MORRIS-WILLIAMS v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al
Filing
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ORDER Denying 17 Motion to Amend Complaint and Dismissing Plaintiff's case. Ordered by U.S. District Judge C. Ashley Royal on 11/7/13. (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
HENRI L. MORRIS‐WILLIAMS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
CIVIL ACTION
v.
:
NO. 5:12‐CV‐341 (CAR)
:
BUTTS COUNTY DEPARTMENT
:
OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND
Plaintiff Henri L. Morris‐Williams, proceeding pro se, filed this action against the
Butts County Department of Human Resources1 (“Butts County DFCS”) and several of
its employees, including Shay Thornton, Henry Woodall, Lynn Tench, Darrell Price,
Larisa Price, and Lee Biggar. In her original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. On April
17, 2013, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Title VII claim and ADA Title I claim.
However, the Court permitted Plaintiff’s remaining ADA Title II claim to proceed and
directed her to amend her Complaint in accordance with the Court’s decision and
explicit instructions. When Plaintiff failed to amend her Complaint in a timely manner,
1 The Court recognizes Butts County Department of Human Resources is not a legal entity
capable of being sued, but a division of the Georgia Department of Human Services. O.C.G.A. §
49‐2‐1(a); Floyd Cnty. Grand Jury v. Dep’t of Family & Children Servs., 218 Ga. App. 832 (1995).
the Court directed her to show cause why her case should not be dismissed for failure
to comply with the Court’s Order.
Four days after the show cause deadline passed, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion
for Leave to File Amended Pleading with an accompanying Memorandum and
Amended Complaint [Doc. 17]. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names the State of
Georgia and Governor Nathan Deal as new Defendants to her action and asserts three
claims: (1) a Title VII claim on the basis of her “race/color/sex/national origin,”2 (2) a
Title VII sexual harassment claim, and (3) an age discrimination claim pursuant to the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq., including
incorporated provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from Defendants, including back pay, $3,000,000 in
“general damages,” $15,000 “for reasonable attorney fees,” the cost of her suit, and
“[p]utative [sic] damages.”3 Notably, Plaintiff does not reallege her ADA Title II claim
and has evidently abandoned it.4
2 Amended Complaint [Doc. 17 at 2].
3 Id. at 2. Plaintiff also requests an “injunction” but does not describe what kind of relief she
actually seeks. Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, she does not qualify for injunctive relief. All of
Plaintiff’s claims and requests for relief are “measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting
from a past breach of a legal duty.” See Summit Med. Assocs. P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336
(11th Cir. 1999). This is the functional equivalent of money damages and does not qualify as
injunctive relief. See, e.g., Burrell v. Teacher’s Ret. Sys. of Ala., No. 2:08‐cv‐330‐MEF, 2009 WL
113692, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2009).
4 See, e.g., Dickens v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:08‐Cv‐1592‐WSD, 2009 WL 2410933, at *1 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 4, 2009); see also Pintando v. Miami‐Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir.
2007) (“[T]he original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the
pleader’s averments against his adversary”) (quotation omitted).
2
In opposition, Defendant Butts County DFCS asserts that this case should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) or, alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Having considered the record, relevant legal authority, and the
parties’ briefs, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Pleading [Doc. 17] is
DENIED as futile, and her case is DISMISSED.
As a preliminary matter, the Court declines to dismiss this case pursuant to Rule
41(b) for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s Orders. “Dismissal of a case with
prejudice is considered a sanction of last resort, applicable only in extreme
circumstances.”5 “Mere negligence or confusion is not sufficient to justify a finding of
delay or willful misconduct.”6 At this point, the Court is not convinced Plaintiff’s
actions amount to the kind of deliberate misconduct or unreasonable delay that
warrants dismissal with prejudice.7 Further, Plaintiff has acknowledged her failings
and apologized for the same.8 Thus, the Court declines to dismiss this case pursuant to
Rule 41(b) and considers Plaintiff’s Motion on its merits.
When, as in this case, a party’s right to amend her complaint has passed, “a party
may amend [her] pleadings only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party.”9 Defendants do not consent to Plaintiff’s proposed amendment; therefore, the
5 Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985).
6 Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006).
7 See Webb v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 1:05 CV 124(WLS), 2006 WL 2583365, at *3 (M.D. Ga.
Sept. 6, 2006).
8 Plaintiff’s Reply [Doc. 19 at 2].
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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Court must determine whether to grant her Motion. As a general rule, courts “should
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”10 However, a “district court may
deny leave to amend a complaint if it concludes that the proposed amendment would
be futile, meaning that the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss”
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.11
Thus, when evaluating Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court must
determine whether, “construing the [proposed] complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and accepting as true all facts which the plaintiff alleges,” the proposed
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.12 To that end, the
Court may consider any written instrument attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint;
such attachments become part of the pleading “for all purposes” pursuant to Rule 10(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court may also consider extrinsic
documents if (1) they are central to Plaintiff’s claims, and (2) their authenticity is not
challenged.13 For purposes of this Motion, the Court has considered both Plaintiff’s
Charge of Discrimination and her Intake Questionnaire [Doc. 17‐1].14 Having reviewed
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and supporting attachments, the Court concludes that it
will not survive a motion to dismiss.
