Carr v. Holloway

Filing 24

ORDER denying 21 Motion for Hearing; granting 22 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 10/1/2010. (nbp)

Carr v. Holloway

Doc. 24

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA M A C O N DIVISION L A R R Y CARR, : : P la in t if f , : : v. : : A L F R E D MORGAN HALLOWAY, : J R ., : : : D e fe n d a n t. _______________________________ : ORDER B e fo re the Court is Plaintiff Larry Carr's ("Carr") Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 2 2 ) and Motion for Hearing (Doc. 21). For the following reasons the motion to re c o n s id e r is granted and the motion for hearing is denied. I. BACKGROUND C a rr filed a complaint alleging violations of state law in this Court on S e p te m b e r 17, 2009 asserting federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity. The c o m p la in t alleges that Carr was injured in a car collision caused by the negligence o f the Defendant Alfred Morgan Halloway, Jr. ("Halloway"). Halloway filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing that Carr failed to s h o w by a preponderance of the evidence that his claims for damages exceeded $ 7 5 ,0 0 0 . Since Carr claimed indeterminate damages, the Court entered a show c a u s e order requiring Carr to come forward with evidence sufficient to show that his c la im s met the jurisdictional minimum. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon

C iv il Action No. 5 :0 9 -c v -3 2 7 (HL)

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Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) ("However, where jurisdiction is b a s e d on a claim for indeterminate damages, the Red Cab Co. "legal certainty" test g iv e s way, and the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of p ro v in g by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim on which it is basing ju ris d ic tio n meets the jurisdictional minimum.") (citations omitted). Carr responded to the show cause order. On August 3, 2010, the Court granted the motion to d is m is s finding that Carr failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the a m o u n t in controversy of Carr's case exceeded $75,000. C a rr then filed his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his case fo r lack of jurisdiction (Doc. 22). In his motion he argues that the Court erred in only c o n s id e rin g the damages to which he assigned a dollar value when determining if th e amount in controversy was met. He contends if the Court considered his c la im e d damages of pain and suffering, to which he did not assign a dollar value, th a t the amount in controversy would be satisfied. II. D IS C U S S IO N A. R e c o n s id e r a tio n Standard

L o c a l Rule 7.6 warns that "Motions for Reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice." M.D. Ga., L.R. 7.6. A motion for reconsideration must b e filed within 14 days after entry of the order. Id. A motion for reconsideration is appropriate if the moving party can show: "(1) th e re has been an intervening change in the law, (2) new evidence has been 2

discovered that was not previously available to the parties at the time the original o rd e r was entered, or (3) reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law o r prevent manifest injustice." Pennamon v. United Bank, 2009 WL 2355816, at *1 (M .D . Ga. July 28, 2009) (citing Wallance v. Georgia Dep't of Trans., 2006 WL 1 5 8 2 4 0 9 , at *2 (M.D. Ga. June 6, 2006). "[A] motion for reconsideration does not p ro v id e an opportunity to simply reargue the issue the Court has once determined." Id. (quoting Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1 3 4 0 (M.D. Fla. 2003). In this case, there has been an intervening change in the law regarding how a proponent of federal jurisdiction may satisfy its burden of proof in proving the a m o u n t in controversy. Because of this change, the motion for reconsideration is g ra n te d . A hearing on the motion is unnecessary. B. In te r v e n in g Change in the Law

T w o days after the Court entered its order dismissing Carr's complaint for lack o f subject matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered an o p in io n , Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2010), which a d d re s s e d whether the allegations in a complaint for indeterminate damages e s ta b lis h e d by a preponderance of evidence the required amount in controversy.1

The Roe opinion followed Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744 (11th Cir.2010). In Pretka, the Eleventh Circuit did not decide a case that required it to look solely at the complaint to determine if the amount in controversy is met. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 770 ("Nonetheless, we need not look solely to the complaint and the named plaintiffs' contracts that are attached to it, and have no occasion to express any view on 3

