Tindall v. H&S Homes, LLC et al
Filing
292
ORDER granting 284 Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiff shall have TWENTYONE (21)DAYS to file a response to this Order, and the Trust Defendants shall then have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS to file a reply. Ordered by Judge C. Ashley Royal on 3/15/12 (lap)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
TERRY CARTRETTE TINDALL,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
Civil Action
:
No. 5:10‐CV‐044(CAR)
H & S HOMES, LLC, et. al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
____________________________________
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court’s Order Granting the Trust Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment” [Doc.
284]. In the challenged Order, this Court found that Plaintiff could not maintain civil
conspiracy claims against Defendants “The Maude Hicks Family Trust,” “The N. Dudley
Horton Revocable Trust,” and “The Robert Dudley Horton Trust” (herein “the Trusts”
or “Trust Defendants”), as she failed to identify sufficient evidence that the Trusts
“actually benefitted from or [were] complicit in the conspiracy alleged.” See Miller v.
Tranakos, 209 Ga. App. 688, 699 (1993).
Through the present Motion, Plaintiff contends that the Court’s finding was
erroneous and contrary to Georgia “conspiracy law.” While the Court disagrees with
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Plaintiff’s claim of error, Plaintiff is correct in her explanation of Georgia law. As
Plaintiff contends, Georgia law does not require a plaintiff to prove that an alleged
co‐conspirator actually benefitted from the conspiracy in order to maintain a civil
conspiracy claim. See, e.g., Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1090 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Georgia law permits civil conspiracy claims against non‐transferee aiders and abettors
when they are alleged to have conspired with the debtor to defraud the creditor by
hindering its collections of an outstanding debt). Plaintiff is also correct that, under
Georgia law, the existence of a conspiracy may simply “be inferred from the nature of
the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the alleged conspirators, and
other circumstances.” Nottingham v. Wrigley, 221 Ga. 386, 388, 114 S.E. 2d 749 (1965).
There is no requirement that a plaintiff prove an “express compact or agreement”
between the alleged co‐conspirators. Id.
Thus, if Plaintiff’s claim was a simple conspiracy claim, the Court would have
indeed erred in requiring Plaintiff to identify evidence that the Trusts “actually
benefitted from or [were] complicit in the conspiracy alleged.” See Miller, supra. The
law cited by Plaintiff, however, is not squarely applicable to her claims. In this instance,
Plaintiff seeks to hold a trust liable for the alleged conspiratorial acts of its trustee.1
1 In her original response, Plaintiff essentially argued that the Trusts Defendants may be implicated in the
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Because of this, the Court must first inquire whether the Trust Defendants may in fact be
held liable for the alleged unlawful acts of Dudley Horton— i.e., whether a trust may be
implicated as a conspirator simply because its trustee participated in a conspiracy.
As previously explained, in Georgia, a trust will generally not be held liable for
the torts of its trustee unless there is some proof that the trust “actually benefitted from
or was complicit in the conspiracy alleged.” Miller, 209 Ga. App. at 689; see also, Burgess
v. James, 73 Ga. App. 857, 859, 38 S.E.2d 637 (1946) (“The general rule in Georgia is that
[trust] funds will not be depleted by subjection to liability for the [acts] of a trustee.”);
Charles R. Adams III, Georgia Law of Torts, § 9–2 (2010–2011 ed.) (“The mere fact that the
trustee used trust funds to the detriment of third persons does not create liability in the
trust; some culpability of the trust beneficiaries must be shown.”). Thus, a trust may be
required to satisfy a trustee’s liability only if it is proven that the trust “actually
benefitted from the trustee’s misdeeds or [if] some other equity, such as conspiratorial
knowledge or unjust enrichment,” authorizes an invasion into the trust. Miller, 209 Ga.
App. at 689. Proof of a benefit received by the trust must “be more than mere suspicion
alleged conspiracy through evidence that Defendant Dudley Horton was the sole trustee of all three
Trusts, that the Trusts held a majority ownership interest in Horton Industries, which in turn owned both
Horton Homes and H&S, and that Dudley Horton used his power and authority over these Horton
companies to make fraudulent transactions – which ultimately protected the Trusts’ investment in Horton
Industries. In short, Plaintiff contended that if Dudley Horton is a conspirator, the Trusts are too.
Plaintiff did “not contend that any of the assets were transferred to the trust” or that the trust were liable
for conduct other than that of its trustee, Defendant Dudley Horton. See Pl’s Brief in Response [Doc. 218].
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arising from circumstances . . . , and must point to specific culpability or, at least, a
specifically proved unjust enrichment.” Id.
Therefore, in this case, even if the Court assumed that Dudley Horton conspired
to enter into fraudulent transactions, his conduct would not automatically implicate the
Trusts in the conspiracy. Under Georgia law, Plaintiff was required to identify some
evidence that the Trusts actually benefitted from or were complicit in the conspiracy
alleged. See id. This could have been accomplished through evidence of either a
specific benefit received by the trust, a use of the trust in furtherance of the actual
conspiracy, or conspiratorial knowledge or other culpability of a trust beneficiary. See id.
After considering Plaintiff’s claims under this standard, the Court determined
that Plaintiff had failed to identify sufficient evidence of the Trusts’ complicity in the
conspiracy or any specific unjust enrichment. Plaintiff’s only support for her claim at
that time was (1) evidence of the close relationship between the Trusts, Dudley Horton,
and the Horton‐operated businesses, (2) evidence of Dudley Horton’s alleged
participation in a conspiracy, and (3) a conclusory, unsupported allegation that the
Trusts would have benefitted from Horton’s misdeeds. Through this, Plaintiff
essentially created no more than a mere suspicion that the Trusts were involved in the
conspiracy. Though Plaintiff had presented evidence of an obvious relationship
between the Trusts and other alleged conspirators, her evidence did not suggest that the
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alleged unlawful acts (i.e., “the nature of the acts done”) necessarily involved the Trusts
or otherwise required Dudley Horton to act in his capacity as trustee. The evidence also
failed to show any specific benefit received by the Trusts as a result of the conspiracy
(i.e., “a specifically proved unjust enrichment”) or that any trust beneficiary had
knowledge of or culpability in the alleged conspiracy.
The Court, therefore, does not find any error in its prior Order. Nonetheless, a
second review of the parties’ arguments did reveal that additional briefing may be
necessary. Though the issues analyzed by the Court are essentially the same as those
raised on summary judgment, neither party articulated the issues in exactly the same
way they were addressed by the Court. As a result, Plaintiff may not have had an
adequate opportunity to address all of the issues considered by the Court. Had Plaintiff
been aware that the Court was going to focus on the rule discussed in Miller v. Tranakos,
209 Ga. App. 688, 699 (1993), rather than on Georgia’s general “conspiracy law,” she may
have made different arguments or produced additional evidence on summary
judgment. This presumption is supported by new facts included in the present Motion,
which were not previously identified and may support a conspiracy claim against the
Trusts. Indeed, those facts (evidence of benefit to a beneficiary and his knowledge of a
withdrawal from that Trust during the time of the alleged conspiracy) would have been
highly relevant under the Court’s analysis. See id.
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Therefore, in the interest of fairness and in an abundance of caution, this Court
will allow both parties to file supplemental briefs on the issues raised by the Court and
to produce additional evidence, if necessary. Plaintiff shall have TWENTY‐ONE (21)
DAYS to file a response to this Order, and the Trust Defendants shall then have
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS to file a reply. To this extent, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration [Doc. 284] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this 15th day of March 2012
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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