KATRICE WALKER v. COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT

Filing 22

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 7 Motion for Summary Judgment Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 10/10/2019 (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
KATRICE WALKER,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED
GOVERNMENT,

*

CASE NO. 4:18-CV-184 (CDL)

*
Defendant.
*
O R D E R
Katrice

Walker

is

employed

by

Columbus

Consolidated

Government (“CCG”) in its Department of Public Services (“Public
Works”).

She asserts that CCG denied her a promotion because of

her race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to
2000e-17.

CCG filed a summary judgment motion, asserting that

Walker was not qualified for the promotion and that the white
man

it

promoted

instead

of

Walker

was

more

qualified.

As

discussed below, genuine fact disputes exist on Walker’s Title
VII race discrimination claim, so CCG’s motion (ECF No. 7) is
denied as to that claim.
Walker’s § 1981 claim.

The motion, however, is granted as to
Walker also asserted a Title VII claim

for discrimination based on her color, and CCG moved for summary
judgment on that claim arguing that Walker had not exhausted her
administrative

remedies.

Walker

did

not

respond

to

CCG’s

summary judgment motion on this claim, so the Court deems it
abandoned. Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587,
599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[G]rounds alleged in the complaint but
not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

In determining whether a

genuine

Fed. R.

dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Walker is a black woman who works as a correctional officer
in

CCG’s

degree

in

Public

criminal

administration.
a

firearm

Works

department.

justice

and

a

Walker
master’s

has

a

degree

bachelor’s
in

public

Walker is a certified correctional officer with

certification.

She

2

is

also

certified

as

a

CCG

customer service specialist and holds a CCG HR Supervisory II
certification.
Walker began working for CCG in 2005.

She has served as a

correctional supervisor in the rainwater division; a chemical
application
correctional

technician;
officer

a

at

management investigator.

public

the

relations

recycling

coordinator;

center;

and

a

a

risk

In her correctional officer/supervisor

roles, Walker supervised inmates on work details but did not
supervise CCG employees.

Walker is currently a correctional

supervisor in the rainwater division.
In 2017, the position of community service coordinator came
open.
Works

The community service coordinator supervises the Public
community

service

division,

which

oversees

they complete their community service obligations.

parolees

as

Three full-

time and twelve part-time CCG employees report to the community
service coordinator.

The written job description includes the

following requirements:
1. “Knowledge of record keeping, report preparation,
filing methods, and record management techniques.”
2. “Knowledge of supervisory practices, procedures, and
policies, including training and work inspections.”
3. “Knowledge of standard business arithmetic.”
4. “Knowledge
practices.”

of

basic

budgetary

principles

5. “Skill
in
the
administration
of
activities, both directly and through
supervision.”
3

and

staff
and
subordinate

6. “Bachelor’s
Degree
in
Public
Administration,
required.”

Business
Administration,
or
related
field
is

7. “Experience sufficient to thoroughly understand the
work of subordinate positions and to be able to
answer questions and resolve problems, usually
associated with one to three years[’] experience or
service.”
Walker

Dep.

Ex.

18,

Community

Service

Coordinator

Job

Description, ECF No. 11-1 at 101.
Walker

applied

for

the

community

service

coordinator

position and received an interview with a three-person panel led
by

Public

Works

Director

Pat

Ralph

Blakely,

a

interviewed

Biegler.

white

The

male,

who

panel
was

also

Walker’s

supervisor and had five years of experience as a crew supervisor
in the Public Works rainwater division.
No. 7-2.

Biegler Aff. ¶ 14, ECF

Blakely does not have a college degree.

The interview

panel decided that Blakely was the best candidate based on his
experience

and

interview,

and

Biegler

offered

Blakely

the

community service coordinator position.
After Walker was not selected for the community service
coordinator position, she discussed the issue with Biegler, her
department director, who told Walker that some of her interview
answers

were

unsatisfactory.

Although

Walker

discussed

the

issue with a member of CCG’s human resources department, she did
not

complete

a

“Fair

Treatment”

form

or

further via CCG’s fair treatment procedures.

