GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. PINSON TRUCKING COMPANY INC et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING 26 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTING 27 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge Marc Thomas Treadwell on 2/5/2013. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
PINSON TRUCKING COMPANY, INC.,
MAURICE DION LAKE, TAMMY JONES
WILLIAMS, and MARCUS TERRELL
BOATWRIGHT
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 5:11-CV-487 (MTT)
ORDER
Before the Court are the Parties’ Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs.
26 and 27). Essentially, the Parties ask the Court to determine whether Plaintiff Grange
Mutual Casualty Company’s insurance policy should be rewritten by the Court to
provide coverage for a tractor leased by its insured to a motor carrier. For the following
reasons, Grange’s Motion is GRANTED, and the Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Defendant Pinson Trucking Company’s and Lumber Transport’s Lease
Arrangement
The Parties have stipulated to the relevant facts. (Doc. 25). Defendant Pinson
Trucking Company (Pinson), which is insured by Grange, and Lumber Transport, Inc.
(Lumber) are “for-hire motor carriers operating commercial motor vehicles for the
purpose of transporting property.” (Doc. 25 at 3). However, only Lumber is authorized
by the United States Department of Transportation to transport property across state
lines and by the State of Georgia to transport property within Georgia. (Doc. 25 at 3).
Pinson does not have any motor carrier authority, and thus cannot legally haul goods for
hire. (Doc. 25 at 4). Presumably because of this, Pinson had for some time leased its
truck, the tractor of a tractor-trailer rig, to Lumber, and Lumber operated the tractor
pursuant to its motor carrier authority.1 (Doc. 25 at 4).
Lumber agreed to provide liability insurance for the tractor. (Doc. 25 at 8). At the
time of the accident giving rise to this action, Lumber had an insurance policy with Great
West Casualty Company (Great West) providing liability coverage of $1,000,000 to
Lumber, Pinson, and Pinson employees for any one accident or loss involving a motor
carrier. (Doc. 25 at 9-10). The Great West policy included an endorsement for public
liability pursuant to requirements under the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.
§ 10101 et seq., commonly called a Form MCS-90 endorsement. (Doc. 25 at 9).
Lumber also had an excess liability insurance policy with Hallmark Insurance Company
providing Lumber, Pinson, and Pinson employees with $2,000,000 in additional
coverage. (Doc. 25 at 10). Although the lease agreement required Pinson to provide a
driver for the tractor, the tractor would “at all times be operated to the exclusive direction
and supervision of” Lumber. (Doc. 25-7 at 2). Further, the lease agreement gave
Lumber “exclusive possession, control, and use” of the tractor, and Lumber “assume[d]
complete responsibility for operation” of the tractor. (Doc. 25-7 at 4).
B. The August 8, 2011 Accident
On August 8, 2011, Pinson employee Marcus Boatwright, while driving the
Pinson-owned tractor leased to Lumber, was involved in an eight vehicle automobile
1
The “Permanent Lease Agreement Contract” attached to the Parties’ Stipulation of Facts identifies one
tractor as the only equipment subject to the lease. (Doc. 25-7 at 9). The Parties’ Stipulation of Facts
states that “all of the tractors owned by Pinson” were leased to Lumber. (Doc. 25 at 4). Elsewhere in
their Stipulation, the Parties state “[t]he tractor-trailer involved in the accident was owned by Pinson.”
(Doc. 25 at 10). Whether Pinson leased other tractors and trailers to Lumber is not material.
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accident. (Doc. 25 at 10). Three people died and several more were injured in this
accident. Defendants Maurice Dion Lake and Tammy Jones Williams2 were among the
injured. The accident also caused significant property damage to vehicles and the
roadway. (Doc. 25 at 10). The tractor was being operated by Lumber pursuant to the
lease between Pinson and Lumber. (Doc. 25 at 10). Of course, Lumber was operating
the tractor pursuant to its motor carrier operating authority. (Doc. 25 at 11).
