Spivey v. Smu
ORDER DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Mandriez Ramon Spivey. Ordered by Judge Marc Thomas Treadwell on 6/9/2011. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
NO. 5:11-CV-224 (MTT)
Petitioner MANDRIEZ SPIVEY filed this pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus
petition challenging the validity of his January 14, 1998 conviction in the Superior Court
of Bibb County, Georgia, for which he received five years probation.1 Petitioner is
currently incarcerated in Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, pursuant to a
sentence of 18 months, imposed in a 2007 conviction from the Superior Court of Lamar
Petitioner’s Bibb County conviction expired long ago. He nevertheless
challenges his Bibb County conviction in this action because it allegedly was used to
enhance his current Lamar County sentence.
A staff attorney of this Court confirmed the above sentence with the Superior Court of Bibb
The Court determined the nature of Petitioner’s 2007 conviction through his filing in Spivey v.
Jones County LEC, 5:11-CV-81 (MTT).
Petitioner can no longer bring a section 2254 habeas petition directed solely at
his 1998 Bibb County conviction, as he is not “in custody” with respect to this conviction.
See also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (habeas petitioner must be “in
custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed”).
Although Petitioner is in custody with respect to his 2007 conviction, the United States
Supreme Court held in Lackawanna County Dist. Att’y v. Coss., 532 U.S. 394 (2001),
once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or
collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed
to pursue those remedies while they were available (or
because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction
may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is
later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant
generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through
a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior
conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.
Id. at 403-04. Thus, although Petitioner’s 1998 Bibb County conviction may have been
used to enhance his current sentence, the earlier conviction is nevertheless not subject
The only circumstances under which Petitioner might challenge the 1998 Bibb
County conviction would be if: (1) counsel was not appointed in violation of the Sixth
Amendment; or (2) “no channel of review was available with respect to the prior
conviction, through no fault of the petitioner.” Birotte v. Secretary for the Dep’t of
Corrections, 236 Fed.Appx. 577, 579 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at
402-04). Neither exception is present here. Petitioner’s habeas petition indicates that
he had counsel in the Bibb County proceeding, and he does not contend that he lacked
any channel of review for his 1998 Bibb County conviction.
Alternatively, the Court finds that Petitioner’s petition is patently time-barred by
section 2254's one-year statute of limitations.
In light of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with
SO ORDERED, this 9th day of June, 2011.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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