CLEMENTS v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
Filing
68
ORDER denying 66 Motion for Directed Verdict. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 3/7/2013. (nbp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
MILLON R. CLEMENTS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 5:11-CV-322 (HL)
v.
NORFOLK SOUTHERN
COMPANY,
RAILWAY
Defendant.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law (Doc. 66). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
On August 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant pursuant
to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”). The case was tried before a jury
beginning on February 19, 2013. At the close of Plaintiff’s case in chief, and after
the close of all the evidence, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law
pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court reserved
ruling on the motion. On February 21, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in
Plaintiff’s favor. Defendant again moved for judgment as a matter of law, and the
Court again reserved ruling. The Court now formally rules on the Rule 50 motion.
Rule 50 allows a district court to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law if “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the [nonmoving party].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). This is
the standard whether the motion is made before or after the case is submitted to
the jury. Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007). In
conducting a Rule 50 analysis, the court must refrain from invading the province
of the jury. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge.” Id. at 1193 (internal citations omitted).
After considering the parties’ arguments, the Court denies Defendant’s
motion. While Defendant orally raised a number of issues during and after trial in
support of its motion, the only issue the Court believes merits additional
discussion is causation.
Under FELA, a plaintiff “must prove the traditional common law elements
of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation.” Kelson v. Central of
Ga. R. Co., 234 Ga. App. 200, 203, 505 S.E.2d 803 (1998) (quotation, citations,
and punctuation omitted). With respect to causation, the question is whether the
employer’s negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury
or death for which damages are sought. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352
U.S. 500, 505-06, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added); CSX
Transp., Inc. v. McBride, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011).
2
Defendant contends it is entitled to judgment in its favor because Plaintiff
did not present sufficient evidence of causation or any probative facts from which
a jury could conclude Plaintiff met his burden of proof on the element of
causation. In a nutshell, Defendant believes Plaintiff had to present expert
medical testimony at trial to establish causation - specifically that the fall off the
tire caused Plaintiff’s back injury.
Expert evidence is often required in FELA cases to establish the causal
connection between the accident and the alleged injury. When “there is no
obvious origin to an injury and it has ‘multiple potential etiologies, expert
testimony is necessary to establish causation.’” Myers v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 629
F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32,
46-47 (2d Cir. 2004)). For instance, courts have required expert testimony in
cases where a plaintiff claimed cumulative trauma injuries, Myers, 629 F.3d at
643; degenerative disk disease, Brooks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 620 F.3d 896,
899-900 (8th Cir. 2010); respiratory illness, Schmaltz v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
896 F.Supp. 180, 183 (N.D. Ill. 1995); aggravation of a pre-existing asthmatic
condition, Schrum v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 286 F’Appx. 380, 381
(9th Cir. 2008); a skin condition caused by a uniform hat, Watson v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 500 F.Supp.2d 266, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); and respiratory ailments as a
result of exposure to diesel exhaust fumes and hazardous dust, Shiver v.
3
Georgia & Florida Railnet, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 828, 830-31, 652 S.E.2d 819
(2007). These are all injuries with no obvious origin and cannot be linked with a
specific injury causing event.
On the other hand, expert evidence is not required to establish the causal
connection between the accident and the injury if “the connection is a kind that
would be obvious to laymen, such as a broken leg from being struck by an
automobile.” Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 823 F.2d 693, 695 (1st Cir. 1987).
In other words, “[e]xpert testimony is unnecessary in cases where a layperson
can understand what caused the injury.” Myers, 629 F.3d at 643. “For example,
when a plaintiff suffers from a broken leg or a gash when hit by a vehicle, he
doesn’t need to produce expert testimony.” Id. Courts have found that expert
testimony was not required in cases involving hearing loss, Tufariello v. Long
Island R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2006) (no expert testimony needed in a
case involving hearing loss from lack of ear protection because “there is a
generally understood causal connection between physical phenomena - in this
case, very loud sounds, which we refer to colloquially as ‘deafening’ - and the
alleged injury that ‘would be obvious to laymen’”); a back injury resulting from
swinging a sledgehammer, Williams v. Northeast Illinois Reg’l Commuter R.R.
Corp., 2002 WL 1433724, *10 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that expert testimony was
not needed because “[a] back injury caused by swinging a sledgehammer and
4
overextending one’s swing because rotted wood supporting the structure gave
way is not such an elusive concept”); and an infection at the site of a bug bite,
Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 109-113, 83 S.Ct. 659
(1963).
While there was no specific expert medical causation testimony presented
at the trial of this case, evidence was presented that Plaintiff’s back problems
began on May 20, 2010, the day he fell or slipped off the tire. According to
Plaintiff’s sworn testimony, the injury materialized in the form of pain immediately
after the fall. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not have back problems prior to
May 20. Unlike the plaintiffs in Myers, Brooks, and Schmaltz, for instance,
Plaintiff was able to point to a specific incident that injured him. This is not a case
where Plaintiff is claiming an injury based on years of working at the railroad. If
that was the case, the Court would agree with Defendant that medical expert
testimony is required. However, the Court believes Plaintiff’s injury to have much
more in common with the broken leg example from Moody or the injured back in
Williams than the cumulative trauma injuries in Myers or the respiratory ailment in
Shiver. It is not beyond the province of an ordinary person that falling off a four
foot high tire could cause a herniated disk. The Court finds that there was
sufficient evidence presented at the trial for the jury to draw a causal inference
between the fall off the tire and Plaintiff’s injury.
5
FELA is a very favorable statute for railroad employees. The law is clear
that railroad workers should have the benefit of a jury trial in close cases, and
Plaintiff so had his day in court. After three days of trial, the jury returned a
verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. The Court cannot “second-guess the jury or substitute”
its judgment for that of the jury if the jury’s verdict is supported by sufficient
evidence. Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183,
1186 (11th Cir. 2001). The Court finds that the verdict is supported by sufficient
evidence. The Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 66) is denied. The
Clerk of Court is directed to enter final judgment consistent with the jury verdict
returned on February 21, 2013.
SO ORDERED, this the 7th day of March, 2013.
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE
mbh
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?