DOE et al v. BIBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Filing 43

ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 37 Motion to Amend/Correct. 39 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, is GRANTED. The Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims and Jane Doe I's Title IX claim are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Plaintiffs are ORDERED to recast their amended complaint to comply with this Order. Ordered by U.S. District Judge Marc Thomas Treadwell on 12/17/2013. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
JANE DOE I, individually and as next
friend of JANE DOE II, a minor,

Plaintiffs,
v.
BIBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12-CV-468(MTT)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend (Doc. 37) and
the Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 39).1 For the following reasons, the Plaintiffs’
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the Defendant’s motion is
GRANTED.
Plaintiff Jane Doe I brings this action on behalf of her daughter, Plaintiff Jane
Doe II,2 based on allegations that other students sexually harassed Jane Doe II while
she was a special education student at Northeast High School. The Plaintiffs seek relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX, as well as attorney’s fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988.

1

The Defendant proposes that the Court treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, and the Plaintiffs have informed the Court they do not object to this.

2

Though Jane Doe I initially brought this action in her individual capacity and on behalf of Jane
Doe II, as discussed below, the Plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss Jane Doe I’s individual claims.

I.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early
enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “Judgment
on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore,
Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250
F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001)). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to
the same standard as is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co.
of Philadelphia v. City of Atlanta, 864 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
To avoid dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as
true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “where the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[C]onclusory allegations,
unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not
prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir.
2002). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks

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and citation omitted). Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a
claim regardless of the alleged facts. Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas
Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), leave to amend should be “freely give[n] ...
when justice so requires.” The Court “need not, however, allow an amendment (1)
where there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment would
cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment would be futile.”
Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “[D]enial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the
complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal.” Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367
F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).
Defendant Bibb County School District has only moved to dismiss the § 1983
claims in the Plaintiffs’ complaint, or should the Court grant the Plaintiffs’ motion to
amend, the § 1983 claims in the Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint.3 The Plaintiffs
have agreed to dismiss both Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II’s §1983 claims with prejudice.
(Doc. 42 at 4-6).
In their motion to amend, the Plaintiffs seek to add allegations that Jane Doe I
suffered emotional distress and mental anguish as a result of the Defendant’s conduct.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs seek to amend paragraphs 33(a) and 33(b) of the complaint,

3

The § 1983 claims are unchanged in the proposed amended complaint—the only difference is
the type of relief sought for Jane Doe I, which is discussed below. (Docs. 11 at ¶¶ 49-52; 37-3
at ¶¶ 49-52).
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relating to alleged 2002 and 2008 incidents of sexual assault,4 to conform those
allegations to recently produced discovery. The Defendant contends the portions of the
amended complaint relating to Jane Doe I’s alleged emotional distress would be subject
to dismissal because Jane Doe I lacks standing to advance an individual claim under
either Title IX or § 1983. In addition to agreeing to dismiss the § 1983 claims, the
Plaintiffs also agree to dismiss Jane Doe I’s Title IX claim with prejudice. (Doc. 42 at 5).
The Plaintiffs concede that, in light of the dismissal of all Jane Doe I’s individual claims,
the portions of the proposed amended complaint seeking relief for Jane Doe I’s
emotional distress and those seeking recovery of her lost income are moot.
The Defendant has not opposed the alterations in paragraphs 33(a) and 33(b) of
the proposed amended complaint relating to the 2002 and 2008 sexual assaults. The
Court finds justice requires amendment to the extent the Plaintiffs are altering these two
paragraphs.
II.

CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs’ motion to amend (Doc. 37) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part, and the Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 39), treated as a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, is GRANTED. The Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims and Jane Doe I’s Title IX
claim are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Plaintiffs are ORDERED to recast their
amended complaint to comply with this Order.

4

Part of the Plaintiffs’ legal theory is that the Defendant was aware of previous instances of
sexual harassment by students but that it was deliberately indifferent and failed to respond
appropriately. (Docs. 11 at ¶¶ 33-37; 37-3 at ¶¶ 33-37).
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SO ORDERED, this the 17th day of December, 2013.

S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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