BLOODWORTH v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al
Filing
74
ORDER DENYING 55 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 62 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and DENYING 73 Plaintiff's Motion for Hearing. Ordered by U.S. District Judge MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 5/7/2014. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
EDWARD LAMAR BLOODWORTH,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
JOHN and/or JANE DOES,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:13-CV-112 (MTT)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment (Docs. 55, 62). The Plaintiff failed both to respond to the Defendant’s
statement of material facts and to attach a statement of material facts to his own motion.
Thus, the facts set forth by the Defendant in its statement of material facts (Doc. 63) are
admitted. M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. Indeed, although the Plaintiff is a prolific filer of pleadings,
he barely responded to the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Essentially, he
does nothing more than ask for his day in court. The Plaintiff’s deemed admissions of
fact and the absence of a substantive response to the Defendant’s motion warrant
granting the motion. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the record to determine
whether summary judgment is appropriate and finds the facts undisputed, except where
noted below. The Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED, and the Defendant’s motion is
GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) case stemming from Plaintiff Edward
Lamar Bloodworth’s interactions with federal employees during his wife’s, Dae Eek
Cho,1 immigration case in 2011 and 2012. On April 29, 2011, Bloodworth called the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) duty desk and spoke with Immigration
Enforcement Agent Gary Burcham. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 2). Bloodworth’s first statement to
Burcham was, “Is there anybody at Immigration that has any sense?” (Doc. 62-4 at ¶
5). While Burcham attempted to answer Bloodworth’s questions politely, Bloodworth
continued to complain about the immigration system in a “belligerent and angry” tone
before hanging up. (Doc. 62-4 at ¶ 5). Burcham informed his supervisor about the call,
and Burcham’s supervisor directed him not to answer any other calls from Bloodworth’s
number. (Doc. 62-4 at ¶ 6). Bloodworth called back 10 to 15 times that day and a few
times the next day. (Doc. 62-4 at ¶ 7). Burcham did not answer any of those calls, and
Bloodworth did not leave any messages. (Doc. 62-4 at ¶ 7).
On May 11, 2011, Bloodworth went to the immigration courthouse in Atlanta to
attend his wife’s immigration hearing. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 7). Judge William Cassidy, who
was presiding over Cho’s case at the time, discussed Cho’s immigration status with
Bloodworth and Cho. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 9). Bloodworth requested that Cho’s hearing be
rescheduled to allow him time to retain counsel and that Cho be released on bond.
(Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 10-11). Judge Cassidy denied the request to release Cho because she
was ineligible to be released on bond due to her multiple convictions for shoplifting.
(Doc. 63 at ¶ 12). Judge Cassidy also informed Bloodworth that Cho would need to file
a 601 petition to request a waiver of those crimes if she wished to change her status
from an illegal alien to a citizen on the basis of her marriage. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 13).
1
Cho is a Korean national who was mandatorily detained as an illegal alien with convictions for crimes
involving moral turpitude. Because she was facing deportation, she filed a Form I-601, Application for
Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility, for waiver of the crimes so that she could adjust her status to a
permanent resident based on hardship to Bloodworth as her United States citizen spouse.
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Bloodworth and Cho were also instructed to bring all documents and evidence
necessary to adjudicate the request for the waiver to the next hearing scheduled for
May 25, 2011. (Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 14-15).
On May 13, Burcham retrieved a voice message from Bloodworth to the ICE duty
desk leaving his name and number and yelling, “Call me!” (Doc. 62-4 at ¶ 9). Following
the directions of his supervisor, Burcham contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), and an FBI agent referred the matter to the Joint Terrorism Task Force. (Doc.
62-4 at ¶ 10). Subsequently, a Secret Service agent contacted Burcham and “advised
that the interactions sounded like a case of general disgust with the government” rather
than a direct threat. (Doc. 62-4 at ¶ 10).
On May 25, the date of Cho’s next hearing, Immigration Enforcement Agent
Jamie Sollose-Taylor was assigned to escort detainees to and from court. (Doc. 62-8 at
¶ 4). Because Judge Cassidy’s courtroom was overcrowded, Sollose-Taylor asked all
family members, including Bloodworth, to wait in the hallway until their relative’s case
was called in accordance with courtroom procedures. (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 5). SolloseTaylor observed Bloodworth speaking loudly in the hallway, and she requested
Bloodworth lower his voice because his loud talking was disruptive to the proceedings.
(Doc. 62-8 at ¶¶ 6-7). Bloodworth complied with Sollose-Taylor’s request at that time.
(Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 7).
