FARLEY v. Variety Wholesalers Inc

Filing 18

ORDER granting 15 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Ordered by U.S. District Judge C ASHLEY ROYAL on 5/5/14 (lap)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
MACON DIVISION 

EVA FARLEY, 

Plaintiff, 
v. 

: 
: 

: 

: 

: 
No. 5:13‐CV‐52 (CAR) 
VARIETY WHOLESALERS, INC. 
: 
d/b/a MAXWAY STORES, 
: 

: 
Defendant. 
: 
___________________________________  : 

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Before  the  Court  is  Defendant  Variety  Wholesalers,  Inc.’s  Motion  for  Partial 
Summary  Judgment  [Doc.  15]  on  Plaintiff’s  claim  for  litigation  expenses.    Having  fully 
considered  the  Motion,  the  brief  in  support  thereof,  the  evidence  of  record,  and  the 
applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.   
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary  judgment  is  proper  “if  the  movant  shows  that  there  is  no  genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”1    The  moving  party  “always  bears  the  initial  responsibility  of  informing  the 
district  court  of  the  basis  for  its  motion,  and  identifying  those  portions  of  the 
pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to  interrogatories,  and  admissions  on  file,  together 
with  the  affidavits,  if  any,  which  it  believes  demonstrates  the  absence  of  a  genuine 

1

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).   

issue  of  material  fact”  and  that  entitles  it  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.2    If  the 
moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the  nonmoving party 
to  go  beyond  the  pleadings  and  present  specific  evidence  showing  that  there  is  a 
genuine issue of material fact.3   
The Court must view the facts, and any reasonable inferences drawn from those 
facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.4  “The inferences, 
however,  must  be  supported  by  the  record,  and  a  genuine  dispute  of  material  fact 
requires  more  than  ‘some  metaphysical  doubt  as  to  the  material  facts.’”5    In  cases 
where opposing parties tell different versions of the same events, and one is “blatantly 
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should 
not adopt that version of the facts.”6  A disputed fact will preclude summary judgment 
only  “if  the  dispute  might  affect  the  outcome  of  the  suit  under  the  governing  law.”7  
“The court many  not resolve any material factual  dispute, but must deny the motion 
and proceed to trial if it finds that such an issue exists.”8 

 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324‐26.   
4 Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir. 2010); Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 
1992). 
5 Logan v. Smith, 439 F. App’x 798, 800 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Penley, 605 F.3d at 848). 
6 Pourmoghani‐Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 
U.S. 372, 380) (2007)). 
7 Penley, 605 F.3d at 848 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
8 Envtl. Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir. 1981).  In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 
1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all the decisions of the 
former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 
2 
2
3

If the nonmoving party does not respond to the motion for summary judgment, 

“the district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the 
motion  [is]  unopposed,  but,  rather,  must  consider  the  merits  of  the  motion.”9    In 
discharging its burden,  
The  district  court  need  not  sua  sponte  review  all  of  the  evidentiary 
materials  on  file  at  the  time  the  motion  is  granted,  but  must  ensure  that 
the  motion  itself  is  supported  by  evidentiary  materials.    At  the  least,  the 
district  court  must  review  all  of  the  evidentiary  materials  submitted  in 
support of the motion for summary judgment.10 

Even when the motion is unopposed, the district court must ensure that evidence in the 
record  supports  the  motion  and  may  enter  summary  judgment  only  when  no  genuine 
issue of material fact remains.11 

BACKGROUND 
This premises liability action arises out of injuries sustained by Plaintiff while

shopping at Defendant’s place of business. The facts viewed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, the nonmovant, are as follows.
On March 21, 2011, Plaintiff went shopping at Defendant’s Maxway Store
location in Eatonton, Georgia.12 As she was leaving the store, she stopped to peruse a

 United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
10 Id. at 1101‐02 (internal citation omitted).  
11 Id. at 1101 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 
12 Compl. ¶ 6 [Doc. 1‐3]; Farley Dep. 91:6‐7 [Doc. 17]. 
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display of flowers near the store’s entrance.13 Stacked near the flower display were
boxes on a wooden pallet.14

