HUTCHINS v. BIBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Filing 16

ORDER DENYING 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTING 14 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by U.S. District Judge Marc Thomas Treadwell on 1/8/2014. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
JEROME HUTCHINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-CV-72 (MTT)

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment. (Docs. 13, 14). The Plaintiff did not file any response to the Defendant’s
motion. Thus, the facts set forth by the Defendant in its statement of material facts
(Doc. 14-1) are admitted. M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. The Court has also reviewed the record
and finds the facts undisputed. For the reasons discussed below, the Plaintiff’s motion
is DENIED, and the Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In late September 2011, Plaintiff Jerome Hutchins, an African-American male,
was hired by Defendant Bibb County School District to work as a seventh grade math
teacher at Weaver Middle School. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 4). Hutchins was recommended for
this position by Dr. Pamela Carswell, the principal of Weaver. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 5).
Hutchins previously worked at Bloomfield Middle School in the School District during the
2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 1). During that time, Hutchins
was enrolled in the Georgia Teacher Alternative Preparation Program to obtain his
temporary teaching certificate. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 1). At the end of the 2009 school year,

Hutchins’s contract was not renewed because he had not passed the Georgia
Assessments for the Certification of Educators test. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 1).
During the 2009-2010 school year, Hutchins worked at Thompson Middle School
in the Houston County School District. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 2). His contract was not
renewed at the end of that year. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 2). During the 2010-2011 school year,
Hutchins worked at Randolph Clay Middle School in the Randolph County School
District. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 3). That contract was not renewed either. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 3).
Teachers at Weaver Middle School were evaluated using the Georgia Teacher
Evaluation Program. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 6). This program requires teachers to be
informally and formally observed in the classroom, and formal observations are
conducted using the Georgia Teacher Observation Instrument (“GTOI observation”).
Dr. Carswell assigned Dr. Chad Thompson, an assistant principal at Weaver, to
administer Hutchins’s first formal GTOI observation on November 4, 2011. (Doc. 14-1
at ¶¶ 8-9). Dr. Thompson had previously conducted an informal evaluation of
Hutchins’s classroom, and Dr. Thompson believed Hutchins was not timely responding
to disruptive behaviors among his students. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶¶ 10-11).
Dr. Thompson scored Hutchins with “needs improvement” in two areas, referred
to as “teacher-focused” and “appropriate behavior,” for the November 4 GTOI
observation. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 12). Hutchins believes Dr. Thompson rated him as “needs
improvement” because Dr. Thompson did not realize Hutchins was handling an urgent
situation with a student, but Hutchins admits Dr. Thompson “was right about some
things [he] could improve.” (Doc. 14-1 at ¶¶ 13-14).

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Following this observation, Dr. Carswell asked Dotty Taylor, a teacher support
specialist, to work with Hutchins on the deficiencies identified by Dr. Thompson. (Doc.
14-1 at ¶ 16). Also subsequent to the observation, Dr. Thompson and Jimmie
Montgomery, another assistant principal at the school, responded weekly, and
eventually daily, to disruptive behaviors by students in Hutchins’s classroom. (Doc. 141 at ¶¶ 17-19).
On December 14, 2011, Dr. Carswell, Dr. Thompson, and Montgomery met with
Hutchins to discuss performance issues and the need for a Professional Development
Plan. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 20). A development plan includes specific objectives for
improvement, activities and a timeline for meeting those objectives, criteria for
measuring progress, and a record of participation in the recommended activities. (Doc.
14-1 at ¶ 21). Dr. Carswell presented the plan to Hutchins during a meeting on January
24, 2012. The plan included a requirement that 70 percent of Hutchins’s students meet
or exceed standards on the Spring 2012 administration of the Criterion Referenced
Competency Test (“CRCT”) in math. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 22). Hutchins refused to sign or
take a copy of the plan. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 23). While Hutchins stated he did not oppose
the plan itself, he objected to the 70 percent criterion because 63 percent of the
students failed to meet standards on the prior administration of the exam. (Doc. 14-6 at
65:20-66:3).
On January 25, a second meeting was held with Hutchins to explain the
importance of the development plan, but he again refused to sign or take a copy of it.
(Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 26). On January 27, Dr. Carswell, Dr. Thompson, Montgomery, and Dr.

