CHRISTIAN et al v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al
Filing
20
ORDER ; granting #9 Motion to Remand. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D. LAND on 12/28/2018 (tlf).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
FELICIA CHRISTIAN, individually *
and as administratrix of the
estate of JALIN TERRELL LAWSON, *
and JULLIA ALEXANDRIA MORRIS,
*
Plaintiffs,
*
vs.
*
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, GOODYEAR
TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, FARMER’S *
TIRE CENTER, LLC, and EDDIE
CHRISTIAN,
*
Defendants.
CASE NO. 4:18-CV-147 (CDL)
*
O R D E R
Plaintiffs originally brought this action in the Superior
Court of Clay County, Georgia.
Ford Motor Company removed it to
this Court, contending that the only non-diverse Defendant, Eddie
Christian, was fraudulently joined. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
consented to removal.
Plaintiffs now seek to remand the action
back to the Superior Court, and Ford and Goodyear oppose remand.
For the following reasons, the Court finds that complete diversity
of citizenship is lacking, and therefore, this Court does not have
subject
matter
jurisdiction
over
this
action.
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (ECF No. 9) is granted.
1
Accordingly,
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege the following facts in their Complaint.
In
2017, Eddie Christian purchased tires for his 2001 Ford Explorer.
Instead of purchasing four new tires, Eddie Christian purchased
three new tires and had mechanics install his spare tire on the
vehicle in place of a fourth.
Although the car’s spare tire looked
new, it was older and should have been discarded. Later that year,
Eddie Christian’s grandson, Jalin Lawson, was driving the Ford
Explorer when the spare tire’s tread separated and caused a wreck.
Lawson was killed and his passenger, Jullia Morris, was seriously
injured.
Morris and Felicia Christian, Lawson’s mother, filed this
action in the Superior Court of Clay County, Georgia to recover
damages stemming from the wreck.
They brought claims against Ford
Motor Company, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Farmer’s Tire
Center,
LLC,
jurisdiction
and
was
Eddie
not
Christian.
proper
in
Plaintiffs
federal
court
alleged
because
that
Eddie
Christian and both Plaintiffs were residents of Georgia, and,
therefore, there was no complete diversity of citizenship.
Plaintiffs allege that Eddie Christian “negligently failed to
independently research and become aware that the spare tire [on
the Ford Explorer that he loaned to Lawson], while looking new,
was in fact an older tire and was due to be discarded and not
used.”
Compl. ¶ 49, ECF No. 1-1.
2
On June 29, 2018, Ford received
a sworn interrogatory from Felicia Christian stating that Eddie
Christian gave the Explorer to Lawson to drive.
Ford claims that
this was the first time it had reason to believe that Plaintiffs
could not recover against Eddie Christian under their negligence
theory because Eddie was a gratuitous bailor and, therefore, did
not owe a duty to inspect his vehicle for defects.
Within
thirty
days
of
receiving
the
interrogatory,
Ford
removed this case to federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction, claiming that Eddie Christian had been fraudulently
joined.
Plaintiffs then filed the motion to remand.
DISCUSSION
District courts have diversity jurisdiction over “all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of
$75,000 . . .
States.”
and
is
between . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
citizens
of
different
“If a case is removed to federal
court based on diversity jurisdiction, the federal district court
must remand the case back to state court if complete diversity
between the parties does not exist.” Kimball v. Better Bus. Bureau
of
W.
Fla.,
613
F.
App’x
821,
822
(11th
Cir.
2015)(per
curiam).
Here, complete diversity does not exist because Eddie
Christian
is
a
non-diverse
presumptively required.
defendant.
Therefore,
remand
is
“However, if a defendant shows that
‘there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of
action against [a non-diverse] defendant,’ then the plaintiff is
3
said
to
have
fraudulently
joined
the
non-diverse
defendant.”
Florence v. Crescent Res., LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.
2007)(quoting Henderson v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278,
1281 (11th Cir. 2006)).
“In that situation, the federal court
must dismiss the non-diverse defendant and deny any motion to
remand the matter back to state court.”
Id.
Here, Ford and
Goodyear argue that federal jurisdiction is proper because Eddie
Christian,
the
only
non-diverse
defendant
in
the
case,
was
defendant
was
fraudulently joined.
The
burden
of
proving
that
a
non-diverse
fraudulently joined “is a ‘heavy one.’”
Crowe v. Coleman, 113
F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)(quoting B, Inc. v. Miller Brewing
Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)).
“If there is even
a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint
states a cause of action against . . . the resident defendant[],
the federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the
case to state court.”
Id. (quoting Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709
F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc.,
991 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1993)).
When analyzing a claim of
fraudulent joinder, “the district court must evaluate the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must
resolve any uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of
the plaintiff.”
Id.
4
Here, Ford and Goodyear ague that there is no possibility the
Superior Court of Clay County will find that Plaintiffs have a
cause of action against Eddie Christian.
the implausibility of Plaintiffs’ claim.
against Eddie is for negligence.
Defendants exaggerate
Plaintiffs’ only claim
To recover for negligence in
Georgia, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant breached a duty
of care.
Shortnacy v. N. Atlanta Internal Med., P.C., 556 S.E.2d
209, 213 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)(“A plaintiff must come forward with
specific facts establishing a breach of duty [to recover for
negligence].”).
Plaintiffs argue that Eddie breached the duty of
reasonable care imposed under the common law and breached a duty
of
care
established
under
Georgia
statutory
law.