Following the accident and the filing of a civil lawsuit in the Superior Court of
Greene County, Georgia against Great West, Pinson, Lumber and Boatwright, Great
West undertook the legal defense of Pinson, Lumber and Boatwright. (Doc. 25 at 12).
All these parties are represented by the same counsel. Boatwright admitted he was
responsible for the August 8 accident; however, he reserved the issues of proximate
cause and damages. (Doc. 25 at 13). Further, Pinson admitted that Boatwright was
operating within the scope of his employment with Pinson at the time of the accident.
(Doc. 25 at 13).3
C. The Grange Mutual Policy
Pinson had a “Commercial Package” policy with Plaintiff Grange Mutual Casualty
Company (Grange). (Doc. 25 at 5). At the time Pinson’s most recent policy with
Grange was renewed,4 Grange knew “that Pinson was a for-hire motor carrier operating
motor vehicles for the purposes of transporting property in interstate and intrastate
2
The Parties refer to Tammy Jones Williams as both “Jones” and “Williams” in the Stipulation of Facts.
(Doc. 25). For consistency purposes, the Court will refer to her as “Williams.”
3
Even though the lease agreement provided that the tractor was operating under the “exclusive direction
and supervision” of Lumber and that Lumber had “exclusive possession, control, and use” of the tractor
and “assume[d] complete responsibility” for its operation, Pinson was apparently satisfied that it was
nonetheless responsible for the accident. See Hendley v. Evans, 734 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. App. 2012).
4
At oral argument, the Parties disclosed that the policy had been renewed nineteen times.
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commerce.” 5 (Doc. 25 at 5). However, neither Pinson nor Grange intended the
Grange policy to provide liability coverage for Pinson-owned vehicles that were leased
to Lumber and used in hauling freight and goods for hire. (Doc. 25 at 8).
The Grange policy provided “general liability insurance for risks associated with
people coming on Pinson Trucking’s premises” and “property damage coverage in case
any of Pinson Trucking’s building were damaged or destroyed.” (Doc. 34 at 5) (citing
Doc. 25-5). The policy included a commercial automobile coverage endorsement
insuring only two scheduled vehicles—a 1999 Chevrolet pick-up and a 2000 Fleetwood
motor home. (Doc. 25 at 7). Pinson owned both vehicles. Of course, neither vehicle
was used by Pinson for hauling freight or goods for hire. The Grange policy did not
contain a Form MCS-90 endorsement, nor did it contain a Georgia “Form ‘F’
endorsement. A Form F endorsement is somewhat similar to a MCS-90 endorsement
and is required of certain intrastate motor carriers.6 (Doc. 25 at 7-8).
D. The Present Declaratory Judgment Action
On November 4, 2011, all known personal injury claims, and some property
damage claims, were settled at mediation, with the exception of Defendants Lake and
Williams. (Doc. 25 at 14). The settlement exhausted Great West’s $1,000,000 policy
5
To the extent this stipulation suggests that Pinson was itself acting as an authorized motor carrier, it is
misleading. Again, Lumber was operating Pinson’s tractor pursuant to Lumber’s authority as a motor
carrier.
6
Georgia’s Public Service Commission Rules require that all certificates of insurance be made on Form E
and all endorsements made on Form F. Rule 1-8-1-.07(d)-(e) of the Rules of the Georgia Public Service
Commission. Form E is styled “Uniform Motor Carrier Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability
Certificate of Insurance.” Form F bears the title “Uniform Motor Carrier Bodily Injury and Property
Damage Liability Insurance Endorsement.” Form E certifies that a designated insurer issued a specified
motor carrier an insurance policy “which, by attachment of the Uniform Motor Carrier Bodily Injury and
Property Damage Liability Insurance Endorsement, has... been amended to provide automobile bodily
injury and property damage liability insurance covering the obligations imposed upon such motor carrier
by the provisions of the motor carrier law....” Rule 1-8-1-.07(d) of the Rules of the Georgia Public Service
Commission; see Kinard v. Nat. Indem. Co., 225 Ga. App. 176, 180(2), 483 S.E.2d 664 (1997).