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Bertha Caldwell, an assistant superintendent for the School District, met with Hutchins a
third time to discuss the plan, but Hutchins again refused to sign it. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 27).
Dr. Carswell requested that Lynn Janes, the coordinator of school improvement
in mathematics, conduct an independent observation of Hutchins’s classroom
instruction on February 6, 2012.1 (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 28). Janes believed Hutchins was not
properly disciplining his students and was giving them inconsistent instructions. (Doc.
14-1 at ¶ 29). Hutchins, however, contends he was merely conducting an “engaging”
classroom. (Doc. 14-6 at 92:23-25). Janes sent an email containing her observation
summary to Hutchins and Dr. Carswell, but Hutchins seemed unwilling to accept
Janes’s recommendations or to work with her to improve his classroom management.
(Doc. 14-1 at ¶¶ 30-31).
A second GTOI observation was conducted by Dr. Carswell on February 13,
2012, and she gave Hutchins nine “needs improvement” marks. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 32).
Dr. Carswell noted the “classroom environment was chaotic,” “the physical setting of the
classroom was messy,” and Hutchins was not addressing inappropriate student
behavior. (Doc. 14-3 at ¶ 21). Dr. Carswell also requested that Charles O’Cain, the
math department chair at Weaver Middle School, work with Hutchins to improve his
classroom instruction, but O’Cain reported back to Dr. Carswell that he was not making
progress with Hutchins. (Doc. 14-3 at ¶ 25).
In advance of the deadline for issuing non-renewal decisions to teachers, the
School District conducts a series of at-risk conferences to review documentation of

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Hutchins believes Dr. Carswell and Janes selected February 6, 2012, the date after the 2012 Super
Bowl, for the observation because they knew teachers would not be organized the day after the Super
Bowl, and they were engaged in a conspiracy to get rid of him. (Doc. 14-6 at 102:9-103:6).
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performance issues and discuss the appropriateness of recommended non-renewal
decisions. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 34). On February 27, 2012, Dr. Carswell met with Hutchins
to inform him that he had been placed on the list of employees who would be
considered for non-renewal during the at-risk committee meetings, and later that day
she provided Hutchins with a written summary of their meeting. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 41). Dr.
Carswell made this decision after determining “no additional amount of … instructional
support or time for remediation was likely to improve [Hutchins’s] classroom
performance” and because of his “stubborn refusal to accept responsibility for
responding to classroom behaviors … and to incorporate recommended, researchbased strategies into his classroom instruction.” (Doc. 14-3 at ¶¶ 29-30).
A third GTOI observation was conducted by Montgomery on March 22, 2012.
(Doc. 14-3 at ¶ 32). Montgomery informed Dr. Carswell that some students in
Hutchins’s classroom were “excessively off task” and caused a distraction for the other
students because Hutchins was not appropriately addressing the timely behavior. (Doc.
14-3 at ¶ 33). Although the third GTOI observation occurred after, and thus was not a
factor in, Dr. Carswell’s decision to place Hutchins on the recommended non-renewal
list, Dr. Carswell stated the final observation reaffirmed her conclusion that Hutchins’s
performance was unlikely to improve over time. (Doc. 14-3 at ¶ 34).
The at-risk committee agreed with Dr. Carswell’s recommendation and submitted
it to the School District’s superintendent for his approval. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 42). The
superintendent approved the recommendation, and Hutchins’s contract with the School
District was not renewed for the 2012-2013 school year. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 42). Hutchins

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believes Dr. Carswell discriminated against him because he alleges white employees
with similar classroom management problems were treated more favorably.
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment must be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A factual dispute is genuine only if ‘a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281
F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop.,
941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)). The burden rests with the moving party to prove
that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 281 F.3d at
1224. The party may support its assertion that a fact is undisputed by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
“If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must
establish all essential elements of the claim or defense in order to obtain summary
judgment.” Anthony v. Anthony, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing
Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438). The moving party must carry its burden
by presenting “credible evidence” affirmatively showing that, “on all the essential
elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury
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could find for the nonmoving party.” Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438. In
other words, the moving party’s evidence must be so credible that, if not controverted at
trial, the party would be entitled to a directed verdict. Id.
“If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is entitled to summary
judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, ‘comes[s] forward with significant,
probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.’” Id. (quoting
Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1991))
(alteration in original). However, “credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge. ... The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). Thus, the Court “‘can only grant summary judgment if everything in the
record demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.’” Strickland v. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805
F.2d 940, 952 (11th Cir. 1986)).
In contrast, “[w]hen the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material
negating the opponent's claim.’” Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1437 (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party “simply may
show … that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Id. at 1438 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Assuming the moving party
has met its burden, the non-movant must then show a genuine dispute regarding any

