WILLIAMS v. COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 25

ORDER granting 23 Motion for Summary Judgment Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 05/09/2022 (CCL)

Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
THOMAS WILLIAMS,

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

NATHAN TOOLEY,

*

Defendant.

CASE NO. 4:20-CV-215 (CDL)

*
O R D E R

A

Columbus

Williams

for

Police

driving

Department
without

officer

headlights

pulled

over

Thomas

illuminated.

The

officer requested backup, and Columbus Police Corporal Nathan
Tooley responded to the scene.

Tooley conducted a warrantless

search of Williams’s vehicle and found a gun and ammunition.
Williams
firearm.

was

arrested

for

being

a

felon

in

possession

of

a

In the criminal action against him, Williams filed a

motion to suppress evidence of the gun and ammunition.

The

Court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that, although
the

initial

stop

of

Williams’s

vehicle

was

legal,

Tooley’s

warrantless search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Williams, 409 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1342 (M.D. Ga.
2019).

After the criminal action against him was dismissed,

Williams brought this pro se action against Tooley, alleging
various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the warrantless

Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 2 of 9

search and the arrest.
claims against him.

Tooley now seeks summary judgment on all

For the reasons set forth below, Tooley’s

motion (ECF No. 23) is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

In determining whether a

Fed. R.

genuine dispute of

material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in
the opposing party’s favor.
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
A fact is material if it is relevant

or necessary to the outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Id.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
There are no disputes about the facts.1

Around midnight on

October 25, 2018, Williams was driving his girlfriend’s vehicle
in a high crime area in Columbus, Georgia with the headlights
off.

A Columbus police officer initiated a traffic stop and

Tooley’s statement of facts is supported mostly by the transcript
from the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress in the criminal
case and by the Court’s order on the motion to suppress. Williams did
not respond to the summary judgment motion or to the statement of
material facts.
1

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Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 3 of 9

called for backup.

The officer asked if she could search the

car, and Williams declined.
Williams’s license.

The officer ran a license check of

It did not reveal any outstanding warrants,

but it did disclose that Williams was a known gang member who
should be considered armed and dangerous.
Tooley, a police corporal, arrived on the scene while the
other officer was processing the traffic citation.

He decided

to run Williams’s name through the city’s database to find out
whether

Williams

permits

was

warrantless

under

a

Fourth

searches

Amendment

under

certain

waiver,

which

circumstances.

Tooley discovered that Williams was on parole and probation for
state felony offenses, and Tooley saw the notation “Fourth Amd.”
next to one of Williams’s prior convictions.

Tooley did not

have access to a copy of the waiver—just the shorthand notation.
Based on the notation, Tooley decided to search the vehicle.
During

the

search,

the

officers

extra magazines, and ammunition.

discovered

a

stolen

pistol,

After the officers discovered

the gun and ammunition, they arrested Williams for being a felon
in possession of a firearm.
Williams was prosecuted in this Court for being a felon in
possession

of

a

firearm,

evidence of the gun.

and

he

filed

a

motion

to

suppress

The Court held a hearing and found that as

a condition of his state parole on a prior forgery conviction,
Williams

agreed,

in

writing,

that

3

his

“community

supervision

Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 4 of 9

officer or any other community supervision officer may, at any
time, conduct a warrantless search of [his] person, papers, and
place

of

residence,

[his] control.”

automobile,

or

any

other

property

under

Williams, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (quoting

Gov’t Ex. 4, Parole Order 2, ECF No. 18-2 in 4:19-CR-26 (M.D.
Ga.)).

At the hearing, Tooley testified that he did not have

access to the waiver, but if he had read the entire waiver, he
would

have

concluded

that

a

police

officer

“fall[s]

under . . . community supervision just as much as a probation
officer,” and he believed “it would’ve given [him] the ability
to search [Williams’s] vehicle.”
104:5-16,

ECF

No.

22

in

Mot. to Suppress Hr’g Tr.

4:19-CR-26

(M.D.

Ga.).

The

Court

concluded that the waiver only permitted “certain warrantless
searches

by

an

employee

of

the

Department

of

Community

Supervision who supervises parolees” and that Williams “had no
reasonable expectation that a patrol officer employed by the
city police department could conduct a suspicionless search of
his car during an investigative Terry stop.”
Supp. 3d at 1348.

Williams, 409 F.

Accordingly, the warrantless, suspicionless

search was not permitted under the Fourth Amendment.
1349.

Id. at

And evidence of the firearm was suppressed, resulting in

dismissal of the federal charges.

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Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 5 of 9

DISCUSSION
Williams brings § 1983 claims against Tooley based on the
warrantless search of the car and the arrest.
the

Fourth,

Fifth,

Eighth,

bases for his claims.

and

Fourteenth

Williams invokes
Amendments

as

the

Obviously, his present claims implicate

only the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits warrantless searches
and arrests except in certain circumstances.