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limits, and Hallmark’s $2,000,000 limits were reduced to $281,833.62. (Doc. 25 at 15).
Lake and Williams have rejected Hallmark’s remaining limits offered to settle their
claims. (Doc. 25 at 15).
On November 21, counsel for Pinson, Boatwright, Lumber, Great West and
Hallmark7 forwarded to Grange Williams’ and Lake’s settlement demand of
$1,036,380.50. (Doc. 25 at 16). Williams and Lake argue that Grange’s policy “by
operation of law” should be rewritten to include coverage in the amount of $750,000, the
amount required for a MCS-90 endorsement. (Doc. 25 at 16). On December 7, counsel
for Pinson, Boatwright, Lumber, Great West and Hallmark also demanded (on behalf of
Pinson), that Grange pay $750,000.00 to Williams’ and Lake’s claims. (Doc. 25 at 17).
On December 12, Grange sought a declaratory judgment determining whether the
Grange policy provides coverage to Pinson and Boatwright for the claims asserted by
Williams and Lake. (Doc. 25 at 17; Doc. 1).
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on
the evidence presented, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir.
7
The same counsel, retained by Great West, has represented the Defendants in this case throughout the
litigation arising from the August 8 accident. (Doc. 40). Clearly, Great West sees no conflict among the
parties. The Court does not suggest there is, although it perhaps is significant that if Grange were forced
to pay pursuant to an implied MCS-90 endorsement, Grange could seek reimbursement from Pinson. 49
C.F.R. § 387.15 ill. I. (“The insured agrees to reimburse the company for any payment made by the
company ... for any payment that the company would not have been obligated to make under the
provisions of the policy except for the agreement contained in [the MCS-90 endorsement.”). The relevant
point, however, is that the fact that one law firm could represent all the defendants bolsters the conclusion
that Pinson and Lumber were, as a practical matter, operating as one motor carrier, and that carrier was
Lumber.
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2002); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant must
cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must rebut the movant’s
showing “by producing…relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.”
Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The non-moving party
does not satisfy his burden “if the rebuttal evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative of a disputed fact.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). However, “credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge. … The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Further, “[c]ross
motions for summary judgment do not change the standard.” Perez-Santiago v. Volusia
Cnty., 2010 WL 917872 (M.D. Fla.) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Whether the MCS-90 Should be Incorporated into the Grange Policy as a
Matter of Law
Pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 and regulations promulgated
thereunder, certain interstate motor carriers must obtain an insurance policy containing
a MCS-90 endorsement “providing that the insurer will pay within policy limits any
judgment recovered against the insured motor carrier for liability resulting from the
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carrier’s negligence.” Waters v. Miller, 564 F.3d 1355, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal
citation and quotations omitted). The primary purpose of the MCS-90 endorsement is
“to assure that motor carriers maintain an appropriate level of financial responsibility for
motor vehicles operated on public highways.” 49 C.F.R. § 387.1. “In order to
accomplish this purpose, the endorsement makes the insurer liable to third parties for
any liability resulting from the negligent use of any motor vehicles by the insured, even if
the vehicle is not covered under the insurance policy.” Waters v. Miller, 560 F. Supp. 2d
1318, 1321 (M.D. Ga. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The MCS-90
endorsement applies “regardless of whether or not each motor vehicle is specifically
described in the policy and whether or not such negligence occurs on any route or in
any territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere.” 49 C.F.R. § 387.15.
It is, in effect, a suretyship by the insurance carrier to protect the public. Waters, 560 F.
Supp. 2d at 1321.
Here, Grange and Pinson did not intend to insure Pinson’s tractor. Pinson
intended, and the lease agreement provided, that Lumber would provide the required
insurance coverage for Pinson’s tractor. Grange, perhaps naively given its stipulated
knowledge that Pinson was a motor carrier, only intended to insure Pinson’s pick-up
truck and camper.