4

pursue

the

matter

DISCUSSION
I.

Walker’s Title VII Claim
Title

VII

prohibits

employers

from

intentionally

discriminating against an employee based on her race.
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).1
evidence

of

judgment.2

Walker did not point to any direct

discrimination,

circumstantial

evidence

See 42

of

so

she

must

discrimination

present
to

sufficient

survive

summary

She may do that using the framework established in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Under

that framework, the employee must establish a prima facie case
of discrimination.

E.g., Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys.,

408

(11th

F.3d

763,

establishes

a

767
prima

facie

Cir.

2005)

case,

the

(per

curiam).

employer

may

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

If

she

proffer

a

Id.

If

the employer meets its burden, the plaintiff must establish that
the proffered reason was pretextual.

1

Id.

Section 1981 also prohibits employers from engaging in intentional
race discrimination against an employee.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
As
discussed in more detail below, though, the Court grants CCG’s summary
judgment motion as to Walker’s § 1981 claim because Walker did not
point to evidence to establish municipal liability on that claim.
2 Walker contends that CCG’s director of Public Works once stated in
her presence that “if black people stop wanting people to give them
something, they will be better off.”
Walker Dep. 133:8-9.
This
statement is not direct evidence of discrimination because there is no
evidence that it was related to the community service coordinator
decisionmaking process. “Direct evidence is evidence that establishes
the existence of discriminatory intent behind the employment decision
without any inference or presumption.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs.,
Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). “[R]emarks unrelated to
the decisionmaking process itself are not direct evidence of
discrimination.” Id.

5

Walker

may

establish

a

prima

facie

case

of

failure

to

promote by demonstrating that (1) she belonged to a protected
class, (2) she was qualified for and applied for a position her
employer was seeking to fill, (3) she was rejected despite her
qualifications, and (4) the employer filled the position with
someone outside her protected class.
dispute

that

Walker

belongs

to

a

Id. at 768.
protected

CCG does not

class,

that

she

applied for the community service coordinator position, that she
was

rejected,

or

that

it

filled

outside Walker’s protected class.

the

position

with

someone

CCG argues, however, that

although it considered Walker qualified enough to offer her an
interview, Walker was not actually qualified for the position
because

she

did

not

have

one

to

three

years

of

experience

supervising CCG employees; she only had experience supervising
inmates on work details.
CCG

pointed

to

evidence

that

the

Public

Works

director

stated, in an affidavit she prepared to support CCG’s summary
judgment motion, that the community service coordinator “must
have sufficient knowledge and experience – approximately 1 to 3
years – in supervising subordinate employees.”
¶ 6.

But,

the

written

job

description

Biegler Aff.
requires

only

“[k]nowledge of supervisory practices, procedures, and policies,
including

training

administration

of

and
staff

work
and

inspections,”
activities,

6

“[s]kill
both

in

the

directly

and

through subordinate supervision,” and “[e]xperience sufficient
to thoroughly understand the work of subordinate positions and
to be able to answer questions and resolve problems, usually
associated with one to three years[’] experience or service.”
Walker

Dep.

Ex.

18,

Community

Description, ECF No. 11-1 at 101.
genuine

fact

dispute

on

whether

Service

Coordinator

Job

Thus, the Court finds a
the

community

service

coordinator position required one to three years of experience
supervising CCG employees.

Viewed in the light most favorable

to Walker, a jury could conclude that it did not and that Walker
was qualified for the community service coordinator position.
CCG proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision to select Blakely instead of Walker for the community
service coordinator job: Blakely was better qualified because he
had more supervisory experience and a better interview.

Thus,

Walker “must come forward with evidence sufficient to permit a
reasonable fact finder to conclude that the legitimate reasons
given by the employer were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination.”
evidence

must

inconsistencies,

reveal

Vessels, 408 F.3d at 771.

‘such

weaknesses,

incoherencies

or

“This

implausibilities,

contradictions

in

the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a
reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.’”

