CHRISTIAN et al v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Filing 70

ORDER denying 25 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 35 Motion to Strike 25 MOTION for Summary Judgment, 35 MOTION to Strike Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 12/20/2023 (CCL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
FELICIA CHRISTIAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

*
*

vs.

*

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

*

Defendant.

*

CASE NO. 4:22-CV-62 (CDL)

O R D E R
Presently pending before the Court are Ford Motor Company’s
summary judgment motion and Plaintiffs’ motion to strike evidence.
As discussed below, both motions (ECF Nos. 25 & 35) are denied.
The Court will address Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Ford’s notice
of non-party fault (ECF No. 60) in a separate order.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).

Fed. R. Civ.

In determining whether a genuine dispute of material

fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment,

drawing

party’s favor.
(1986).

all

justifiable

inferences

in

the

opposing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the

outcome of the suit.

Id. at 248.

A factual dispute is genuine if

the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.

Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the record
reveals the following facts.1

This action is about a 2001 P207

Ford Explorer Sport Trac, which was manufactured by Ford Motor
Company and first sold as new in 2000.

Ford’s target understeer

gradient for the Sport Trac was 2.4 deg/g, which made it more
susceptible to loss of control and rollover than vehicles with
higher understeer gradients.

Testing of at least one Sport Trac

in December 2000 revealed a much lower understeer gradient of 1.5
deg/g for the test vehicle, which made it even more susceptible to

1

Ford argues that its evidence establishes that the Sport Trac was
adequately designed. At trial, the jury may not resolve all the genuine
fact disputes in Plaintiffs’ favor, but at the summary judgment stage,
the Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs.
Ford also argues that the Court should not consider certain
evidence, including (1) a 1981 Ford engineering report regarding the
Bronco II, (2) the “Chamberlain document,” and (3) a report by Dennis
Guenther. Ford contends that the “Chamberlain document” is inadmissible
hearsay, but it is clear that Plaintiffs offer it to prove notice, so
the Court may consider it. Ford argues that the 1981 document regarding
the Bronco II and the Guenther report are irrelevant in part because
those documents report on testing of vehicles other than the Sport Trac,
but Plaintiffs’ experts relied on those documents on the issue of Ford’s
knowledge of how stability influences rollover propensity; such reliance
is permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 703. In its reply brief,
Ford challenges Guenther’s methodology and suggests that Plaintiffs’
experts should not have relied on any portion of the report, but Ford
did not file a motion to exclude the opinions of Larry Wilson, who
appears to rely on a small portion of data from the Guenther report.
Based on the present record, the Court declines to exclude Wilson’s
opinions, including those informed by the Guenther report.

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rollover.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, testing of several mid-

size sport utility vehicles showed that tested vehicles with an
understeer gradient of less than 2.4 deg/g went into oversteer
during a rear tire tread separation.

Ford knew of these issues

before the Sport Trac at issue here was first sold as new.

Ford

also knew before the Sport Trac at issue here was first sold that
drivers facing an oversteer situation often lose control of their
vehicles and that this risk can be mitigated by increasing the
understeer gradient. Additional testing in 2003 showed that nearly
all drivers lost control of their vehicles during a rear tire
separation if the understeer gradient was 2.4 deg/g or lower. Ford
did not issue any warnings about these issues for the Sport Trac,
nor did it warn of the increased risk of tread separation with
aging tires.
Ford knew before 2001 that a vehicle occupant wearing a
seatbelt could hit the roof during a rollover crash.

Despite

knowing of the rollover risk, Ford did not conduct dynamic rollover
testing on the 2001 Sport Trac to determine how the roof would
hold up in a real-world rollover crash.

When Ford was testing the

P207 Sport Trac, it did do a crush certification test, which
revealed that the vehicle did not meet the minimum roof strengthto-weight ratio requirement (1.5) based on the original weight
parameters

Ford’s

engineers

used

and

would

only

meet

the

requirement if the maximum unloaded vehicle weight was reduced by

3

100 pounds.

According to Plaintiffs’ expert, the P207 Sport Trac,

as designed and manufactured, experienced a total collapse of the
roof

structure

over

the

occupant

compartment

during

designed to simulate a real-world rollover.
elements

were

reinforced,

the

roof

crush

testing

But if certain
would

have

been

significantly reduced. Ford did not issue any warnings about these
issues for the Sport Trac.
Eddie Christian owned the Sport Trac at issue here. He loaned
it to his grandson Jalin Lawson.