Nevertheless, the Defendants contend that “[s]ince Grange had actual
knowledge Pinson was a for-hire interstate motor carrier, it was obligated to issue an
insurance policy which complied with federal law. … [T]his Court should engraft a MCS90 onto the policy as a matter of federal law.” (Doc. 26-2 at 2). Further, the Defendants
contend that once the Court writes the MCS-90 endorsement into the policy, it should
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require that the MCS-90 endorsement be applied to Lake’s and Williams’ claims
“irrespective of whether there may be other coverage or tortfeasors which contribute to
satisfying the claims of an injured member of the motoring public.” (Doc. 26-2 at 2).
Grange contends that no authority supports incorporating a MCS-90 endorsement into a
general commercial liability policy issued to a “business that happens to be a ‘motor
carrier.’” (Doc. 34 at 2).
The most comprehensive discussion of the issue in this circuit is found in Judge
Clay D. Land’s decision in Waters v. Miller, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. Ga. 2008). In
Waters, the insured owned a tractor-trailer that he used to haul automobiles. Waters,
560 F. Supp. 2d at 1319. The insured had a commercial vehicle insurance policy
covering the tractor-trailer, but the insurer cancelled the policy for nonpayment of
premiums just before the truck rear-ended the Plaintiff’s car. Id. If the policy had had a
MCS-90 endorsement, the cancellation would not have been effective and the policy
would have covered the tractor-trailer at the time of the accident.8 However, the policy
did not contain a MCS-90 endorsement because, according to the insurer, the insured
was not operating interstate when it issued the policy. In other words, the insurer
intended to, and did, insure the tractor-trailer but it did not intend to issue a MCS-90
endorsement because the vehicle was not supposed to cross state lines. The Plaintiff
argued that the MCS-90 endorsement should be incorporated into the insurance policy
as a matter of law because the tractor-trailer was operating interstate. Id. at 1321.
Judge Land disagreed, primarily because there was no evidence the insurer
knew or should have known that the insured was operating the truck across state lines.
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It seems possible the insurer would have denied coverage anyway because the tractor-trailer was
outside the territorial limits of the policy.
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Id. at 1324. On the contrary, “the record is clear that at the time the policy was issued
[the insured] was not engaged in interstate travel.” Id. at 1323 n.3.
The Eleventh Circuit, in affirming Judge Land, held that because the plaintiff did
not present sufficient evidence that the insurer knew or should have known the motor
vehicle would be traveling interstate, the MCS-90 endorsement should not be written
into the policy. Waters, 564 F.3d at 1357-58. The Eleventh Circuit thus found it
unnecessary “to reach the issue of whether the endorsement can be read into a policy
that does not contain it.” Id. at 1358.
The Defendants argue that this Court should apply Judge Land’s “analytical
framework” and find that a MCS-90 endorsement should be written into Grange’s policy.
They point, of course, to Grange’s stipulated knowledge that Pinson was a for-hire
motor carrier engaged in interstate and intrastate travel.
However, there is a subtle, but significant, difference between the facts in Waters
and the facts here. In Waters, the insurer undertook to insure the insured’s motor
carrier operations. Grange did not. It would be one thing to rewrite a policy issued to
cover motor carrier operations to include a MCS-90 endorsement if that insurer knew
the motor carrier whose operations it was insuring was hauling interstate. However, it is
quite another thing to require an insurer that was never asked to insure an insured’s
motor carrier operations generally or a particular tractor to cover that tractor with a
MCS-90 endorsement.9 The Defendants cite no cases supporting such a proposition
and the Court has found none.
9
The Court acknowledges that one purpose of a MCS-90 endorsement is to provide coverage for a
tractor even though that tractor is not scheduled in the policy. The relevant point, however, is not just that
the tractor was not scheduled, but rather that Grange never insured Pinson’s motor carrier operations.
