Coffey v. State of Georgia
Filing
126
ORDER Overruling 124 Motion for Reconsideration (Objection to US Magistrate's Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Disallowance of Costs). Ordered by U.S. District Judge C ASHLEY ROYAL on 12/10/14 (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
MICHAEL RAY COFFEY,
a.k.a. RANDALL CHARLES
SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
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:
:
:
:
:
No. 5:12‐CV‐384 (CAR)
STEPHANIE DANIELS, et al.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ :
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Ray Coffey’s “Objection to United States
Magistrate Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Disallowance of Costs” [Doc.
124]. Having conducted a de novo review of the matters raised therein, the Court finds the
Objection to be without merit.
Following the entry of judgment in his favor, Defendant Deputy David Moss filed a
bill of costs requesting $19.40 related to copying costs. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court taxed
costs for the requested amount against Plaintiff. In response to the Clerk’s order, Plaintiff
filed a timely “Motion for Disallowance of Costs,” which the Magistrate Judge denied.
Plaintiff now seeks this Court’s review.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that “[u]nless a federal statute, these
rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be
allowed to the prevailing party.”1 This rule “establishes a presumption that costs are to be
awarded to a prevailing party, but vests the district court with discretion to decide
otherwise.”2 The Eleventh Circuit has cautioned, however, that “the district courtʹs
discretion not to award the full amount of costs incurred by the prevailing party is not
unfettered, since denial of costs is in the nature of a penalty for some defection on [the
prevailing partyʹs] part in the course of the litigation.”3 To overcome the presumption in
favor of awarding full costs, “a district court must have and state a sound basis for doing
so.”4
In his Objection, Plaintiff provides two arguments in support of his request to deny
an award of costs.5 First, as evidenced by the Court allowing him to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) in this case, Plaintiff contends he cannot afford to pay costs and, therefore,
taxing costs against him would be unjust. Simply put, “a court may assess costs against a
litigant who is proceeding [IFP].”6 If the judgment against a prisoner proceeding IFP
includes the payment of costs, Section 1915(f) provides that the prisoner shall make the
payments under the same partial payment plan as that prescribed for filing fees until the
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1038 (11th Cir. 2000).
3 Id. at 1039 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
4 Id.
5 In the remainder of his Objection, Plaintiff simply reargues the merits of his case to further support the
denial of costs. The Court has previously addressed the merits of these claims in its prior rulings and will
not do so again here.
6 Ang v. Coastal Intʹl Sec., Inc., 417 F. Appʹx 836, 838 (11th Cir. 2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1)(“Judgment may be
rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or action as in other proceedings”); see also Chapman, 229 F.3d
at 1039 (“[A] non‐prevailing partyʹs financial status is a factor that a district court may, but need not,
consider in its award of costs pursuant to Rule 54(d).”).
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costs are paid in full. 7 Accordingly, the fact that the Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed
IFP does not preclude the taxation of costs.
Moreover, even if the Court were inclined to consider Plaintiff’s indigence, his
financial status could not justify a denial of all costs. In this Circuit, “[e]ven in those rare
circumstances where the non‐prevailing partyʹs financial circumstances are considered in
determining the amount of costs to be awarded, a court may not decline to award any
costs at all.”8 Thus, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s request to deny all costs.
Second, Plaintiff argues than an award of costs at this juncture is premature because
his appeal is still pending before the Eleventh Circuit. The Court does have discretion to
postpone an award of costs pending resolution of the case on appeal.9 Since filing his
Objection, however, the Eleventh Circuit has dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal as frivolous.10 In
light of this recent event as well as this Court’s initial denial of Plaintiff’s motions to
proceed IFP on appeal, the Court sees no reason to defer taxation of costs in this case.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Objection [Doc. 124] is OVERRULED.
SO ORDERED, this 10th day of December, 2014.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ADP
28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2).
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039.
9 Estate of Pidcock By & Through Pidcock v. Sunnyland Am., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1322, 1341 (S.D. Ga. 1989).
10[Doc. 125].
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