In 2016, Eddie bought three new

tires for the Sport Trac and had Farmer’s Tire Center mount those
tires on the Sport Trac.

Eddie thought that the Sport Trac’s spare

tire “looked new,” so he had Farmer’s mount it, too.
Dep.

25:18-21,

ECF

No.

31.

The

spare

was

a

Christian

Goodyear

tire

manufactured in 2001, and it was mounted as the right rear tire on
the Sport Trac.

Although Ford knew that tires that are six-plus

years old are susceptible to tire tread separation, Ford did not
provide a warning of this hazard with the 2001 Sport Trac.

In

2006, based on its research about dangers of tread separation
associated with tire aging, Ford began recommending that Ford
owners replace their tires after six years.

Ford did not warn

owners of pre-2006 Ford models to take older tires out of service.
Christian did not know that an older tire that looks new could
still have problems with tread separation.

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If he had known, he

would not have had the spare tire mounted on the Sport Trac, and
he would not have let Jalin drive the vehicle.
On May 14, 2017, Jalin was driving Eddie’s Sport Trac.

The

right rear tire (the 2001 Goodyear) separated, Jalin lost control
of the vehicle, and the vehicle rolled over four times before
coming to rest on its roof.

Jalin was killed in the crash, and

his passenger, Jullia Morris, was injured. Jalin’s mother, Felicia
Christian, and Morris brought a strict liability and negligence
action against Ford, Goodyear, Farmer’s, and Eddie Christian in
the Superior Court of Clay County on December 12, 2017 and served
Ford on December 19, 2017.

The Clay County court granted summary

judgment in favor of Goodyear and denied Ford’s summary judgment
motion.

Plaintiffs dismissed that action without prejudice and

timely filed this renewal action against Ford only on March 23,
2022.

Plaintiffs now assert claims for negligent design and

failure to warn.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs claim that Ford negligently designed the 2001 P207
Sport Trac because (1) the Sport Trac had a low understeer gradient
that made the vehicle difficult to control in the event of a rear
tire tread separation and (2) the Sport Trac was top heavy and
prone to roll over yet did not have a sufficiently strong roof to
prevent collapse and serious injury in the event of a rollover
crash.

Plaintiffs also assert that Ford did not adequately warn

5

consumers of these risks, including the risk of rollover crashes
caused by the failure of an older tire.
I.

The Negligent Design Claim
Ford argues that Plaintiffs’ negligent design claim is barred

by Georgia’s statute of repose for product liability cases.2
general,

no

product

liability

action

(including

a

In

negligence

action) may be commenced “after ten years from the date of the
first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing
or otherwise bringing about the injury.” O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2),
(c). But the statute of repose does not apply to negligence claims
“arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or
wanton disregard for life or property.”

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(c).

The statute of repose does not “relieve a manufacturer from the
duty to warn of a danger arising from use of a product once that
danger becomes known to the manufacturer.”

Id.

Conduct manifests willful disregard for life or property if
it involves “an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury.”
Ford Motor Co. v. Cosper, 893 S.E.2d 106, 111 (Ga. 2023) (quoting
Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1994)). Conduct
manifests wanton disregard for life or property if it “is so
reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences as to
be the equivalent in spirit to actual intent.”

2

Georgia law applies in this diversity action.

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Id. (quoting

Batten, 450 S.E.2d at 212).

Reckless disregard for life or

property is a third “standalone exception to the statute of
repose.”

Id. at 114.

Conduct manifests reckless disregard if

“the actor intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which
it is his duty to the other to do,” while knowing or having reason
to know of “facts which would lead a reasonable person to realize
that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of
harm to another's life or property but also involves a high degree
of probability that substantial harm will result to the other’s
life or property.”

Id. at 118–19.

Ford argues that the “willful and wanton standard” is not met
here.

Ford relies on authority establishing that the “willful and

wanton”

standard

cannot

be

met

if

the

undisputed

evidence

demonstrates that the product “performed well” on multiple tests
required by regulators, if there was no real dispute that the
manufacturer “expended considerable effort to ensure that its
product was within the guidelines considered by the industry and
manufacturers at the time[,]” and if the only evidence of design
problems is after-the-fact expert opinion.