10 Id.
11 Christman v. Walsh, 416 F. App’x 841, 844 (11th Cir. 2011).
12 Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d
1230, 1255 (11th Cir. 2008).
13 SMF Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010).
14 See, e.g., Patterson v. WMW, Inc., No. 1:11‐CV‐3172‐WSD‐SSC, 2012 WL 3261290, at *4 (N.D. Ga.
June 15, 2012) (considering plaintiff’s intake questionnaire on defendant’s motion to dismiss).
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First, Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment
of the United States Constitution.15 Absent waiver or express congressional abrogation,
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a suit brought by a private individual against a
state in federal court.16 Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agencies,
departments, officials, and employees when the state is the real party in interest or
when state employees are sued in their official capacities.17 The Supreme Court has
explicitly held that this immunity applies to age discrimination claims under the
ADEA.18 Thus, the State of Georgia, Governor Nathan Deal, and any individually‐
named Defendants sued in their official capacities are protected by Eleventh
Amendment immunity.19 Consequently, Plaintiff’s ADEA claim must be DISMISSED.20
Second, even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff’s ADEA claim is not barred by
Eleventh Amendment immunity, both her ADEA claim and two Title VII claims are
time‐barred. As the Court explained in its previous Order, a plaintiff must properly
15 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91‐92 (2000); see also Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d. 677, 678
(11th Cir. 1998).
16 See Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
17 Regents of the Univ. of Cali. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Mt. Health City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1997).
18 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (holding that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity to suit by private individuals).
19 All of the named individuals are Butts County DFCS employees. Therefore, they qualify as
state employees. Powell v. Dep’t of Human Res., 918 F. Supp. 1575, 1578‐79 (S.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d
114 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the DFCS is a state agency that is established in
each county merely for administrative convenience).
20 To the extent Plaintiff intends to name these Defendants in their individual capacities, they
cannot be held liable under the ADEA. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007).
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exhaust her administrative remedies before filing a Title VII claim in federal court.21
The same standard applies to ADEA claims.22 “The first step down this path is filing a
timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC.”23 Although Plaintiff alleges that she
“timely filed a charge of discrimination,” the Charge attached to the instant Motion
suggests otherwise.24 Therein, Plaintiff asserts that she was unlawfully terminated
March 3, 2010. She filed her Charge on February 8, 2011, exactly 342 days later and well
beyond the permitted filing period.25 “[W]hen the exhibits contradict the general and
conclusory allegations of the pleading, the exhibits govern.”26 Thus, the dates in the
Charge control, and the Court finds that Plaintiff did not file a timely charge with the
EEOC.
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings, the Court has independently
examined Plaintiff’s EEOC Intake Questionnaire to determine whether it constitutes a
timely charge for purposes of the filing period.27 It does not. “[A]s a general matter an
21 Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001).
22 Bost v. Federal Express Corporation, 372 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004).
23 Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1317.
24 Compare Amended Complaint [Doc. 17 at 1] with EEOC Charge of Discrimination [Doc. 17‐1 at
8].
25 Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (180‐day filing period). Plaintiff
alleges that, as a Georgia employee, she had 300 days to file a charge with the EEOC rather than
180. While Plaintiff does not provide a legal basis for this 300‐day period, the Court
acknowledges that the EEOC website for the Atlanta District Office supports her allegation. See
EEOC, Atlanta District Office, Timeliness, (last visited Oct. 31, 2013), www.eeoc.gov/field/
atlanta/timeliness.cfm. However, the Court need not resolve this discrepancy; Plaintiff filed her
Charge well beyond either period.
26 Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 (11th Cir. 2007).
27 See, e.g. Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1321.
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intake questionnaire is not intended to function as a charge.”28 However, the Eleventh
Circuit has concluded that a verified intake questionnaire with certain basic information
may constitute a charge “when the circumstances of the case would convince a
reasonable person that the charging party manifested her intent to activate the
administrative process” by submitting her intake questionnaire.29 There is no evidence
Plaintiff intended to activate the administrate process by filing her Intake Questionnaire
with the EEOC. In fact, her actions suggest the exact opposite.
The Questionnaire specifically directed Plaintiff to “check Box 2” if she “want[ed]
to file a charge.”30 Plaintiff selected “Box 1,” which states “I want to talk with to an
EEOC employee before deciding whether to file a charge. I understand that by
checking this box, I have not filed a charge with the EEOC. I also understand that I
could lose my rights if I do not file a charge in time.”31 Plaintiff filed a separate Charge
of Discrimination on February 8, 2011, further demonstrating that she did not intend
her Intake Questionnaire to serve as a charge.32 Finally, there is no evidence the EEOC
made any misleading representations to Plaintiff or Defendants that would suggest
Plaintiff’s Intake Questionnaire was a charge. Thus, all of Plaintiff’s discrimination
claims are due to be DISMISSED as untimely.
For foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend [Doc. 17] is DENIED as
28 Pijnenburg v. West Ga. Health Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001).
29 Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1321.
30 Intake Questionnaire [Doc. 17‐1 at 8].
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Bost, 372 F.3d at 1241.
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futile, and Plaintiff’s case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED, this 7th day of November, 2013.
BBP
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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