7

Id. (quoting Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th
Cir. 2004)).
A plaintiff may establish pretext by pointing to evidence
that the employer selected a candidate who was, based on the
employer’s own objective criteria, unqualified for the position
instead of the plaintiff, who was qualified.
Cnty.

Comm’rs,

256

F.3d

1095,

1107–08

See Bass v. Bd. of
(11th

Cir.

2001),

abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v.

White,

548

U.S.

53

(2006)

as

recognized

in

Crawford

v.

Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 971, 973 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that
county’s

hiring

of

an

employee

who

was

unqualified

for

a

position instead of the plaintiff, who was qualified, supported
an inference of discrimination); see also Vessels, 408 F.3d at
772 (finding a genuine fact dispute on pretext where, under the
employer’s own regulations, the position required qualifications
that the selected candidate did not have but the plaintiff did).
Here, Walker pointed to evidence from which a jury could
conclude that she met the objective criteria listed in the job
description.

She also pointed to evidence from which a jury

could conclude that Blakely did not meet the objective criteria
because he did not hold a college degree—a qualification that
was

“required”

description.

by

the

community

service

coordinator

job

Walker Dep. Ex. 18, Community Service Coordinator

Job Description, ECF No. 11-1 at 101.

8

CCG argues, though, that

a college degree was not actually required for the community
service

coordinator

job.

In

support

of

this

argument,

CCG

points to testimony from several decisionmakers, mainly in the
form of affidavits prepared for summary judgment purposes, that
they did not consider a degree to be a requirement for the
community service coordinator job.

But CCG did not point to any

authority which squarely holds that an employer may have an
employee’s discrimination claim summarily dismissed simply by
pointing

to

post-hoc

testimony

by

its

decisionmakers

that

a

written job description doesn’t really mean what it says.
The Court recognizes that some confusion may exist based on
Springer v. Convergys Customer Management Group Inc., 509 F.3d
1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007).

In Springer, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of

an

employer

on

the

plaintiff’s

failure

to

because the plaintiff did not establish pretext.

promote

claim

The plaintiff

attempted to prove pretext by pointing to a job requisition form
which listed a four-year college degree as a job requirement.
The Court of Appeals explained that the “job requisition form”
for

the

position

did

list

a

four-year

college

degree

as

a

requirement, but the hiring director testified that a separate
written “job description” permitted several years of experience

9

as the equivalent of a degree.3

Id.

So, when the employer in

Springer promoted a candidate with significant experience but no
degree over the plaintiff, who had a degree but less experience,
the plaintiff could not establish pretext just by pointing to
the formal requisition form because the separate written job
description said that experience could be substituted for formal
education.
job

Thus, under Springer, where the employer’s written

description

equivalent

of

permits
formal

it

to

consider

education,

its

experience

consideration

as

the

of

such

experience cannot be pretextual.
In

contrast,

here,

the

written

job

description

unequivocally stated that a college degree was required for the
community service coordinator position.

CCG did not point to

any evidence that the job description was supplemented by a
separate document permitting experience in lieu of education or
that

CCG

equally

had

an

official

candidates

education,

training,

who
and

policy
had

an

that

equivalent

experience,

official job description required.

permitted

it

to

weigh

combination

regardless

of

what

of
the

Thus, a genuine conflict

exists between the written job description and the testimony of
some of CCG’s employees that a college degree wasn’t really
required

notwithstanding

the

unambiguous

3

statement

of

the

The Court of Appeals and the district court did not spend much time
discussing the “job requisition form” and the “job description,” but
the district court records available on PACER suggest that these were
two separate documents.

10

requirement

in

the

qualifications.

only

written

description

of

the

job

The Court emphasizes that it does not find

today that the community service coordinator position actually
required

a

college

degree,

minimum

qualifications

that

for

Blakely

the

failed

job,

or

supervising CCG employees was irrelevant.

to

that

meet

the

experience

Rather, the Court

finds that Walker pointed to evidence that, with all reasonable
inferences construed in her favor, would allow a reasonable jury
to conclude that CCG engineered the process to favor Blakely,
who

was

white,

over

Walker,

who

was

black,

by

adding

an

unwritten requirement that Walker did not have but Blakely did
and deleting a written requirement that Blakely did not have but
Walker

did.4

Accordingly,

CCG

is

not

entitled

to

summary

judgment on Walker’s Title VII claim.
II.

