GHOLSTON v. HUMPHREY
Filing
187
ORDER ADOPTING as modified 164 Report and Recommendations, GRANTING 86 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, DENYING 8 Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, and DISMISSING without prejudice 1 Plaintiff's Complaint. Pu rsuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court DIRECTS the entry of final judgment as to all of Plaintiff Gholston's claims because there is no just reason for delay. This Order is immediately appealable. Ordered by U.S. District Judge MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 11/4/2014. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
DEANTE GHOLSTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARL HUMPHREY,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-97 (MTT)
ORDER
Before the Court is the Order and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Stephen
Hyles. (Doc. 164). The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant Warden
Carl Humphrey’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 86) Plaintiff Deante Gholston’s complaint
(Doc. 1) and denying the Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 8).
The Plaintiff has objected to the Recommendation. (Doc. 176).1 The Court has
reviewed the Recommendation and has made a de novo determination of the portions
of the Recommendation to which the Plaintiff objects.
The Plaintiff contends his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Humphrey
based on denial of physical exercise should not be dismissed. The Magistrate Judge
recommends dismissing this claim because, while the complaint alleges “physical
exercise is denied for month[ ]s at a time and when allowed, only twice a week,” the
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The Plaintiff agrees his motion for a temporary restraining order should be denied, his
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim should be dismissed, and all but one of
his Eighth Amendment claims should be dismissed.
Plaintiff fails to allege he was deprived of physical exercise for months at a time. (Doc.
1-1 at 4). According to the Plaintiff, he has alleged personal deprivation of physical
exercise for months at a time. Though conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a
claim for relief, pro se pleadings are liberally construed, and in all cases, reasonable
inferences are to be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. See Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d
1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006). Liberally construing the Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court
finds he alleged he was personally deprived of exercise for months. However, he has
still failed to sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment claim against the Defendant.
To state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must make a twoprong showing: “an objective showing of a deprivation or injury that is ‘sufficiently
serious’ to constitute a denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities’ and
a subjective showing that the official had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Thomas
v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994)). For claims based on prison conditions, the relevant state of mind is
deliberate indifference. Id. To show the prison official acted with deliberate
indifference, the Plaintiff must establish: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence.”
Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Additionally, to hold a supervisory official liable for a constitutional violation, the
Plaintiff must show “that the supervisor either participated directly in the unconstitutional
conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor's actions and the
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alleged constitutional violation.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir.
2014). The requisite causal connection can be established if “a history of widespread
abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so”; the supervisor’s “custom or policy … result[s] in
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; or “when facts support an inference that
the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates
would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Plaintiff cites cases from the Ninth Circuit finding that denial of exercise can
be a “sufficiently serious” deprivation to support an Eighth Amendment claim. See
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Allen v. Sakai, 48
F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993).
Even assuming the Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to meet the objective prong of an
Eighth Amendment claim, however, he has failed to show Defendant Humphrey was
either personally involved in the deprivation of his rights or that the Defendant’s actions
had a causal connection to the deprivation. Simply alleging that the Defendant’s actions
resulted in the Plaintiff’s prolonged confinement in the Administrative Segregation Unit
(“ASU”) where he was deprived of exercise is insufficient to show a causal connection.
He does not allege the Defendant implemented a policy restricting exercise to prisoners
confined in the ASU, nor does he allege the Defendant directed his subordinates to
deny the Plaintiff exercise. For the same reasons, the Plaintiff has also failed to show
the Defendant acted with deliberate indifference.
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The Court has reviewed the Recommendation, and the Court accepts and adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge except as
modified by this Order. The Recommendation is ADOPTED as modified and made the
order of this Court. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 86) is
GRANTED, the Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice, and the
Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 8) is DENIED.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court DIRECTS the entry of final judgment
as to all of Plaintiff Gholston’s claims because there is no just reason for delay. This
Order is immediately appealable.
SO ORDERED, this 4th day of November, 2014.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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