Ivy v. Ford Motor Co.,

646 F.3d 769, 777 (11th Cir. 2011).
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, as the Court must do at this stage in the litigation,
a jury could conclude that Ford knew (1) the Sport Trac’s target
understeer

gradient

was

low,

(2)

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vehicles

with

comparable

understeer

gradients

went

into

oversteer

during

a

rear

tire

separation, (3) drivers facing oversteer very often lose control
of their vehicles, which can lead to rollover crashes, (4) presale testing of a Sport Trac revealed an even worse understeer
gradient than the already low target for at least one exemplar of
the manufactured product, (5) the loss-of-control and rollover
risks can be mitigated by increasing the understeer gradient, (6)
pre-sale testing of the Sport Trac did not include dynamic rollover
testing despite the vehicle’s increased risk of rollovers, and (7)
pre-sale testing of the Sport Trac found an inadequate strengthto-weight ratio for the roof and that the minimum 1.5 standard
would only be met if the maximum unloaded vehicle weight was
reduced by 100 pounds.

In light of this evidence, the Court finds

that genuine fact disputes exist on whether Ford acted with
willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property in the
design of the 2001 P207 Sport Trac.

Accordingly, Ford is not

entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of repose.

For

the same reason, Ford is not entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim.
Ford also contends that roof crash tests of a Chevrolet
Malibu, a Ford Crown Victoria, a Chevrolet Blazer, and an Isuzu
Rodeo establish that head and neck injuries to vehicle occupants
in rollover crashes occur before the roof collapses, so Plaintiffs
cannot establish that any negligent design of the roof caused

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Jalin’s death.3

But Plaintiffs presented evidence that Jalin’s

injury would not have been fatal if his occupant survival space
had been better preserved.

Accordingly, genuine fact disputes

preclude summary judgment on this issue.
II.

The Failure to Warn Claim
In

addition

to

their

negligent

design

claim,

Plaintiffs

assert that Ford did not adequately warn Sport Trac users about
(1) the risk of oversteer and rollover during a tire separation or
(2) the risk of separation when using an old tire.

In Georgia, a

manufacturer must warn users of “nonobvious foreseeable dangers
from the normal use of its products.”

Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc.

v.

Ct.

Johns,

830

S.E.2d

549,

557

(Ga.

App.

2019)

(quoting

CertainTeed Corp. v. Fletcher, 794 S.E.2d 641, 645 (Ga. 2016)).
This duty is continuing; the “duty to warn arises whenever the
manufacturer knows or reasonably should know of the danger arising
from the use of its product.” Batten, 450 S.E.2d at 211.
Ford

argues

that

failure-to-warn

claims

based

on

Ford’s

failure to warn of the oversteer and rollover risks associated

3

Plaintiffs contend that the “Malibu” and “CRIS” studies are
inadmissible because the tested vehicles are not substantially similar
to the Sport Trac and because the crash test dummies were not positioned
or restrained the way a human occupant would be.
It is the Court’s
understanding that the studies examined what happens to an occupant
during a rollover crash and that Ford’s expert relied on the studies to
opine that Jalin more likely than not sustained a fatal head injury
before the Sport Trac’s roof collapsed, so a reinforced roof would not
have made a difference to his injuries. Based on the present record,
the Court declines to exclude those studies, so Plaintiffs’ current
motion to strike them (ECF No. 35) is denied.

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with tire separation are merely repackaged design defect claims
and that a finding of no design defect disposes of such claims.
But, as discussed above, genuine fact disputes exist on whether
Ford negligently designed the Sport Trac.

Ford contends that even

if this claim is a proper failure-to-warn claim, Plaintiffs did
not identify a risk that could be reduced with a proper warning.
But they did: Plaintiffs’ warnings experts opine that Ford—despite
knowing of the Sport Trac’s oversteer and rollover hazards, despite
providing a general warning about the risk of rollover on the Sport
Trac’s visor that implied rollovers could be prevented by not
driving recklessly, and despite understanding the best way for a
driver

to

respond

to

an

oversteer

situation—never

provided

specific warnings of how to mitigate loss of control or minimize
the rollover risk.