Walker’s § 1981 Claim
CCG

claims

that

even

if

Walker’s

Title

VII

race

discrimination claim survives summary judgment, her § 1981 claim
cannot because the promotion decision was subject to meaningful
administrative

review

that

Walker

4

did

not

pursue.

Walker

The Court also emphasizes that this is not a comparative
qualifications case, where a plaintiff can only establish pretext by
showing that there were such significant disparities between her
qualifications and those of the selected candidate that no reasonable
person could have chosen the selected candidate over the plaintiff.
Rather, the Court finds that Walker met her burden of establishing
pretext by pointing to evidence from which a jury could find that
Blakely was not qualified for the community service coordinator
position based on CCG’s own objective criteria.

11

brought her § 1981 claim against CCG through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To

prevail

on

this

claim,

Walker

must

demonstrate

that

the

promotion decision was the result of a CCG custom, practice, or
policy.

See Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399

(11th Cir. 1997). “[M]unicipal liability may be imposed for a
single

decision

by

municipal

policymakers

under

appropriate

circumstances.” Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 480 (1986)).

But, “[f]inal policymaking authority

over a particular subject area does not vest in an official
whose

decisions

in

the

area

are

administrative review.” Id. at 1401.
the

Court

is

whether

the

Public

subject

to

meaningful

So, the key question for
Works

director’s

promotion

decision was subject to meaningful administrative review.
Under CCG’s Fair Treatment policy, employees who believe
that they have been subjected to unlawful discrimination based
on race may pursue a written complaint.

Walker Dep. Ex. 7, Fair

Treatment Policy, ECF No. 11-1 at 67-69.

To seek review under

this policy, an employee must complete a Fair Treatment form and
submit it to her department director.

Id., ECF No. 11-1 at 69.

If the department director does not resolve the complaint, then
the employee should escalate the issue to the human resources
director, who may “propose alternate solutions or suggestions on
appropriate and acceptable alternatives.”
resources

director

does

not

resolve

12

the

Id.

If the human

complaint,

then

the

employee

may

seek

review

by

the

city

manager,

who,

“at

his

option, will confer with appropriate individuals, review fair
treatment

procedure

documentation,

and

communicate

decision through the Human Resources Director.”

Id.

a

final

The Public

Works department is under the deputy city manager of operations,
who reports to the city manager.5
18-6.

Hollowell Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No.

Because the Fair Treatment Policy permits a CCG employee

to escalate complaints of alleged discrimination to the city
manager, who has the power to override an employment decision by
one of his subordinates like the Public Works director, the Fair
Treatment

Policy

provides

meaningful

administrative

review.

Thus, the Public Works director did not have final policymaking
authority

over

the

promotion

decision,

and

the

Court

grants

CCG’s summary judgment motion as to Walker’s § 1981 claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies CCG’s
summary judgment motion (ECF No. 7) on Walker’s Title VII race
discrimination claim.

The Court grants CCG’s summary judgment

5

Walker objects to this affidavit because it was part of CCG’s
supplemental evidence.
The Court permitted CCG to supplement the
record with additional affidavits.
The Court understands that new
evidence is not normally permitted to support a reply brief. That is
why the Court gave Walker an opportunity to respond to it with her own
evidence and argument.
Walker argues that she cannot respond to
paragraph 6 of Hollowell’s affidavit without more discovery, but it is
disingenuous to suggest that Walker had no opportunity to learn about
CCG’s organizational structure or Fair Treatment Policy during
discovery.

13

motion on Walker’s § 1981 claim and her Title VII claim for
discrimination based on her color.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 10th day of October, 2019.
s/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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