Jackson v. Carlisle et al

Filing 110

ORDER DENYING 103 Motion to Vacate and GRANTING 102 Motion to Stay Appealability of Judgment. The thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal will begin to run the on the date this Order disposing of the Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion is entered. Ordered by Judge Marc Thomas Treadwell on 3/21/2012. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

CURTIS JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRAD CHRISTENSEN, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:09-CV-274(MTT)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Curtis Jackson’s Motion to Stay
Appealability of Judgment (Doc. 102) and Motion to Vacate Judgment (Doc. 103).1 On
September 9, 2011, United States Magistrate Judge Charles H. Weigle filed a
Recommendation in which he recommended denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and granting the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 94).
This Court granted the Plaintiff an extension of time in which to file an objection to the

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The Plaintiff’s recent filings did not appear on the Court’s docket until January 31, 2012. The
Defendants claim, pursuant to the prison maibox rule, that the Plaintiff’s filings should be
“deemed filed” on January 26, 2012, the date Dooly State Prison officials stamped the Plaintiff’s
documents as “Received.” See Doc. 103 at 1. The Defendants are correct that, pursuant to the
prison mailbox rule, inmate filings are considered filed the date they are delivered to prison
authorities for mailing. However, absent evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or
other records, which the Defendants in this case do not cite, courts are to assume that a pro se
prisoner’s motion is delivered to prison authorities the date the prisoner signed the motion.
Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, the Plaintiff’s Motion
to Vacate and other documents are signed and dated January 25, 2012, and will be deemed
filed on that date. See Doc. 103 at 13.

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation on three separate occasions, yet the Plaintiff
failed to file an objection prior to the Court-imposed deadline of December 15, 2011.
Thus, on December 28, 2011, the Court entered an order adopting the Magistrate
Judge’s Recommendation, granting the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment,
and dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims. Judgment was entered the same day. (Doc. 101).
Now, the Plaintiff has moved the Court to vacate its Judgment. In addition, the
Plaintiff has filed an untimely 104-page objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
Recommendation. (Doc. 104). Whether the Plaintiff intended his lengthy objection as a
brief in support of his Motion to Vacate or as a stand-alone objection is of no matter, as
the Court is under no obligation to consider untimely objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Thomas v. Owens, 2009 WL 3747162 (M.D. Ga. 2009). The Plaintiff was given over
four months, as opposed to the customary 14 days, to file his objection, and the Court is
not persuaded by his excuses for failing to do so. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s late-filed
objection is overruled.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) sets forth the grounds on which a court, in
its discretion, can vacate or amend a final judgment or order:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies
relief.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion to alter or amend a judgment cannot be used to
relitigate old matters, raise arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment.” Jones v. Southern Pan Services, 2012 WL 29071 (11th
Cir. 2012).
Here, the Plaintiff claims that the Judgment should be modified or vacated
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (4), and (6). Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to relieve a
party from a final judgment or order for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” However, “such relief is available only for obvious errors of law and limited to
perfunctory correction.” Wendy’s Intern., Inc. v. Nu-Cape Const., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 680,
687 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (citation omitted). Having reviewed the record, the Court does not
find that there were any facially obvious errors of law in the Magistrate Judge’s
Recommendation or in this Court’s adoption thereof.
“To obtain relief from a final judgment based upon fraud under Rule 60(b)(3), the
moving party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse party
obtained the verdict through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. The moving
party must also demonstrate that the conduct prevented [him] from fully presenting his
case.” Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). The Plaintiff claims that the Judgment in this case was obtained by
fraud because the Defendants misrepresented facts and perjured themselves under
oath at the Plaintiff’s criminal trial in February 2009 and because they committed
numerous discovery abuses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to meet his
burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendants engaged
in fraud or other misconduct. Moreover, even if the Plaintiff had met his burden, he has

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not shown how the Defendants alleged misconduct prevented him from fully presenting
his case. The Court granted the Plaintiff multiple extensions of time in which to respond
to the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, yet he still failed to do so in a timely
manner. Nonetheless, the Magistrate Judge considered the Plaintiff’s untimely
response, which was 99 pages long and therefore in violation of Local Rule 7.4, and
reached a decision on the merits. Thus, the Plaintiff was not prevented from fully
presenting his case.
Under Rule 60(b)(4), the Court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order
if the Court finds the judgment is void. “Generally, a judgment is void under Rule
60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the
parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Burke v. Smith,
252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The
Plaintiff claims he was denied due process because the Magistrate Judge failed to
consider all the claims within his summary judgment motion. Although it is not clear
which claims the Plaintiff contends did not receive proper consideration, the Court is
satisfied that the Magistrate Judge did not err. In addition to finding the Plaintiff’s claims
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the Magistrate Judge went a step further
and reached the merits on each of the Plaintiff’s claims. Even if the Magistrate Judge
had overlooked one of the Plaintiff’s claims, which the Court expressly concludes was
not the case, the fault would lie not with the Court, but rather with the Plaintiff, as his
Motion, perhaps unsurprisingly, exceeded the page limitation and, at times, bordered on
incomprehensible. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff was not denied due
process of law, and Rule 60(b)(4) offers him no relief.

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Rule 60(b)(6) permits a judgment to be set aside or modified for “any other
reason” that justifies relief. “Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary remedy
which may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Griffin v.
Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984). Even when exceptional
circumstances exist, however, the decision of “whether to grant the requested relief is a
matter of the district court’s sound discretion.” Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235
F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Simply put, the
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that exceptional circumstances warrant granting him
relief from the Court’s previous orders.
As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “Rule 60(b) was never intended to permit
parties to relitigate the merits of claims or defenses, or to raise new claims or defenses
that could have been asserted during the litigation of the case. Rather, the aim of Rule
60(b) [is] to allow a district court to grant relief when its judgment rests upon a defective
foundation.” Gonzalez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1291-92 (11th Cir.
2004). For the reasons set forth above, the Judgment in this case rests on sound legal
principles, and the Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).2 Accordingly, his
Motion to Vacate is denied.
The Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Stay the Appealability of Judgment until
the Court renders a decision on the Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate. Although not clear, the
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Though the Plaintiff clearly seeks relief under Rule 60(b), his Motion also contains a citation to
Rule 59. Reconsideration of an order under Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy, and the
Plaintiff has not proven an intervening change in the law, the availability of new evidence, or the
need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice that would entitle him to relief under the
Rule. Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Neilson, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1994). Thus,
to the extent the Plaintiff has moved the Court to alter or amend its Judgment pursuant to Rule
59(e), the Motion is denied.
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Plaintiff is presumably asking the Court to find that his Rule 60(b) Motion tolled the time
for filing a notice of appeal. Generally, the Plaintiff is correct that, if a party files a timely
motion under Rule 59 or 60, the time to file a notice of appeal does not begin until the
court enters an order disposing of the motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). However, to
take advantage of this provision, a Rule 4(a)(4) motion must be filed within 28 days of
entry of the judgment, and an untimely motion does not toll the time to appeal.
Advanced Estimating Sys. V. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 1996).
The Court issued a final Judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims on December
28, 2011. On January 25, 2012, exactly 28 days later, the Plaintiff moved the Court to
vacate its Judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b). The Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) Motion, for
purposes of tolling, was therefore timely filed and will operate to toll the filing period for
his notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay, to the extent this is the
relief the Plaintiff seeks, is granted. The thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal
will begin to run the on the date this Order disposing of the Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) Motion
is entered.

SO ORDERED, this 21st day of March, 2012.

S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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