Judge Cassidy did not reach Cho’s case prior to the lunch break, and SolloseTaylor and Immigration Enforcement Agent Anthony Settle began escorting detainees
back to the detention cells for the lunch break. (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 8). Before SolloseTaylor could escort Cho from the courtroom, Bloodworth entered and moved
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aggressively towards Cho. (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 10). Sollose-Taylor stepped in front of
Bloodworth and began explaining that Cho’s case would be heard after lunch, but
Bloodworth pushed past Sollose-Taylor by using aggressive physical contact. (Doc. 628 at ¶ 10). Bloodworth began talking to Cho, and Sollose-Taylor asked Bloodworth to
step outside into the hallway. (Doc. 62-8 at ¶¶ 10-11). Bloodworth refused, sat down
on the bench, and said, “Why can’t I sit here on the bench?” (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 11).
Sollose-Taylor again asked Bloodworth to step outside into the hallway, and Bloodworth
complied. (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 12). In the hallway, Sollose-Taylor warned Bloodworth that
his behavior was interfering with court proceedings and that his aggressive manner
toward her violated courtroom procedure. (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 13). Sollose-Taylor also
explained to Bloodworth that detainees were not allowed to have any contact or
communication with family members. (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 14).
Despite the pre-lunch incident, Bloodworth attempted to hand Cho a piece of
paper as she was being escorted back to the courtroom after lunch.2 (Doc. 62-8 at ¶¶
15-16). Sollose-Taylor asked building security to escort Bloodworth out of the building.
(Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 16). Before he could be physically removed, however, Bloodworth
quickly made his way to the lobby and out of the building.3 (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 17). After
Bloodworth left the building, Sollose-Taylor informed Federal Protective Service (“FPS”)
agents of her interactions with Bloodworth. (Doc. 62-8 at ¶ 18).
2
Although Bloodworth did not admit to attempting to hand Cho a piece of paper, Bloodworth did admit
that he spoke with Cho as she was being escorted back to the courtroom. (Doc. 65-1 at 29:11-18).
3
Bloodworth testified that Settle forcibly took him to the lobby as Bloodworth was attempting to reenter
the courtroom. (Doc. 65-1 at 23:12-18).
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Subsequent to those events, Cho’s case was called, and Judge Cassidy
informed Cho of the events leading up to Bloodworth’s departure. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 47).
Because Bloodworth was no longer present, Judge Cassidy set another hearing date of
June 8, 2011 for Cho to present evidence in support of her 601 petition. (Doc. 63 at ¶
48).
The next day, May 26, ICE Assistant Field Office Director Jarvis McMillar
directed an ICE officer to create a “Be on the Lookout” (“BOLO”) alert for Bloodworth.
(Doc. 63 at ¶ 49). McMillar made this direction based on the statements made by
Bloodworth during his calls to the ICE duty desk and Bloodworth’s disruptive behavior
the previous day. (Doc. 62-11 at ¶¶ 4(1)-4(2)). The purpose of the BOLO was for
officer awareness and safety and to notify any agents or court personnel who
encountered Bloodworth in or around the building to report it immediately to FPS and
the Homeland Security Investigations duty agent. (Docs. 62-10; 62-11 at ¶ 4(2)).
On June 8, attorney Joseph Azar appeared on behalf of Cho and requested a
continuance because he was not prepared to move forward with her 601 petition. (Doc.
63 at ¶ 53). Judge Cassidy rescheduled the hearing for June 29, 2011, and Azar asked
Judge Cassidy whether Bloodworth would be allowed to attend that hearing.4 (Doc. 63
at ¶¶ 54-55). Judge Cassidy instructed Azar to file the 601 petition and make a formal
request to FPS to allow Bloodworth to attend, and Azar stated that he understood.
(Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 56-57).
4
Apparently, Bloodworth was asked to leave the building on June 8, 2011 as well. (Doc. 62-11 at ¶ 4(3)).
Bloodworth testified that, although he was removed from the building on this date, he was not touched or
physically assaulted. (Doc. 65-1 at 43:13-44:2).
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However, on June 29, Azar requested another continuance because he was
unprepared again.5 (Doc. 63 at ¶ 58). Judge Madeline Garcia, who was presiding on
that date, admonished Azar for his lack of preparedness given that his client was
detained. (Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 59-60). Nevertheless, Judge Garcia gave Azar an additional
week to make the necessary filings and present the 601 petition. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 61).
On July 7, 2011, Azar appeared on behalf of Cho with Judge Cassidy presiding.
(Doc. 63 at ¶ 63). Bloodworth was denied access to the immigration court. (Doc. 65-1
at 48:19-49:3). Azar again requested additional time, and a new hearing date was set
for September 14, 2011. (Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 64-65). Subsequently, Bloodworth and Cho
fired Azar and retained new counsel. (Doc. 65 at 49:21-50:13).
On September 14, 2011, attorney Christopher Palazzola appeared on behalf of
Cho. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 67). Palazzola was prepared to make several filings on that date,
but Judge Cassidy informed him that any filings should have been made at least 15
days prior to the hearing. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 69). Apparently, Bloodworth did not inform
Palazzola that he had previously been denied access to the immigration court, and
Bloodworth was again detained by agents in a security area. (Doc. 65 at 30:1-25).
