MORRIS-WILLIAMS v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 9 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Title VII claim and ADA Title I claims. Plaintiff is hereby DIRECTED to submit an Amended Complaint within TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS from the date of this Order. It is further ORDERED that the stay granted on November 14, 2012, is lifted. Ordered by Judge C. Ashley Royal on 4/17/2013 (lap)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
HENRI L. MORRIS‐WILLIAMS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
CIVIL ACTION
v.
:
NO. 5:12‐CV‐341 (CAR)
:
BUTTS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF :
HUMAN RESOURCES, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Henri L. Morris‐Williams, proceeding pro se, filed this action against the
Butts County Department of Human Resources1 (“Butts County DFCS”) and several
employees, including Shay Thornton, Henry Woodall, Lynn Tench, Darrell Price, Larisa
Price, and Lee Biggar. Plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), Section 504, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Currently before the Court is Butts
County DFCS’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 9]. Upon review of applicable law, the
Complaint, and the Motion and responses thereto, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to
state a claim for racial discrimination under Title VII and that her ADA Title I claims are
Butts County Department of Human Resources is not a legal entity capable of being sued, but is a
division of the Georgia Department of Human Services. O.C.G.A. § 49‐2‐1(a); Floyd Cnty. Grand Jury v.
Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 218 Ga. App. 832 (1995). Thus, the Georgia Department of Human
Services is the proper party in the instant action.
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time‐barred. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated below, Butts County DFCS’s
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Because Butts County DFCS did not address
Plaintiff’s remaining ADA Title II claims, those claims may proceed subject to the
Court’s directions below.
LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all well‐pleaded facts in a
plaintiff’s complaint.2 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”3 A claim is plausible
where the plaintiff alleges factual content that “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”4 The
plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports a plaintiff’s
claims.5
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her pleadings more
liberally than those submitted by a formally‐trained attorney. 6 Nevertheless, the Court
Sinaltrainal v. Coca‐Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).
4 Id.
5 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
6 Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990).
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is not required to exempt a pro se litigant from complying with the relevant rules of
procedure and substantive law.7
BACKGROUND
For purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.8
According to her Complaint, Plaintiff was employed with Butts County DFCS
from September 2004 to March 2010. Plaintiff claims she was subjected to
discrimination over the entire course of her employment, though it became worse in
2007. Specifically, Plaintiff states that she was the victim of verbal abuse, forced to
travel over 60 miles to file papers, denied requested accommodations for her health, not
permitted to work in her hometown of Griffin, and placed in a more difficult position
after learning a new job. Shay Thornton, a white female director; Henry Woodall, a
white male supervisor; Lynn Tench, a white female supervisor; Durrell Price, a white
male manager; Larisa Price, a white female director; and Lee Biggar, a white male
regional director, were somehow involved in these events, though Plaintiff does not
distinguish their specific, individual actions. Moreover, she does not identify her own
race, gender, or disability in the Complaint.
Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d
1304 (11th Cir. 2003).
8 See Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
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In November 2011, more than 180 days after she was terminated by Butts County
DFCS in March 2010, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Based on its investigation, the
EEOC concluded that the evidence did not establish any violations of the relevant
statutes. The EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of right to sue on May 31, 2012.
Plaintiff filed suit against the above‐named parties on August 22, 2012, alleging
discrimination in violation of Title VII and discriminatory conduct with respect to the
“ADA and Retaliation.” On November 9, 2012, Butts County DFCS filed the instant
Motion to Dismiss.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims she was subjected to adverse employment actions in violation of
the ADA and Title VII, and, presumably, in retaliation for engaging in protected activity
related to her disability. Thus, she seeks (1) reinstatement of her retirement years and
funds, (2) monetary damages for financial, physical, and emotional distress (3) to retire
on disability from Butts County DFCS, and (4) for all negative and false performance
evaluations, notes, and statements to be removed from her work record. The Court
considers each of Plaintiff’s claims in turn.
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I.
Title VII Claim
Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC bars her Title VII claim
against Butts County DFCS. To litigate a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first exhaust
her administrative remedies.9 “The first step down this path is filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC.”10 In a non‐deferral state such as Georgia, a charge of
discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the date of the alleged
discrimination.11 Failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC bars a plaintiff’s claims
from federal courts unless this limitation period is otherwise waived, estopped, or
tolled.12
In this case, Plaintiff alleges she was unlawfully terminated in March 2010 and
filed charges with the EEOC in November 2011—at least 580 days later. Stating the
obvious, Plaintiff’s 180‐day limitations period had elapsed. Plaintiff’s Complaint does
not include any information that would suggest this limitations period was equitably
tolled or satisfied by any other filings, such as a verified intake questionnaire.13 Thus,
Rizo v. Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 228 F. App’x 832, 835 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Wilkerson v.
Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001)).
10 Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐5(e)(1); Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1317.
12 Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980
F.2d 648, 662 (11th Cir. 1993).
13 See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (Noting that the filing of a timely EEOC charge
is “a requirement that, like a statute of limitation, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”);
Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1321‐22.
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Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is procedurally barred and must be DISMISSED for failure to
properly exhaust her administrative remedies.
II.
ADA Claims
The ADA contains five titles: Employment (Title I), Public Services (Title II),
Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities (Title III),
Telecommunications (Title IV), and Miscellaneous Provisions (Title V). In this case,
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges claims with respect to the “ADA and Retaliation.” It is
unclear whether her employment discrimination claim is based on Title I or Title II of
the ADA. Considering Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court interprets her Complaint to
assert claims under both Titles I and II of the ADA.
A. Claims Against Individual Defendants
Plaintiff asserts ADA claims against Shay Thornton, Henry Woodall, Lynn
Tench, Darrell Price, Larisa Price, and Lee Biggar, each of whom Plaintiff names in their
official capacity. 14 The claims against these individuals are indistinguishable from
Plaintiff’s claims against Butts County DFCS.15 A suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official, but rather a suit against the official’s
Where a complaint is unclear as to “whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or
both,” courts must look to “the course of the proceedings,” which will “typically indicate the nature of
the liability sought to be imposed.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); see also Gamble v.
Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir. 1986). Although the course of
proceedings is limited in this case, it is significant that Plaintiff only seeks relief from a State agency
rather than any individual defendant. Accordingly, the Court assumes Plaintiff is suing these individuals
in their official capacity.
15 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
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office.16 As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.17 Because Butts
County DFCS is separately named as a defendant, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
ADA Title I and Title II claims against the individual defendants as redundant.18
B. Title I Claims
Like her Title VII claim, Plaintiff’s ADA employment discrimination and
retaliation claims under Title I are time‐barred because she failed to file a charge in the
180‐day limitations period.19 Because these ADA claims are subject to the same
administrative requirements as Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, the Court incorporates its
reasoning in Section I, and Plaintiff’s Title I claims are DISMISSED.
C. Title II Claims
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, she also attempts to assert
employment discrimination and retaliation claims under ADA Title II. ADA Title II
states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”20 A
“public entity” includes divisions, departments, and agencies of state governments.21
Will v. Michigan State Dep’t of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989).
Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005).
18 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
19 See 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐5(e)(1); Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003).
20 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
21 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)‐(B).
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The Eleventh Circuit has applied this provision in the context of public employment,
providing an alternative avenue for Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims.22
If Plaintiff wishes to maintain this action, however, she must file an Amended
Complaint, which will supersede her original Complaint, as hereinafter directed.23
Currently, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to identify (1) her particular disability and (2) what
conduct allegedly caused Butts County DFCS to retaliate against her. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must explain the specific episode(s) of discrimination
and retaliation with respect to her employment with Butts County DFCS.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. 9]. Thus, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim and ADA Title I claims are hereby
DISMISSED.
Plaintiff’s ADA Title II claims may proceed subject to the following directions:
Plaintiff is hereby DIRECTED to submit an Amended Complaint within TWENTY‐
See Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Cnty., 133 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 1998); Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d
1161, (11th Cir. 2003); see also Swain v. Valdosta City Sch. Dist., No. 7:12‐CV‐146(HL), 2013 WL 486273, at *1
(M.D. Ga. Feb. 6, 2013). Like the Northern District of Georgia, the Court takes issue with the Eleventh
Circuit’s expansion of Title II to encompass employment‐based claims. However, the Court is bound by
the prior precedent of this circuit and must permit Plaintiff’s alternative claim to proceed. Accord Clifton
v. Ga. Merit System, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1363‐68 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
23 Pro se litigants should be afforded an opportunity to amend deficiencies prior to dismissal where there
is no risk of undue prejudice; there is no evidence of plaintiff’s undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive;
and the amendment may not be futile. See Langlois v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., 401 F. App’x 425, 426‐27 (11th Cir.
2010) (citing Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005); Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161,
1163 (2001)).
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ONE (21) DAYS from the date of this Order. The Amended Complaint must be filed in
accordance with this Order. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order in a timely
manner, the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice.
Finally, it is hereby ORDERED that the stay granted on November 14, 2012, is
lifted.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of April, 2013.
BBP/ssh
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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