Jackson v. Stevens et al

Filing 108

ORDER denying 92 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting Report and Recommendations re 100 Report and Recommendations. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 2/11/2010. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA M AC O N DIVISION T O N Y JACKSON, P la i n t i f f , v. B R E N D A STEVENS, D e fe n d a n t. ______________________________ : : : : : : : : :

C iv il Action No. 5:07-CV-136 (HL)

ORDER C u rre n tly pending before the Court is the Recommendation of United States M a g is tra te Judge Claude W . Hicks Jr., entered on January 19, 2010 (Doc. 100), in w h ic h he recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 92) filed by D e fe n d a n t , Brenda Stevens, be denied. Defendant has filed an objection to the R e c o m m e n d a tio n (Doc. 106). After de novo consideration of the portions of the R e c o m m e n d a tio n to which objection is made, the Court accepts the

R e c o m m e n d a tio n and denies the Motion for Summary Judgment. A. Subjective Knowledge of a Risk of Serious Harm "A prison official's deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of s e rio u s harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. An Eighth Amendment vio la tio n will occur when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is s u b je c tiv e ly aware, exists and the official does not `respond[ ] reasonably to the ris k .'" Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc)

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1982-83 (1994)) (in te rn a l citation omitted). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must "produce s u f fic ie n t evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants' d e lib e ra te indifference to that risk; and (3) causation." Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 5 0 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).1 To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official " m u s t both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a s u b s ta n tia l risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." F a rm e r, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. In her objection, Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has not established that s h e had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff from Inmate H a rve y. Defendant contends that the "generalized" threat made by Inmate Harvey d o e s not suggest an obvious risk of harm. She also argues that there is no evidence th a t she had been exposed to any knowledge about Harvey to suggest that she s h o u ld have known Harvey would act on his statements or that would be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that she had actual knowledge of the risk. A c c o rd in g to Plaintiff, when he informed Harvey that he was moving into H a rve y's cell, Harvey replied, "No, you're not. I don't want nobody here with me. I to ld the woman ain't nobody coming in here with me. If you come in here, I'm going

Defendant does not dispute the causation element of Plaintiff's claim. A reasonable jury could find that Defendant caused the alleged constitutional violation. The presence of the requisite causation in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is normally a question of fact for the jury. See Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2004). 2

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to try to kill you. I want to be by myself." (Doc. 92-3, p. 7). Defendant heard Harvey m a k e this threat, and scolded him afterwards, telling him to "[s]hut your damn mouth. Y o u don't run anything around here. You don't have the authority to tell somebody w h o come in and come out. You know, who stay in this cell," and "You don't run n o th in g . You going to have a roommate." (Doc. 92-3, p. 11). Plaintiff returned to his c e ll, and about three or four minutes later, Defendant returned with Harvey. D e fe n d a n t then told Harvey that since he did not want anyone in his cell with him, s h e was putting him in Plaintiff's cell. She then said, "I'm quite sure Jackson's not g o in g to bother you, and you're not going to bother Jackson." (Doc. 92-3, p. 7). H a rve y replied, "I told you we ain't going to be able to live together. I'm going to try to fuck you up." (Doc. 92-3, p. 7). Defendant relies on Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003), to s u p p o rt her argument that Harvey's threatening language was not sufficient to put h e r on notice of a substantial risk of harm. In Carter, the plaintiff, who was shanked b y his cellmate, alleged that prison officials had been deliberately indifferent to a s u b s ta n tia l risk of serious harm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's g ra n t of summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the complaints the plaintiff m a d e to the defendants were too vague to show that the defendants had "actual k n o w le d g e " of a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 1350. The specific complaints m a d e by the Carter plaintiff were that the attacker paced his cell like a wild animal, w a n te d to fake a hanging in order to secure a transfer, and told the plaintiff that he 3

would help the attacker carry out the fake hanging "one way or another." Id. at 1349. T h e appellate court expressly relied upon on the facts that the plaintiff never told p ris o n officials that he "feared" the attacker, never told them that he had been "c le a rly threatened," and never asked to be placed in "protective custody" in finding th a t the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants had a subjective awareness o f a substantial risk to the plaintiff. Id. at 1349-50. Carter can clearly be distinguished on its facts. Here, Defendant was standing a t Harvey's cell with Plaintiff, and later in Plaintiff's cell with Harvey, and she heard H a rve y specifically say that he would try to kill or harm Plaintiff and not to put them in a cell together. This was not an issue of an inmate's general problematic nature o r of vague or general statements. A reasonable juror could find that Defendant a c tu a lly knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm from Inmate H a rve y. B. D is r e g a r d of Serious Risk of Harm D e fe n d a n t next argues that even if she had subjective knowledge of a serious ris k of harm, the evidence does not support a finding that she disregarded the risk. S h e states that "to the extent that she may have identified some risk by Harvey's s ta te m e n ts , she responded by admonishing him and attempting to control Harvey b e fo r e placing him in the cell with Jackson. Stevens did not leave the vicinity after p la c in g Harvey in the cell and immediately upon discerning that Harvey was going