Because
Plaintiffs have alleged a plausible claim for Eddie’s breach of a
statutory duty, Eddie was not fraudulently joined, and remand is
required.
Under Georgia law, “[a] violation of the Uniform Rules of the
Road prima facie establishes negligence per se in the absence of
a valid defense.”
Harden v. Burdette, 420 S.E.2d 626, 628 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1992)(quoting Arnold v. Arnold, 397 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1990)).
“Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
of negligence per se, the ‘burden shifts to the defendant to show
that the violation was unintentional and in the exercise of
ordinary care.’”
Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. v. Shepard, 775
S.E.2d 616, 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)(quoting Harden, 420 S.E.2d at
5
628).
Here, Plaintiffs assert that Eddie violated Georgia’s
general safe vehicle statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7.
prohibits
owners
of
vehicles
from
“caus[ing]
This statute
or
knowingly
permit[ting] to be driven or moved, on any street or highway any
vehicle . . . [w]hich is in such unsafe condition as to endanger
any person.”
O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7(b).
Plaintiffs assert that by
knowingly permitting his grandson to drive his Ford Explorer on
the roads without inspecting his spare tire to ensure that it was
in good condition, Eddie Christian permitted it to be driven or
moved on the streets in an unsafe condition, in violation of the
statute.
Ford and Goodyear argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish
Eddie Christian violated this statute because Plaintiffs do not
assert that Eddie Christian knew his Ford Explorer was in an unsafe
condition.
condition
They argue that knowledge of a vehicle’s defective
is
substantive
requirement.
an
essential
law,
however,
element
does
of
not
the
statute.
clearly
Georgia
establish
this
Ford and Goodyear point to no Georgia case law
interpreting the statute to require knowledge of a vehicle’s
defective condition, and the language of the statute does not
clearly establish such an element.
“Knowingly” in the statute
arguably modifies the word “permit,” not the word “unsafe.”
See,
e.g., Coates v. State, 453 S.E.2d 35, 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
(“[C]rimes relating to equipment and inspection of motor vehicles
6
are violations of strict liability criminal statutes, which means
that although the State must prove that the accused intended to do
the acts or make the omissions that are prohibited, the State does
not have to prove a mental fault.”).
“It is well-settled that
‘[s]tate courts have the right to construe their own statutes.’”
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 667 (11th
Cir. 1984)(quoting Bank of Heflin v. Miles, 621 F.2d 108, 113 (5th
Cir.
1980)).
uncertainties
plaintiff.”
Accordingly,
about
state
the
Court
substantive
law
“must
in
resolve
favor
of
any
the
Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538; see also Florence, 484 F.3d
at 1298-99 (reversing a district court for interpreting a Florida
statute to contain a causation requirement that was not in the
statute’s plain language or Florida case law, noting that “any
ambiguity or doubt about the substantive state law favors remand”
(quoting Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1539)).
Therefore, Ford and Goodyear
have not met their “heavy burden” of showing fraudulent joinder.
Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538.
Ford and Goodyear also argue that the Georgia Court of Appeals
in Almassud v. Mezquital ruled that a lack of knowledge of a
vehicle’s defect is a complete defense to an action for negligence
per se under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7.
2018).
a
811 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. Ct. App.
However, Almassud established no such rule.
plaintiff
O.C.G.A. §
offered
40-8-7,
evidence
among
that
other
7
the
statutes,
In Almassud,
defendant
violated
at
and
trial,
the
defendant offered evidence in rebuttal suggesting that he did not
know his car was defective prior to the accident.
The Georgia
Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant was entitled to a jury
instruction explaining that after a plaintiff establishes the
defendant violated a statute, the defendant has the burden of
producing evidence “to show that the violation was unintentional
and in the exercise of ordinary care.
showing would] be conclusive.”
Otherwise [the prima facie
Id. at 112 (quoting Williams v.
Calhoun, 333 S.E.2d 408, 411 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)(alteration in
original)).
Here, under Almassud, Eddie will be able to offer
evidence at trial to show that his violation of the statute was
unintentional
because
he
was
not
aware
the
spare
tire
was
defective, and he will be entitled to a jury instruction on the
law.
But this does not mean that he will automatically prevail.
Lastly, Ford and Goodyear argue that Eddie did not owe a duty
to inspect his vehicle for defects because he was a gratuitous
bailor.
See Butler v. Shirah, 267 S.E.2d 647, 648 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980)(finding that because the defendant gratuitously loaned his
neighbor a tractor to use on a farm, he did not owe him a duty to
inspect the tractor and discover unknown defects).
However, it is
unclear that the common law gratuitous bailor rule would supersede
an individual’s duties under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-7.
Ford and Goodyear
point to no substantive Georgia law establishing that a defendant’s
status as a gratuitous bailor eliminates
8
his duty under
the
statute.
The
Court
must
resolve
this
uncertainty
regarding
substantive state law in favor of Plaintiffs.
Because Ford and Goodyear
have not met
their burden of
establishing that there is no reasonable possibility Plaintiffs
can recover against Eddie Christian, the Court finds that Eddie
was not fraudulently joined.
Therefore, the Court must remand
this action to the Superior Court of Clay County.
See Crowe, 113
F.3d at 1538 (“When considering a motion for remand, federal courts
are
not
to
weigh
the
merits
of
a
plaintiff’s
claim
beyond
determining whether it is an arguable one under state law.”).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (ECF No. 9)
is granted.
The Clerk is directed to remand this action to the
Superior Court of Clay County, Georgia.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of December, 2018.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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