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Roe, 613 F.3d at 1059. Although Roe arose in the removal context and this case d o e s not, the Eleventh Circuit has held the removal context is analogous to this s e ttin g since on removal a defendant must also show to the court by a p re p o n d e ra n c e of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. S e e Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F.3d at 807 n. 1 (explaining that a declaratory ju d g m e n t action alleging indeterminate damages was similar to removal cases). In Roe, the plaintiff sued claiming damages under the Alabama's Wrongful D e a th Act, a statute that permitted the recovery of punitive, but not compensatory d a m a g e s . Roe, 613 F.3d at 1059-60. Although the complaint did not specify a s p e c ific amount of damages sought, the district court found that it was facially a p p a re n t that the case met the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement. Id. at 1060. In deciding whether the amount in controversy was satisfied, the Eleventh C irc u it explained that "preventing a district judge from acknowledging the value of th e claim, merely because it is unspecified by the plaintiff, would force the court to a b d ic a te its statutory right to hear the case." Id. at 1064 "[A] district court need not s u s p e n d reality or shelve common sense in determining whether the face of a c o m p la in t . . . establishes the jurisdictional amount." Id. at 1062 (citation and

how we would decide this case if that were the only evidence of the amount in controversy. It is unnecessary for us to answer that question, and we imply no view on it, because there is more evidence in this case."). In contrast, here the Court must look to Carr's complaint alleging pain and suffering to determine if the claim for pain and suffering damages pushes the amount in controversy above $75,000. 4

quotation omitted). T h e Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff's c la im s more likely than not exceeded $75,000. Id. at 1065. It concluded that when th e value of the plaintiff's claims were analyzed with judicial experience and common s e n s e and under the factors for determining a punitive damages award in a wrongful d e a th case, the amount in controversy likely exceeded the $75,000. Id. The Roe c o u rt looked to the fact that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant acted wantonly, d e s tro y e d a human life, and that the defendant could have prevented the victim's d e a th it had exercised ordinary care. Id. at 1066. Because the defendant was a tire m a n u fa c tu re r and sold its tires throughout the nation, the public has a substantial in te re s t in deterring the defendant's conduct. Id. These allegations led the Roe court to believe that the amount in controversy was satisfied. Id. In sum, Roe made clear that a district court need not dismiss a case for lack o f subject matter jurisdiction solely because the complaint alleges indeterminate d a m a g e s . Applying Roe's rule that a district court must apply its common sense and ju d ic ia l experience to indeterminate damages claims, the Court finds that Carr's c o m p la in t satisfies the amount in controversy. C. W h e th e r Carr's Unspecified Damages Claim for Pain and Suffering P u s h e s the Amount in Controversy Above $75,000

C a rr argued in his response to the Court's show cause order that his case met th e amount in controversy because he incurred damages arising from medical

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expenses, lost wages, diminished future earning capacity, and pain and suffering. In its order (Doc. 19) granting Halloway's motion to dismiss the Court determined th a t Carr proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his damages for medical e x p e n s e s and lost wages amounted to $72, 143.99. It did not review the claimed d a m a g e s for pain and suffering because Carr assigned no dollar figure to them and m e re ly asserted that his complaint sought damages for intangible losses attributed to pain and suffering. The Court also concluded that Carr did not produce any e v id e n c e showing what his damages for his diminished future earning capacity w o u ld be. Since Carr met his burden only to $72, 143.99, the Court dismissed the c o m p la in t for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In his motion for reconsideration Carr asserts that damages for pain and s u ffe rin g would exceed $2,856.02 and therefore, if the Court considered them along w ith damages for medical expenses and lost wages, then the Court would find that th e amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. He points to his medical records filed in his response to the Court's show cause order, which describe his pain as "d e b ilita tin g " and opinions of his medical providers who opined that Carr was unable to engage in many normal activities and usual work from the date of the collision th ro u g h the filing of Carr's complaint. Damages for pain and suffering will seldom be reduced to dollar figures as a n o rm a l part of litigation. Under Georgia law, "[p]ain and suffering is a generic name fo r several types of damages falling under that head, including mental and physical 6

pain and suffering, past, present and future. The measure of damage in such cases is the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors." Aretz v. United States, 456 F .S u p p . 397, 401 (D.C. Ga.1978). A s is to be expected, Carr has not assigned dollar figures to the amount of his c la im e d damages for pain and suffering, but he has presented evidence that his s u s ta in e d injuries caused him to be unable to work since the date of the accident. He has received medical treatment for his injuries, including treatment for his neck and back pain, and has presented evidence that he suffers from a diminished w o rk in g capacity. The court's common sense and judicial experience lead it to b e lie v e that this evidence, if presented to a jury, would more likely than not result in a pain and suffering award in excess of $2,856.02. Thus, after reviewing the c o m p la in t and other evidence regarding Carr's medical expenses and lost wages, C a rr has satisfied his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that th e amount in controversy of his case exceeds $75,000. III. C O N C L U S IO N T h e motion for reconsideration is granted and the final judgment dismissing th e case is vacated. The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case. S O ORDERED, this the 1 s t day of October, 2010. s / Hugh Lawson HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE lm c

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