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issue for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 281
F.3d at 1224-25 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ
from the standard applied when only one party files a motion.2 See Am. Bankers Ins.
Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). “Cross-motions for
summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary
judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts
that are not genuinely disputed.” United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th
Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court will consider each
motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose
motion is under consideration. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., 408 F.3d at 1331.
B. McDonnell Douglas Framework
A Title VII plaintiff may prove his case directly or circumstantially. Here, there is
no direct evidence of discrimination, so Hutchins must rely on circumstantial evidence.
The framework for analyzing circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination is provided in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).3

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Hutchins previously moved for summary judgment, but the Court dismissed his motion without prejudice
for its failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Local Rule 7.1. (Doc. 12). The Court also sent
Hutchins a copy of the local rules. Nevertheless, Hutchins has filed a second motion for summary
judgment that fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Local Rule 7.1, and he asks the Court to excuse
this failure because he is pro se. Although courts liberally construe pro se pleadings, pro se plaintiffs are
not excused from procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). To the extent
Hutchins is requesting appointment of counsel in his second motion, appointment of counsel is
unwarranted because his claims are neither factually nor legally complex nor has he shown that
exceptional circumstances exist justifying the appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Wahl v. McIver,
773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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The Court recognizes that establishing the McDonnell Douglas elements is not “the sine qua non for a
plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion in an employment discrimination case.” Smith v.
Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff can always avoid summary
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Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden
of production, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). This burden of production means the
employer “need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered
reasons” but must produce evidence to raise a genuine factual dispute as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff. Kragor v. Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304,
1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
A plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that the employer’s stated reason is in
fact pretext for discrimination. “The plaintiff can show pretext ‘either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.’” Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). Put another way, “a plaintiff can
survive a motion for summary judgment … simply by presenting evidence sufficient to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the truth or falsity of the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.” Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957,
964-65 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Consequently, at this juncture it is not
required that a plaintiff prove his employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.