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to assault Jackson, returned to the cell to have Harvey restrained and moved." (Doc. 1 0 6 , p. 9) (citations omitted). This statement does not accurately summarize the evidence in this case. P la in tiff's testimony clearly states that Harvey assaulted him before Defendant re t u r n e d to the cell. Nothing supports Defendant's allegation that she "discerned" th a t Harvey "was going to assault" Plaintiff, and returned to the cell. Further, a s s u m in g Defendant did not leave the area after placing Harvey in Plaintiff's cell, she c e rta in ly has not presented any evidence to support her assertion that she "stay[ed] in the vicinity to immediately respond at the sign of actual trouble." (Doc. 106). "[P]rison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel a n d Unusual Punishments Clause." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845, 114 S.Ct. at 1983. A p ris o n official violates the Eighth Amendment if he responds to a known risk "in an o b je c tive ly unreasonable manner." Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ). A prison official responds to a known risk in an objectively unreasonable m a n n e r if "he knew of ways to reduce the harm but knowingly declined to act" or if "h e knew of ways to reduce the harm but recklessly declined to act." Hale, 50 F.3d a t 1583. It is clear that whether Defendant's response to Harvey's threats was re a s o n a b le is a question for the jury. On one hand, there is a question of whether a d m o n is h in g and attempting to control Harvey before placing him in the cell with P la in tiff was a reasonable response by Defendant. On the other hand, there is a 5

question of whether moving Harvey into Plaintiff's cell minutes after Harvey directly th re a te n e d to try to kill Plaintiff if they were put in a cell together was a reasonable re s p o n s e by Defendant. Deciding which of these was a reasonable response is for th e jury. C. Negligence D e fe n d a n t next argues that the Magistrate Judge erred because he did not c o n s id e r the argument that Plaintiff has conceded that the conduct attributed to D e fe n d a n t was merely negligent. The Court overrules this objection. W h e th e r the fa c ts presented in this case establish deliberate indifference or a lesser form of c u lp a b ility is a question for the jury. D. Q u a lifie d Immunity F in a lly , Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge erred because he did not address her qualified immunity argument. Qualified immunity shields governmental d e fe n d a n ts sued in their individual capacities so long as their conduct "does not vio la te clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable p e rs o n would have known." Vinyard v. W ils o n , 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (q u o ta tio n omitted). "The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litig a tio n ." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court must apply a two-step analysis to determine whether or not the d e fe n d a n t is entitled to qualified immunity. The first inquiry is when "[t]aken in the 6

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the o ffic e r's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 1 2 1 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). "If a constitutional right would have been violated u n d e r the plaintiff's version of the facts, the court must then determine `whether the rig h t was clearly established'" at the time of the alleged violation. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1 1 9 4 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2156).2 "[T]he relevant, d is p o s itive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it w o u ld be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation h e confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2156. Under his version of the facts, Plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation. T h e Court must now consider whether the law was clearly established. Defendant a rg u e s that the law was not clearly established and constitutional liability cannot be im p o s e d based upon some generalized duty to protect. A c c o rd in g to Plaintiff, Harvey directly threatened him while Defendant was lis te n in g . Defendant scolded Harvey, but nevertheless moved him to Plaintiff's cell. There, she again heard Harvey make a direct threat against Plaintiff. N o tw ith s ta n d in g those threats, Defendant had Plaintiff turn his back so she could ta k e off his handcuffs, and when Plaintiff turned back around after Defendant closed th e cell door, Harvey immediately hit Plaintiff.

The Court recognizes that it is no longer required to consider these prongs in the order set out in Saucier. See Pearson v. Callahan, --- U.S. - - -, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009). 7

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"[T]he eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment im p o s e s a duty to provide reasonable protection" when a prison official becomes "aware of a threat to an inmate's health and safety." Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1 5 3 3 , 1537 (11th Cir. 1990). W h e n prison officials are "deliberately indifferent to a k n o w n danger . . . their failure to intervene offend[s] `evolving standards of decency' [a n d ] ris[es] to the level of a constitutional tort." Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U .S . 97, 105-06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291-92 (1976)). U n d e r Plaintiff's version of the facts, Defendant refused to respond to protect P la in tiff's safety despite subjective knowledge of the threats made by Harvey. In s te a d , she put Harvey and Plaintiff in the same cell. The Eighth Amendment right o f prisoners to be free of deliberate indifference by prison officials resulting in harm w a s clearly established at the time of the events in this case. See Hudson v. M c M illia n , 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999-1000 (1992). In light of this precedent, D e fe n d a n t was on notice that failing to respond to a known threat to Plaintiff's safety w a s unlawful. W h ile Defendant argues that there is no specific precedent e s ta b lis h in g that her conduct would violate Plaintiff's rights, "there need not be a c a s e `on all fours,' with materially identical facts, before we will allow suits against th e m ." Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004). Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claim.

E.

Conclusion 8

The Recommendation (Doc. 100) is adopted and made the order of this Court. D e fe n d a n t's objection is overruled. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D o c . 92) is denied. Plaintiff's Motion to W ith d ra w Document (Doc. 104) is granted.

SO ORDERED, this the 11 th day of February, 2010. s / Hugh Lawson HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE m bh

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