EASLEY v. MACON POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 20

ORDER GRANTING 15 Defendants Macon Police Department, City of Macon, and Mike Burns's Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge Marc Thomas Treadwell on 10/10/2013. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
ANTONIO EASLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MACON POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-148 (MTT)

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Macon Police Department, City of Macon, and
Mike Burns’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 15). For the following reasons, the
motion is GRANTED.
Summary judgment must be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A factual dispute is genuine only if ‘a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281
F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop.,
941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)). The burden rests with the moving party to prove
that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of
Atlanta, 281 F.3d at 1224. The district court must “view all evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in
its favor.” Id.

In his complaint, the Plaintiff initially asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, as well as several state tort claims, seeking compensatory and punitive
damages. (Doc. 1-1). The claims are based on an incident involving the Plaintiff and
Officer Antoinne Jordan, during which time Burns was serving as Chief of Police.
(Docs. 15-4 at 38:4-39:11; 15-2 at ¶ 17). At oral argument, the Plaintiff’s counsel
conceded summary judgment was appropriate on the claims against the Macon Police
Department, the claims against Burns in his official capacity, the state law claims, and
the punitive damages claim. This leaves the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the City
and Burns in his individual capacity.1 The basis of the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against
both the City and Burns is they failed to properly train and supervise Officer Jordan,
leading to the alleged deprivation of the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Docs. 1-1 at ¶¶
63-65; 17 at 6-7).
A municipality may be held liable pursuant to §1983 when there is a causal link
between one of its policies and the alleged constitutional injury to the Plaintiff. Am.
Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir.
2011). While a “municipality’s policy- or custom-based failure to adequately train or
supervise its employees” may be the basis for municipal liability, it must “‘amount[] to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.’”
Id. at 1188 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). To establish
this, the Plaintiff must “put forward some evidence that the municipality was aware of
the need to train or supervise its employees” and “establish that the city ‘made a

1

 Since Officer Jordan has not moved for summary judgment, all claims against him still stand.

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deliberate choice’ not to train its employees.” Id. at 1189 (quoting Gold v. City of Miami,
151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998)).
“[S]upervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor
personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal
connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). “The necessary
causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the
responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he
fails to do so.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, “the causal
connection may be established when a supervisor's custom or policy . . . result[s] in
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Id. (internal quotations marks and
citation omitted). As discussed above, Burns’s liability is premised on a failure-to-train
theory.  The Plaintiff does not contend Burns personally participated in the alleged
deprivation of his constitutional rights.
The Plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument he would have to show a
causal connection between the City and Burns’s actions and the Plaintiff’s alleged
constitutional deprivation in order to prevail. However, he also conceded no evidence in
the record shows such a causal connection. In his response brief, the Plaintiff took the
position there were sufficient prior incidents to show Burns and the City were on notice
of Officer Jordan’s prior misconduct and were deliberately indifferent to the need for
better training. (Doc. 17 at 6-7). However, the only citation was to the Plaintiff’s own
response to an interrogatory, which was not even part of the record.

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For the first time at oral argument, the Plaintiff’s counsel requested the Court to
take judicial notice of two prior lawsuits against Officer Jordan without elaborating on
the subject matter of these lawsuits. A glance at the prior lawsuits to which the Plaintiff
refers shows that, even if the Court were to take judicial notice of these prior lawsuits,
they would not help the Plaintiff. One was resolved favorably to Officer Jordan, and the
other settled before the merits were considered.
Because nothing in the record establishes the requisite causal connection
between the City and Burns’s actions and the Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury, and
because the Plaintiff concedes summary judgment is appropriate on his other claims,
Defendants Macon Police Department, City of Macon, and Burns’s motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this the 10th day of October, 2013.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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