HORRY v. TRIPLETT et al

Filing 45

ORDER granting 42 Motion for Joinder. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 42 MOTION for Joinder. Ordered by US MAGISTRATE JUDGE AMELIA G HELMICK on 9/24/2024. (mlb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
DARREL HORRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CERT OFFICER TRIPLETT,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:23-cv-123-CDL-AGH

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
On June 27, 2024, the Court received Plaintiff’s Motion to Show Good Cause
Defendant is Evading Service. ECF No. 42. Therein, Plaintiff seeks leave to join
Deputy Warden Thomas as a defendant in this case. Plaintiff claims that Thomas
lied about Defendant Triplett’s military deployment so that Defendant Triplett could
evade personal service. Thomas should thus be joined as “a punishment.” Further,
Plaintiff claims Thomas is Defendant’s supervisor and knew that the “strip search
procedure is illegal[.]” Id. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
request to join Thomas as a defendant, but recommends dismissal of that claim upon
a preliminary review.
I.

Standard for permissive joinder
Permissive joinder, such as Plaintiff requests here, is governed by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 20(a). Under Rule 20(a), a plaintiff must
demonstrate two prerequisites in order to permissively join a party:
first, the claims against the party to be joined must “aris[e] out of the
same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,”

and second, there must be some question of law or fact common to all
parties to be joined.
Vanover v. NCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 857 F.3d 833, 839 (11th Cir. 2017) (alteration in
original) (quoting Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000)
overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Although joinder is “strongly encouraged[,]” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966), “district courts have ‘broad discretion to join parties or not
and that decision will not be overturned as long as it falls within the district court’s
range of choices.’” Vanover, 857 F.3d at 839 (quoting Swan v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252,
1253 (11th Cir. 2002)).
II.

Plaintiff’s request for joinder
As best the Court can tell, Plaintiff seeks to join Deputy Warden Thomas to

assert that Thomas should be held liable for Defendant Triplett’s actions by virtue of
being Triplett’s supervisor. Pl.’s Mot. for Joinder, ECF No. 42. Plaintiff states that
Thomas should be joined as a defendant because Thomas assisted Defendant Triplett
in evading service.

Id.

As explained directly above, however, there are rules

governing joinder; an individual cannot otherwise be joined as a party to a matter
merely as a sanction for a perceived wrong. Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request
to join Thomas as “a punishment.”
However, liberally construing Plaintiff’s motion, it appears that Plaintiff is
attempting to assert a claim against Thomas that may arise out of the same
transaction or occurrences as alleged against Defendant Triplett.

In his recast

complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Triplett conducted a strip search in a
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sexually harassing manner. Recast Compl. Attach. 1 at 8, ECF No. 8-1. In his motion
for joinder, Plaintiff contends that Thomas “gives the orders and sets procedure for
staff on the pat down search.” Pl.’s Mot. for Joinder. Thus, construing Plaintiff’s
allegations liberally, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim against Thomas that arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence as alleged against Defendant Triplett.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for joinder (ECF No. 42) to the
extent he alleges a claim against Thomas arising out of the same occurrence as
alleged against Defendant Triplett.
III.

Preliminary review of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Thomas
Having joined Thomas in this matter, the Court must screen the claim asserted

against him because the Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF Nos. 1, 6). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), after a court grants
a plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP, the court “shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” An action is
frivolous when the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Additionally, “[a] case is frivolous if
the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless,’ or if it is based on an ‘indisputably
meritless’ legal theory.” Johnson v. Wilbur, 375 F. App’x 960, 963 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)).

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A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion
[of] a legally cognizable right of action[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (second alteration
in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id.
at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff contends that Thomas is Defendant Triplett’s supervisor. Pl.’s Mot.
for Joinder. Supervisory officials are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis
of respondeat superior or supervisory liability. Supervisors are liable under § 1983
only if they personally participate in the constitutional violation, direct their
subordinates to act unlawfully, or know their subordinates will act unlawfully but
fail to stop them. Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010); see
also Asad v. Crosby, 158 F. App’x 166, 170-72 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming district
court’s dismissal of supervisory liability claims against two defendants because the
record failed to show that they “personally participated in the alleged constitutional
violations, or that there was a causal connection between the supervisory defendants’
actions and an alleged constitutional violation.”).

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As the Court previously explained to Plaintiff, see ECF No. 24 at 5, a causal
connection can be established if
(1) “a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on
notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he fail[ed] to do
so”; (2) “the supervisor’s improper custom or policy le[d] to deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights”; or (3) “facts support an inference
that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew
that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from
doing so.”
Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original)
(citation omitted).

“The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his]

individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Id.
While Plaintiff alleges that Thomas gives orders and sets the procedures for
pat down searches, Plaintiff has not articulated any facts establishing a history of
similar acts at the prison or that Thomas maintained an improper custom or policy
with regard to pat down searches. See Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947,
958 (11th Cir. 2019) (prisoner failed to state supervisory liability claim where he
failed to “point to other instances” of unconstitutional conduct or allege any facts
concerning the policies or customs that led to constitutional violations). Plaintiff also
does not allege facts sufficient to show that Thomas directed Defendant Triplett to
act unlawfully or knew Defendant Triplett would do so and failed to stop him. At
most, Plaintiff states that Thomas gives orders and sets procedures for pat down
searches.

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are therefore insufficient to show a

colorable supervisory liability claim against Thomas.

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As a result, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claim against Deputy Warden Thomas be
DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written
objection to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections,
within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection
should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4.
The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
Recommendation to which objection is made.

All other portions of the

Recommendation must be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the
absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED, this 24th day of September, 2024.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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