judgment by creating a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent. A plaintiff does this
by presenting “‘a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional
discrimination by the decisionmaker.’” Id. (quoting Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir.
2011)). However, Hutchins has not presented such evidence and does not meet Lockheed-Martin’s
standard.
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C. Racial Discrimination Claim
Generally, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII, Hutchins must show: (1) he is a member of a protected
class; (2) he was qualified for the position held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside his protected class or was treated
less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his protected class. Maynard
v. Bd. of Regents of the Div. of Univs. of the Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802). The School District
does not dispute that Hutchins can satisfy the first, second, and third elements of his
prima facie case.
Hutchins has not alleged he was replaced by a person outside his protected
class. However, Hutchins has identified Susan Hector and Elizabeth Wills, both
Caucasian teachers at Weaver Middle School, as two similarly-situated individuals who
were disciplined differently and treated more favorably than him. To be a proper
comparator, the employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class must be “similarly
situated in all relevant respects.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.
1997) (citations omitted). To determine whether employees are similarly situated, we
evaluate “whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar
conduct and are disciplined in different ways.” Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368
(11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he quantity and
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quality of the comparator’s misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent courts from
second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.”
Id. (citation omitted). In making this determination, courts must be mindful that “Title VII
does not take away an employer’s right to interpret its rules as it chooses, and to make
determinations as it sees fit under those rules.” Id. at 1369 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “[T]he most important factors in a comparator analysis in the
disciplinary context are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the
punishments imposed.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir.
2008) (citing Silvera v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Hector taught business and consumer science at Weaver during the 2011-2012
school year. During the Spring 2012 administration of the CRCT, Hector was assigned
as a text examiner, and Hutchins acted as a proctor. (Docs. 14-1 at ¶ 47; 14-6 at 121:916). Hector failed to comply with testing guidelines by using an e-reader during the
test’s administration, which Hutchins witnessed. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 48). Hutchins
contends Hector was treated more favorably because the school’s administration did
not require her to participate in a development plan, and she was not terminated.
Hector was, however, issued a letter of direction by Dr. Thompson for the infraction.
(Doc. 14-4 at 4, 7). Unlike Hutchins, Hector did not have any issues related to
classroom management, and she did not receive any “needs improvement” marks
during her GTOI observations. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 50). Hector’s infraction occurred on one
occasion, while Hutchins’s classroom management problems were documented on
multiple occasions. Thus, Hector was not accused of similar conduct, and she is not a
proper comparator.
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Wills taught language arts at Weaver during the 2011-2012 school year. Dr.
Carswell conducted Wills’s first GTOI observation on September 14, 2011 and gave her
one “needs improvement” mark for classroom management. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 52). Like
Hutchins, Wills was assigned to work with Taylor to improve her classroom
management skills. (Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 54). Soon after her observation, however, Wills
went on approved medical leave from October 5, 2011 through February 24, 2012.
(Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 53). Dr. Carswell did not consider submitting Wills’s name to the at-risk
committee because “she did not have an adequate opportunity to engage in remediation
activities or to benefit from instructional support during the school year.” (Doc. 14-3 at ¶
38). Wills received three “needs improvement” marks during her second GTOI
observation and was soon after placed on a development plan. (Doc. 14-3 at ¶¶ 39,
40).
Thus, Hutchins and Wills had similar issues with their classroom management
and were disciplined differently, but they were not similarly situated in all relevant
respects. Wills went on medical leave soon after her first GTOI observation and did not
return until the last day for Dr. Carswell to submit names to the at-risk committee.
Unlike Hutchins, Wills did not have the opportunity to work on a development plan or
with teaching instructors prior to that deadline. Further, the School District contends
Wills “did not engage in the kind of insubordinate, uncooperative[,] and oppositional
behavior that characterized [Hutchins’s] tenure at Weaver Middle School.” (Doc. 14-2 at
15).
Even if Wills or Hector was a proper comparator and Hutchins had established a
prima facie case of discrimination, the School District has offered legitimate,
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nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Hutchins. The School District asserts
Hutchins’s contract was not renewed because he: (1) refused to sign and accept his
development plan on three occasions; (2) failed to cooperate in the implementation of
the plan; and (3) dismissed recommendations by instructional support staff that were
intended to improve his overall performance. Thus, the presumption of discrimination
has been rebutted, and Hutchins must show the School District’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons are pretext.
As noted above, Hutchins may carry his burden of establishing the School
District’s proffered reasons for his termination were pretextual “either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 80405). The Court must consider “whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
find them unworthy of credence.” Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d
1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff
can demonstrate evidence of pretext by identifying a defendant’s inconsistent
statements, but the “mere denial of credibility” has no evidentiary value. Howard v. BP
Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 526 (11th Cir. 1994). “[A] plaintiff withstands summary
adjudication by producing sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to
conclude that the defendant's articulated reasons for its decision are not believable.” Id.

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Hutchins has produced no evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude
the School District’s proffered reasons are pretext. Hutchins does not contest that he
refused to sign the development plan or cooperate in its implementation, although he
insists he was only delaying signing the plan until he had time to consider the condition
requiring at least 70 percent of his students pass the CRCT. Instead, Hutchins makes
conclusory allegations that Weaver Middle School’s administrators were conspiring
against him and setting him up to fail. Contrary to Hutchins’s allegations, the School
District has produced evidence that it attempted to provide Hutchins with remedial
services to improve his classroom management on multiple occasions prior to its
decision to submit his name for nonrenewal. Hutchins had no problems with the plan
and acknowledged it was designed for his benefit, but he refused to sign it only because
he felt the 70 percent requirement was unreasonable.
The Court’s job is only to evaluate the honesty of the School District’s articulated
reasons and not to “‘second-guess [its] business judgment.’” Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp.,
731 F.3d 1196, 1207 (11th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. Al.
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)). The School District has provided
honest reasons for its decision to terminate Hutchins, and an employee’s failure to
participate in a development plan designed to improve his job performance could
motivate a reasonable employer to terminate an employee. Although Hutchins may
disagree with the wisdom of the School District’s requirement that at least 70 percent of
his students pass the CRCT, he has not put forth sufficient evidence to show the School
District’s explanations are unworthy of credence.  Accordingly, the School District is
entitled to summary judgment on Hutchins’s Title VII discrimination claim.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED, and the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED, this the 8th day of January, 2014.

S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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