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The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Dupont,
326 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003), the facts of which arguably present a compelling case for
rewriting a motor carrier’s insurance policy. In Dupont, the insurer specifically insured
one truck used by the insured in its logging operations. Id. at 666-67. When one of the
insured’s drivers was involved in an accident while hauling the insured’s logs but with a
non-scheduled truck not owned by the insured, the insurer denied coverage. Id. There
being no other insurance available, the plaintiff contended that the MCS-90
endorsement should be deemed to be a part of the policy because the insured was a
motor carrier subject to the Motor Carrier Act. Id. at 667.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. First, even assuming that the logging company was
a covered motor carrier, the court noted that it is the responsibility of the motor carrier,
not the insurer, to obtain a MCS-90 endorsement. Id. at 669; see also Canal Insurance
Co. v. Barker, 2007 WL 3551508, *5 (E.D. Va.) (“When a motor carrier opts not to use
an insurance policy to meet its financial responsibility requirements, then the regulations
do not require the carrier to maintain a minimum of $750,000 in insurance. … In the
present case, … the policy does not contain a MCS-90 endorsement. Thus, it is
evidence that this policy was not being used to satisfy the [motor carrier’s] proof of
financial responsibility requirement.”). This makes sense, the Fifth Circuit reasoned,
because the motor carrier is in the best position to determine whether the nature of its
operations require a MCS-90 endorsement.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit concluded, writing a MCS-90 endorsement into the
policy, regardless of whether the motor carrier had requested or paid for the
endorsement, would create a “perverse incentive.” Id. “Motor carriers would then have
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an incentive not to comply with the regulations and obtain the endorsement and pay the
additional premiums associated with it, knowing that the courts would deem the
endorsement part of the policy whether or not it was requested by the carrier.” Id.; see
also Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. Zinsmaster, 2007 WL 670937, *5 n.1 (N.D. Ind.)
(reasoning, in the context of a policy lacking the MCS-90 endorsement, that the
insurance company should not be obligated “to pay monies it did not contract to pay.”).
Thus, even though the insurer in Dupont insured the insured’s trucking operations, the
Fifth Circuit refused to rewrite the policy to include a MCS-90 endorsement.
The Defendants point to three circuit cases to support their position, but the
cases are not at all applicable. In each case, the insurers agreed, or conceded, that the
MCS-90 endorsement should be incorporated in the policy, even though the
endorsement was not physically attached to the policy. See Prestige Casualty Co. v.
Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1340 (6th Cir. 1996); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co.,
787 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1986); Hagans v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir.
1972). For example, in Hagans, the Tenth Circuit assumed the endorsement was a part
of the policy because the parties acted as though it was. Id. at 1252. Indeed, the
insurer in Hagans had affirmatively represented to regulators that the policy complied
with federal law by filing the appropriate certificate of insurance with the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Id. at 1252. Unlike the cases cited by the Defendants, this is
not a case of a mistakenly omitted MCS-90 endorsement that the parties agree should
have been attached to the policy.
Lacking authority for the relief they seek, the Defendants essentially make a
policy argument. Given the deaths and injuries, the Defendants argue public policy
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favors writing the endorsement into Grange’s policy. “Assuming that public policy
concerns should inform our analysis,” as the Fifth Circuit put it in Dupont, that argument
falls shorter here than it did in Dupont. Perhaps it would be “fair” to require an insurer to
stand by a MCS-90 endorsement if it undertook to insure an insured’s trucking
operations and if, because of the absence of a MCS-90 endorsement, the public would
not have the benefit of the minimum coverage required for an interstate motor carrier.
Neither criterion is present here. Grange did not undertake to insure Pinson’s trucking
operations and, importantly from a “policy” standpoint, the victims had available to them
the $3,000,000 coverage provided by Lumber’s insurers. Tragically, that coverage is
not adequate, but it nevertheless far exceeds the statutory minimum.10
In sum, the Court will not rewrite the Grange policy to incorporate a MCS-90
endorsement. Therefore, it is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the MCS-90
endorsement would apply to this case if it were in the Grange policy.