These fact disputes create a jury question on

this claim.
Ford also argues that it had no duty to warn of the dangers
associated with using aging tires on its vehicle because it did
not manufacture the tire.4

Relying on Davis v. John Crane, Inc.,

4

Ford points out that the Clay County superior court judge concluded
that Goodyear was not required to warn of dangers with its aging tire
because of the learned intermediary doctrine. The superior court judge
reasoned that since the tire installer knew of the risks but installed
the old spare tire anyway, Goodyear’s failure to warn could not be a
but-for cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.
Ford argues that this ruling
means that Ford should not have an obligation to warn of dangers
associated with the tire. Of course, the superior court judge determined
that Ford had a duty to warn of dangers associated with the Sport Trac,
including dangers of driving the vehicle with old tires.

10

Ford emphasizes that, in general, a manufacturer is not required
“to warn of the hazards in another manufacturer’s product.”
S.E.2d 577, 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).

836

In Davis, a boiler operator

was injured when he used asbestos-containing replacement parts to
repair a boiler.

Id. at 580.

Those replacement parts did contain

warnings that they contained asbestos.

Id. at 581-82.

operator

claim

pursued

a

failure-to-warn

against

The boiler
the

pump

manufacturer, arguing that it was foreseeable that the pump might
require

asbestos-containing

replacement

parts

made

by

third

parties and that the pump manufacturer should have warned of the
hazards of asbestos.

Id. at 583-84.

But there was no evidence

that the boiler operator was exposed to asbestos contained in the
original pump, and the evidence showed that while the pumps could
operate with replacement parts that did not contain asbestos, the
operator’s employer elected to use third-party replacement parts
that did contain asbestos (which the third-party manufacturer
warned about).

Id.

So, although it was foreseeable that some

third-party replacement parts might contain asbestos, the pump
manufacturer was not required to warn of the risks of asbestos in
those products.

Id.

In summary, the Davis court found no duty to

warn about dangers in third-party replacement parts where (1) the
replacement parts did not render the manufacturer’s product more
dangerous and (2) not all replacement parts contained the hazard
for which a warning was sought.

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The

record

here,

though,

reveals

a

different

landscape.

Unlike in Davis, the issue is not simply whether Ford should warn
of a potential defect in a possible replacement part that might be
used with one of its products. Rather, the present record suggests
that every tire is susceptible to deterioration over time and that
old tires decrease the safety of Ford’s products.

Moreover,

Plaintiffs’ claim is that Ford failed to warn of dangers with its
product—the Sport Trac—and that users should not use Ford’s product
with old tires because Ford’s product was susceptible to oversteer
and rollover in the event of tire separation.

Accordingly, the

Court rejects Ford’s argument that because it is not a tire
manufacturer, it had no obligation to warn users of the dangers of
using its product with old tires.
Finally, Ford argues that because there is no evidence that
Jalin

or

Eddie

read

the

owner’s

manual

for

the

Sport

Trac,

Plaintiffs cannot establish causation for their failure-to-warn
claims.

Ford points out that where a plaintiff makes a claim based

on the inadequacy of the content of a warning but failed to read
the allegedly inadequate warning, “the adequacy of the warning’s
contents cannot be a proximate cause of the . . . injuries.”
Camden Oil Co. v. Jackson, 609 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
Here, though, Plaintiffs’ claim is not that Ford provided an
inadequate

warning

of

the

specific

dangers

underlying

their

claims, but that Ford did not provide any warnings of these dangers

12

at all, in the manual or otherwise.

In this type of case, where

Plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of the manufacturer’s efforts
“to communicate the dangers of the product to the buyer or user,”
failure to read a product manual does not bar recovery.

Key Safety

Sys., Inc. v. Bruner, 780 S.E.2d 389, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 460 S.E.2d 532, 534 (Ga.
Ct.

App.

1995)).

Moreover,

genuine

fact

disputes

exist

on

causation because Plaintiffs presented evidence that Eddie would
have modified his behavior if Ford had adequately communicated a
warning by (1) not having the spare tire mounted on the Sport Trac
and (2) not letting Jalin drive the vehicle.

For all these

reasons, Ford is not entitled to summary judgment on the failureto-warn claims.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, Ford’s summary judgment motion (ECF No.
25) is denied, as is Plaintiffs’ motion to strike certain evidence
(ECF No. 35).

The Court will address Plaintiffs’ motion to strike

Ford’s notice of non-party fault (ECF No. 60) in a separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 20th day of December, 2023.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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