LOCKETT v. PEACH COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE et al

Filing 10

ORDER denying 9 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by Judge Hugh Lawson on 3/1/2013. (nbp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
BRADLEY LANE-LOCKETT,

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Plaintiff,
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VS.
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PEACH COUNTY SHERIFF’S
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OFFICE, et. al.,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________

NO. 5:12-CV-515-HL-MSH

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Bradley Lane-Lockett’s Motion for Reconsideration
(ECF No. 9) of the Court's Order (ECF No. 5) dismissing the present case prior to service.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Peach County officials have refused to return seized
property despite his repeated requests that they do so. After conducting a preliminary screening the
Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), this Court found that, because the state of Georgia
provides a legal remedy for deprivation of property,1 Defendants’ alleged failure to return Plaintiff’s
property does not state a claim for relief under federal law – regardless of whether the deprivation
was due to the negligence of state officials or whether it was intentional and malicious. See Lindsey
v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir.1991) (“Because [plaintiff] has had access to an adequate
post-deprivation remedy, no procedural due process violation occurred, whether or not [defendants]
ever initiated forfeiture proceedings). See also, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S. Ct.
1

“The state of Georgia has created a civil cause of action for the wrongful conversion of personal
property. See O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 (1982). ‘This statutory provision covers the unauthorized seizure of
personal property by police officers. Therefore, the state has provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy
when a plaintiff claims that the state has retained his property without due process of law.’” Lindsey, 936 F.2d
at 561 (quoting Byrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987)).

662, 663, 88 L. Ed.2d 662 (1986) (addressing the negligent deprivation of property); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3204, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (addressing the intentional
deprivation of property).
Local Rule 7.6 contemplates motions like the one at bar but warns that “Motions for
Reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice.” Such motions are only
appropriate if the movant can show “(1) there has been an intervening change in the law, (2) new
evidence has been discovered that was not previously available to the parties at the time the original
order was entered, or (3) reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.” Wallace v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 7:04-CV-0078-HL, 2006 WL 1582409,
* 2 (M.D. Ga. June 6, 2006) (citing McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1222 23
(M.D.Ga.1997)).
Plaintiff’s Motion fails to satisfy the requirements for reconsideration. See Wallace, 2006
WL 1582409 at *2. Plaintiff in fact appears to have misunderstood the Court’s finding, as he now
argues that reconsideration is warranted because the court erred in finding that he failed to state the
relief he was seeking in his Complaint. Plaintiff’s Complaint was not dismissed for failing to
specify the relief sought. It was dismissed because his Complaint does not state a federal claim upon
which relief may be granted. Nothing in the present Motion persuades the Court that this finding
was erroneous or otherwise unjust.
Plaintiff Motion for Reconsideration is accordingly DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2013
s/ Hugh Lawson
HUGH LAWSON, Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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