Tooley asserts

that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim arising
out of the search and that the claim arising out of the arrest
fails because the arrest was supported by probable cause.
I.

Claim Arising Out of the Search
“Qualified

performing
individual

immunity

discretionary
capacities

established

statutory

protects
functions

unless
or

their

government
from

reasonable person would have known.”

suits

conduct

constitutional

officials
in

violates

rights

of

their
clearly

which

a

Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d

1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d
991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003)).

There is no dispute that Tooley was

a public official performing a discretionary function when he
participated

in

the

vehicle

search.

The

Court

already

determined that the search of the vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment.

Williams, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1346-49.

The remaining

question, therefore, is whether the search violated a “clearly
established” right—a right so well established “that that every

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Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 6 of 9

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.”

Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Reichle

v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).
It has long been clearly established that a warrantless,
suspicionless search violates the Fourth Amendment.

But it is

also clear that a suspicionless search of a parolee does not
violate

the

Fourth

Amendment

if

unambiguous Fourth Amendment waiver.
3d

at

1346

(2006)).

(citing

Samson

v.

the

parolee

executed

an

See Williams, 409 F. Supp.

California,

547

U.S.

843,

846

In this case, Tooley knew that Williams was a parolee

who had executed some type of Fourth Amendment waiver.

The

Court, which had access to a copy of the Fourth Amendment waiver
that Williams signed, concluded that the text of the waiver did
not

clearly

and

unambiguously

inform

Williams

that

subject to warrantless searches without any cause.
The

Court

also

noted

that

the

waiver

he

was

Id. at 1348.

restricted

warrantless

searches of Williams to “community supervision officers,” the
specific meaning of which is defined in a Georgia statute.

Id.

Thus, the Court concluded that Williams’s “condition of release
[did] not so diminish or eliminate his reasonable expectation of
privacy

that

the

suspicionless

search

of

his

car

under

the

circumstances presented here may be permitted under the Fourth
Amendment.”

Id. at 1349.

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Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 7 of 9

There is no dispute, however, that Tooley believed based on
the “Fourth Amd.” notation in the city’s database that Williams
had signed a Fourth Amendment waiver (which he had).

There is

also no dispute that Tooley could not access the actual Fourth
Amendment waiver but believed, based on his experience as a
police officer, that the database notation meant that Williams
had executed a Fourth Amendment waiver which would allow any law
enforcement officer—not just parole officers—to conduct a search
pursuant to the waiver.

Under these circumstances, the Court

cannot find that every reasonable officer faced with the same
information would have known that Williams’s Fourth Amendment
waiver did not permit a police officer to conduct a search of
Williams’s vehicle.

Cf. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54,

68 (2014) (concluding that an officer’s reasonable mistake of
the law resulted in reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic
stop).

Therefore, it was not clearly established on October 25,

2018 that a search of Williams’s vehicle under the circumstances
presented here would violate the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly,

Tooley is entitled to qualified immunity on unreasonable search
claim.
II.

Claim Arising Out of the Arrest
Turning to Williams’s claim based on the arrest, there is

no question that a “warrantless arrest without probable cause
violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis for a section

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Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 8 of 9

1983 claim.”
Cir.

Carter v. Butts Cnty., 821 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th

2016) (quoting

(11th

Cir.

Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525

1996)).

“But

where

probable

cause

supports

an

arrest, it acts as ‘an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for
false arrest.’” Id. (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382
F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004)).
exists

if

‘the

facts

and

“Probable cause to arrest

circumstances

within

the

officer’s

knowledge, of which he has reasonably trustworthy information,
would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances
shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense.’” Id. (quoting Kingsland, 382 F.3d
at 1226).
Here, at the time of Williams’s arrest, Tooley knew from
his database search that Williams was a convicted felon.

He

also knew that he had found a gun under Williams’s seat in the
vehicle Williams was driving.
Tooley’s

position

could

Thus, a reasonable officer in

believe

that

Williams

possessed a firearm in violation of Georgia law.
§ 16-11-131
felons).

(prohibiting

possession

of

firearms

illegally

See O.C.G.A.
by

convicted

The fact that the firearm was discovered during an

illegal search does not eliminate this probable cause under the
circumstances
prohibits

the

presented
admission

here.
of

The

evidence

exclusionary
discovered

rule,
during

which
in

an

illegal search in a criminal action, “does not apply in a civil

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Case 4:20-cv-00215-CDL Document 25 Filed 05/09/22 Page 9 of 9

suit against police officers.”
1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2016)

Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d

(emphasis added).

Thus, Tooley

could rely on the firearm discovered in the vehicle to establish
probable

cause.

This

probable

cause

is

an

absolute

Williams’s Fourth Amendment claim based on the arrest.

bar

to

Tooley

is thus entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, Tooley’s summary judgment motion (ECF
No. 23) is granted in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 9th day of May, 2022.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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