
context,
medical
care
an
inadvertent
cannot
be
said
failure
to
to
provide
constitute
‘an
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to
the conscience of mankind.’”
Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d
1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10607).
In Mann, for example, the deputies “may have made an error
in judgment” but were not deliberately indifferent when they took
an arrestee experiencing “excited delirium” to the jail instead
of to the hospital.
Id. at 1307-08.
And, they “took appropriate
action” of applying cold compresses to cool down the arrestee,
who they thought was suffering from a heat stroke, and ultimately
calling
911
about
nineteen
minutes
unresponsive
with
labored
breathing.
13
after
the
Id.
arrestee
at
1301,
became
1308.
Similarly, here, corrections officers called 911 shortly after
Burden collapsed, and officers attempted CPR on Burden from the
time they realized he had stopped breathing until the paramedics
arrived.
This is not a case where prison officials ignored a
serious medical need or intentionally delayed medical care.
The
Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden of pointing to
evidence
suggesting
that
the
corrections
officers
disregarded
Burden’s risk by conduct that is more than gross negligence.6
Even
if
a
genuine
factual
dispute
existed
regarding
the
corrections officers’ deliberate indifference to Burden’s serious
medical need, Plaintiff failed to point to evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that such indifference proximately
caused Burden’s death.7
“An inmate who complains that delay in
medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place
verifying
medical
evidence
in
the
record
to
establish
the
detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.”
McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 458–59 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d
6
The Corrections Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
because Plaintiff did not present enough evidence to establish a
constitutional violation.
Even if there were such evidence, these
Defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity because
Plaintiff did not point to any authority clearly establishing that the
failure to use an AED would amount to deliberate indifference under the
circumstances presented here, where officers promptly called for
emergency medical personnel and attempted to perform CPR.
7
Plaintiff does not argue that she could not present evidence on
causation based on the limited discovery the Court permitted so that
Plaintiff could find out what happened to Burden.
Rather, she argues
that the present record contains substantial evidence of causation.
14
1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds
by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 n.9 (2002)).
Plaintiff argues that she presented “substantial evidence”
that
the
failure
Burden’s death.
to
use
AED
was
the
proximate
cause
of
Pl.’s Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Mot.
for Summ. J. 14-15.
GDOC’s
an
medical
She did not.
director
agreed
Plaintiff pointed out that
that
CPR,
which
keeps
blood
pumping when the heart stops, would not get the heart started
again but an AED may.
not
point
to
conditions
any
would
Lewis Dep. 60:13-19.
medical
have
evidence
responded
to
on
an
But Plaintiff did
how
AED
Burden’s
or
to
any
heart
medical
evidence that proper and timely use of an AED would have made a
difference to Burden.
Walker,
a
Rather, Plaintiff cited the testimony of
corrections
officer,
and
Warden
Alex
Haden,
who
generally agreed that they understood an AED can be effective to
treat cardiac events.
medical
causation
Even if their testimony could be viewed as
evidence,
Plaintiff
did
not
point
to
any
evidence that Walker and Haden were qualified to offer medical
opinions.
pamphlet
Plaintiff also submitted an American Heart Association
which
states
that
an
AED
can
stop
“ventricular
fibrillation by using an electrical shock” and that if a person
experiences
ventricular
fibrillation,
his
“chance
of
survival
decreases by 7 to 10 percent for every minute that passes without
defibrillation.”
Pl.’s Resp. to GDOC’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1,
15
Pamphlet, ECF No. 56-1 at 4.
But Plaintiff did not point to
evidence that Burden suffered from ventricular fibrillation or
that
his
condition
likely
would
have
responded
to
an
AED.
Without some medical evidence that Burden’s cardiac event could
have been treated successfully with an AED, the Court cannot
speculate
that
a
defibrillator
would
have
made
a
difference
simply because Burden’s death was related to several issues with
his heart.8
In summary, Plaintiff did not point to evidence from which a
reasonable
jury
Defendants
were
need
or
that
could
conclude
deliberately
any
deliberate
that
the
indifferent
to
indifference
Officer Defendants caused Burden’s death.
Corrections
a
by
serious
the
Officer
medical
Corrections
Accordingly, Plaintiff
has not created a genuine factual dispute on these issues. The
8
Plaintiff argues that causation “can be shown by personal
participation in the constitutional violation.”
Pl.’s Resp. to
Corrections Officer Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 14 (quoting Goebert, 510
F.3d at 1327).
The causation question at issue in the portion of
Goebert that Plaintiff cites is whether a jail commander who delayed a
plaintiff’s obstetrical treatment had a causal connection to the
plaintiff’s harm—the stillbirth of her baby. There was a fact question
on the issue because the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff showed that the jail commander knew that the plaintiff
had a serious medical need (leaking amniotic fluid for days) but
decided to withhold medical care, resulting in a one-day delay of
proper obstetrical care.
There was medical evidence that the
commander’s delay foreclosed several treatment options, and there was
medical evidence that if the plaintiff had received appropriate
obstetrical care sooner, the baby’s chance of survival would have been
significantly higher.
Id. at 1319, 1329.
Thus, there was a fact
question on whether the jail commander’s deliberate indifference caused
the loss of the plaintiff’s child.
Id. at 1329.
Here, in contrast,
there is no medical evidence that Burden’s medical conditions would
have responded to an AED or that he would have had a significantly
better chance of survival if an AED has been used.
16
Corrections Officer Defendants are therefore entitled to summary
judgment.
All of Plaintiff’s claims against GDOC are based on GDOC’s
alleged failure to supervise and train the Corrections Officer
Defendants.
In the absence of a constitutional violation, the
supervisory liability claim against GDOC cannot succeed, even if
the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s argument that the county
Prison employees were also employed by GDOC.
Paez v. Mulvey, 915
F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]here can be no supervisory
liability
. . .
violation.”
Thomas,
reasons,
516
if
(second
F.3d
there
was
alteration
952,
Plaintiff’s
955
in
underlying
original)
(11th
municipal
County likewise fails.9
no
Cir.
liability
constitutional
(quoting
2008))).
claim
Gish
For
against
v.
similar
Harris
See, e.g., Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d
1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no basis for holding a city
liable
under
§ 1983
without
an
underlying
constitutional
violation by a city employee).
CONCLUSION
Burden’s death was tragic.
The possibility that it may
could have been prevented compounds the heartbreak.
9
Moreover,
The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Harris County
because Plaintiff did not adequately allege a Harris County policy or
custom was the moving force behind a constitutional violation that
injured Burden. Bryant v. Harris Cty., No. 4:18-CV-106 (CDL), 2018 WL
5316359, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2018). Plaintiff moved to set aside
that order, arguing that Burden’s death was the result of a Harris
County policy, but the claim against Harris County fails without an
underlying constitutional violation.
17
evidence
of
possible
someone accountable.
federal
claims
is
negligence
increases
the
desire
to
hold
But the narrow issue regarding Plaintiff’s
whether
a
constitutional
violation
by
the
Defendants caused Burden’s death; and as explained previously,
the answer to that question is clear.
Accordingly, Defendants’
summary judgment motions (ECF Nos. 33 & 34) are granted as to all
of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
Those are the only claims over
which the Court has original jurisdiction.
exercise
supplemental
jurisdiction
over
The Court declines to
Plaintiff’s
state
law
claims, and those claims are remanded to the Superior Court of
Harris County.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Plaintiff’s motion to
set aside the Court’s order granting Harris County’s motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 59) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of February, 2020.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
18
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