As Plaintiff began to walk back to her car, one of

Defendant’s employees clipped the wire strap securing the boxes, causing the boxes to
fall.15 Some of the boxes struck Plaintiff as they fell, forcefully knocking her into the
parking lot.16 Due to the fall, Plaintiff injured her lower back, left shoulder, and neck,
and skinned her leg when she hit the concrete.17
On January 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in the Superior Court
of Putnam County, alleging Defendant’s employee negligently caused the boxes to fall
on Plaintiff, and Defendant negligently failed to keep its premises safe in violation of
O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1.18 In her Complaint, Plaintiff seeks compensation for past, present,
and future pain and suffering, medical expenses, and litigation expenses pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.19

Defendant denied liability and asserted a defense based on

Plaintiff’s contributory negligence.20

On February 12, 2013, Defendant removed

Plaintiff’s action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446.
Defendant now moves for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for
litigation expenses. Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion, and the time in which to do
so has expired. Therefore, the Motion is now ripe for review.

 Farley Dep. 64:12‐19 [Doc. 17].  
 Id. at 66:10‐18. 
15 Id. at 65:1‐14. 
16 Id. at 69:23‐25.  
17 Id. at 34:19‐36:1. 
18 Compl. ¶¶ 8‐13 [Doc. 1‐3].  
19 Id. at ¶¶ 16‐19. 
20 Answer, pp. 1‐2 [Doc. 1‐4]. 
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DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff seeks litigation expenses pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, which states
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the
damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made
prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been
stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and
expense, the jury may allow them.
To recover litigation expenses under this statute, Plaintiff must demonstrate
Defendant’s conduct falls within one of the three categories above. In its Motion,
Defendant argues no record evidence shows Defendant acted in any of the three ways
prescribed by this statute, and thus an award of litigation expenses under Georgia law
would be improper. The Court agrees.
Under the “bad faith” prong, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant’s
conduct amounted to more than negligence or bad judgment.21

Bad faith within the

meaning of this statute “imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and
implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some
motive of interest or ill will.”22 In addition, Plaintiff must show Defendant acted with
bad faith “in the transaction [giving rise] to the litigation” to support her claim for

 Powell Co. v. McGarey Grp., LLC, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1219 (N.D. Ga. 2007); see also Metro. Atlanta Rapid 
Transit  Auth.  v.  Mitchell,  289  Ga.  App.  1,  4  (2007)  (“[M]ere  negligence  will  not  support  an  award  of 
attorney fees based on bad faith.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
22 Rapid Grp., Inc. v. Yellow Cab of Columbus, Inc., 253 Ga. App. 43, 49 (2001) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
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litigation expenses.23 Bad faith does not encompass Defendant’s conduct during the
litigation itself.24
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, at most, Defendant and
its employee acted negligently in failing to keep the premises safe and clipping the wire
strap securing the boxes. No evidence in the record suggests that Defendant or its
employee acted with a dishonest purpose or was otherwise motivated by ill will to
cause harm to Plaintiff. Because bad faith requires more than mere negligence, Plaintiff
is not entitled to litigation expenses on this ground.
In addition, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant has been stubbornly
litigious or has caused Plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense. To recover litigation
expenses under these prongs, Plaintiff must show “there exists no bona fide controversy
or dispute regarding liability for the underlying cause of action.”25 Here, genuine issues
of material fact remain as to liability, causation, and damages. Specifically, an issue
remains as to whether Plaintiff failed to take precautions for her own safety, and, by
extension, whether she is partially responsible for her own injuries. Moreover, given
her previous medical history, a dispute exists as to whether, or to what extent, the fall
caused the injuries in question. Because bona fide controversies exist, Plaintiff has
failed to show Defendant has been stubbornly litigious or has caused Plaintiff

 David G. Brown, P.E., Inc. v. Kent, 274 Ga. 849, 850 (2002). 
 Id.  
25Kent, 274 Ga. at 850. 
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unnecessary trouble and expense. Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot recover
litigation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 in this case.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
[Doc. 15] on Plaintiff’s claim for litigation expenses is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 5th day of May, 2014. 
S/  C. Ashley Royal 
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, CHIEF JUDGE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
ADP/ssh 

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