BLOODWORTH v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

Filing 59

ORDER DENYING 48 Motion to Amend/Correct; DENYING as moot 51 Motion for an Order on Cassidy Immunity; and DENYING 57 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Ordered by U.S. District Judge MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 2/14/2014. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
EDWARD LAMAR BLOODWORTH,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
JOHN and/or JANE DOES,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-CV-112 (MTT)

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint
(Doc. 48) and motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 57). The Plaintiff filed his first motion to
amend his complaint on September 9, 2013. (Doc. 18). That motion was denied on
January 6, 2014, and the Plaintiff was instructed to renew his motion and attach a
proposed amended complaint by January 17 if he still wished to amend his complaint.
(Doc. 47). The Plaintiff filed his second motion to amend on January 15 but failed to
attach a proposed amended complaint. The Court then ordered the Plaintiff to file a
proposed amended complaint separate from his motion. (Doc. 49). The Plaintiff again
failed to file a separate proposed amended complaint and, instead, filed a lengthier
version of his motion to amend which jumbles together his allegations, claims, and
arguments. (Doc. 50).
The Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add eight individual defendants.
The Plaintiff claims he did not learn the identities of these individuals until discovery
began in this case. The Defendant argues that allowing the amendment would be futile

because all of these individuals are entitled to qualified or absolute immunity and any
claims that occurred prior to September 9, 2011 are barred by the statute of limitations.1
The Defendant contends the proposed defendants are entitled to immunity because the
Plaintiff does not make any specific allegations against any of them and instead lumps
them together under legally conclusive statements of liability.
The Court agrees with the Defendant. The Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
specific to any individual’s conduct and instead collectively accuses them of committing
civil conspiracy and violating his various constitutional rights.2 Without any allegations
as to each individual’s conduct, he has failed to identify any constitutional or statutory
violations caused by the individuals, and therefore, the proposed defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity.3 Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s motion to amend is DENIED. 4

1

Contrary to the Plaintiff’s assertions, the Defendant did not waive its right to oppose his motion to amend
nor did the Court state the Defendant was limited to opposing the motion on statute of limitations grounds
only.

2

The Plaintiff does identify particular individuals who he alleges confronted or assaulted him on May 25,
2011 and June 8, 2011. (Doc. 50 at 2). However, any claims arising from events on those dates are
barred by the two-year statute of limitations for Bivens claims because the Plaintiff did not seek leave to
amend his complaint until September 9, 2013. These claims are not saved by relation pack pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) because the evidence and “the [P]laintiff's conduct compel the conclusion that
the failure to name the prospective defendant[s] in the original complaint was [not] the result of … a
mistake concerning the proper defendant[s’] identit[ies].” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538,
552 (2010).

3

Judge Cassidy is entitled to absolute immunity because the Plaintiff has failed to allege that any of
Judge Cassidy’s actions were taken “in clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stevens v. Holder, 950 F. Supp.
2d 1282, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (citations omitted). Interestingly, the Plaintiff submitted a declaration from
a “courtroom observer” who attended the Plaintiff’s wife’s hearing in October 2011 but “did not observe
Judge Cassidy saying or doing anything that was unprofessional, inappropriate, or in any way out of the
ordinary.” (Doc. 48-1 at ¶ 6).
4

The Plaintiff’s motion for an order on whether Cassidy is entitled to immunity is DENIED as moot. (Doc.
51).

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Regarding the Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel, “the court may request an
attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
However, “[a]ppointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right.” Wahl v.
McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hunter v. Dept. of Air Force
Agency, 846 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.1988) (stating that decision is within discretion
of district court). Rather, “it is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional
circumstances.” Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174. In exercising its discretion regarding whether
to appoint counsel for an indigent party, “the district court typically considers, among
other factors, the merits of the plaintiff’s claim and whether the claim is factually or
legally so complex as to warrant the assistance of counsel.” Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850,
853 (11th Cir. 1989).
Here, the Plaintiff asserts that he should be appointed counsel because the
issues in his case are complicated. Even assuming the Plaintiff’s claims have merit,
appointment of counsel is unwarranted because the Plaintiff has not made any showing
that his claims are factually or legally complex. See Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174 (finding
that exceptional circumstances were not established where essential facts and legal
doctrines were ascertainable without assistance of court-appointed counsel).
Accordingly, because the Plaintiff has not shown the existence of exceptional
circumstances necessary to justify the appointment of counsel, the motion to appoint
counsel is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this the 14th day of February, 2014.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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