A. Whether the Georgia Form F Should be Incorporated into the Grange Policy
as a Matter of Law
Georgia’s Motor Carrier Act requires a Form F endorsement, which operates
roughly similar to the federal MCS-90 endorsement and requires the insurer to provide
coverage in some situations even when the policy does not expressly provide coverage.
The Defendants, citing Sapp v. Canal Insurance Co., 288 Ga. 681, 706 S.E.2d 644
(2011), contend that if the Court does not incorporate the MCS-90 endorsement into the
Grange policy, then the Court should require Grange to provide coverage “in an amount
10
The Court is not suggesting that an insurer with an applicable MCS-90 endorsement could avoid
payment because the vehicle is covered by a MCS-90 endorsement issued by another insurer. If two
MCS-90 endorsements apply, both have to pay. See Herrod v. Wilshire Insurance Co., 2012 WL 4820722
(10th Cir.); Fairmont Specialty Ins. Co. v. 103012 Ontario, Inc., 2011 WL 3651333 (N.D. Ind.). The point
here is that the presence of other insurance coverage undercuts policy arguments that the MCS-90
endorsement should be written into the Grange policy.
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equal to its policy limits” pursuant to Georgia law. (Doc. 26-2 at 2). The Court rejects
this argument for the same reasons it refuses to write a MCS-90 endorsement into the
Grange policy.
However, discussion of Sapp is instructive. In Sapp, the claimant was injured in
an accident with a dump truck. Sapp, 288 Ga. at 681, 706 S.E.2d at 645. The
insurance policy at issue was “a basic automobile liability policy rather than a motor
carrier policy” that provided liability coverage for the dump truck. Id. Though the
insurance policy covered the dump truck, the policy contained a “50-mile radius of use
limitation” which, the insurance company argued, precluded coverage for the accident.
Reversing the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court held the motor
vehicle insurance policy was subject to Georgia’s Motor Carrier Act.11
The supreme court gave two reasons for its holding. First, it was undisputed that
the insured relied on his insurance agent to procure appropriate vehicle insurance for
his trucking operations, and he was never informed that his policy lacked the
endorsement necessary to provide motor carrier coverage. Id. at 684, 706 S.E.2d at
648. The insurer knew the insured was a motor carrier obtaining insurance for its motor
carrier vehicles and “thus its need to obtain motor carrier insurance.” Id. The insured
had no reason to believe its policy fell short of the coverage required under Georgia law.
Id.
Second, “the Court’s rationale [] hinged on the policy purpose of the [ Georgia
Motor Carrier] Act to protect the motoring public.” Id. at 685, 706 S.E.2d at 648. “This
being the case, any negative consequences arising from noncompliance with the Act
should be suffered by the insured motor carrier or its insurer….” Id. Without subjecting
11
O.C.G.A. § 46-7-1 et seq.
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the policy to the Georgia Motor Carrier Act, the traveling public would be left without any
liability insurance protection for injuries caused by the motor carrier. Id.
The supreme court concluded that when an insurance company issues a motor
vehicle policy to a motor carrier, with knowledge that the insured vehicles will be used in
the insured’s motor carrier operations, then the policy is subject to the requirements of
Georgia’s Motor Carrier Act. Id. at 687, 706 S.E.2d at 650. Thus, the Act operated to
negate the insurance policy’s fifty mile radius of use limitation because it “would serve to
reduce or negate [the insurance company’s] obligation to the motoring public.” Id. at
685, 706 S.E.2d at 649.
Sapp is easily distinguishable. Indeed, the facts in Sapp make the public policy
argument that the Defendants here cannot make. Unlike the insurer in Sapp, Grange
did not undertake to insure Pinson’s tractor, and the traveling public has not been left
without any liability insurance protection.
In sum, the Court does not find it appropriate to rewrite Grange’s policy to include
a Form F endorsement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Grange’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Grange policy does
not provide coverage to Pinson and Boatwright for claims arising out of the August 8
accident. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 5th day of February, 2013.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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