Judge Cassidy determined Cho’s newly retained counsel did not have a strong
understanding of the case and rescheduled the hearing date to October 28, 2011 but
warned there would be no future continuances. (Doc. 66 at 47:23-49:6). Judge
Cassidy also noted that FPS had denied Bloodworth’s request to enter the building on
that date but stated that the court would make “other means available, either telephone,
affidavit, or the like, to ensure that safeguards are in place that we can have a full and
5
Bloodworth testified that he was denied entry to the building on June 29, 2011. (Doc. 65-1 at 48:8-18).
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complete hearing.” (Doc. 66 at 48:6-10; 49:7-9). Subsequently, Bloodworth and Cho
fired Palazzola. (Doc. 65 at 31:23-24).
On October 28, 2011, Cho appeared for her rescheduled hearing without
counsel. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 74). Bloodworth did not come to the court for this hearing
because he mistakenly believed the hearing was set for the previous day, although he
testified that he was denied access on October 27.6 (Doc. 65-1 at 51:16-52:18). Judge
Cassidy noted that Cho was in a “difficult situation” because Bloodworth was “a
necessary party to [her] case[,]” but FPS would not allow Bloodworth to enter the
building. (Doc. 66 at 51:18-23). Judge Cassidy stated that he wanted to “make
arrangements for [Bloodworth] to testify, albeit telephonic[ally],” and Judge Cassidy
gave Cho another continuance so that she could find representation. (Doc. 66 at 51:2352:1). Judge Cassidy again provided Cho with a list of attorneys who could represent
her and suggested she find an attorney to help her. (Doc. 66 at 52:6-53:15). After
Judge Cassidy’s numerous attempts to explain to her that he did not have the authority
to order FPS to admit Bloodworth into the building nor did he have the authority to
release her from detention due to her criminal record, Cho accused Judge Cassidy of
scaring away her attorneys. (Doc. 66 at 53:16-64:9).
Cho’s next hearing was held on December 8, 2011, and attorney Bonnie Youn
made an appearance on behalf of Cho. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 78). Bloodworth was also present
for that hearing.7 (Docs. 63 at ¶ 79; 65-1 at 54:2-7). Youn presented the 601 waiver
6
Despite his testimony, Bloodworth still asserts he was denied access to the immigration court on
October 28, 2011. (Docs. 55 at 2; 67 at 2).
7
Again, despite his testimony to the contrary, Bloodworth asserts in his motion for summary judgment
and response to the Government’s motion that he was denied access to the immigration court on
December 8, 2011. (Docs. 55 at 2; 67 at 2).
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petition, including exhibits, to which the parties made objections on the record. (Doc. 63
at ¶¶ 80-82). Youn presented an expert report from a psychologist, but the government
objected because the expert was not available to testify or be cross-examined. (Doc.
63 at ¶ 83). Youn conferred with Cho and Bloodworth to determine if they wanted a
continuance to obtain the expert’s testimony, and Judge Cassidy allowed the expert to
testify by phone to alleviate the financial costs of requiring him to testify in person.
(Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 84-85). Youn also requested the court issue a subpoena to obtain Cho’s
medical records from the detention facility, and Judge Cassidy agreed to do so. (Doc.
63 at ¶¶ 87-88). Judge Cassidy asked Youn to let him know when she wanted to
reschedule the hearing after consulting with the expert witness and obtaining records.
(Doc. 63 at ¶ 83). On January 26, 2012, Youn filed a motion to withdraw as Cho’s
counsel, citing Cho’s financial constraints and Cho’s wishes to no longer be represented
by Youn as the reasons for withdrawal.8 (Doc. 62-13).
On February 14, 2012 at 9:00 a.m., Cho appeared at her rescheduled hearing
without counsel or Bloodworth. (Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 91-92). Judge Dan Pelletier presided
over the hearing.9 (Doc. 63 at ¶ 91). Cho explained to Judge Pelletier that she had filed
a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 66 at 94:18-23). After Judge Pelletier informed Cho that her
motion would be denied, she requested they hold off on proceeding until Bloodworth
arrived for her hearing. (Doc. 66 at 96:15-97:7). Judge Pelletier resumed the hearing at
1:00 p.m., but Bloodworth had still not arrived. (Doc. 66 at 97:10-20). Judge Pelletier
8
Cho stated at her next hearing that she and her husband fired Youn. (Doc. 66 at 91:2-8). Bloodworth,
however, testified that Youn was not fired but, instead, was retained only for the purpose of attending the
December 8, 2011 hearing. (Doc. 65 at 75:11-76:3).
9
Judge Pelletier was assigned to Cho’s case after Judge Cassidy recused himself. (Doc. 66 at 89:2491:1).
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rescheduled Cho’s hearing for February 21, 2012 and told Cho she needed to inform
Bloodworth, as Cho’s petitioner, it was very important that he be present for her hearing.
(Doc. 66 at 104:7-17).
On February 21, Cho appeared without counsel, but Bloodworth was present.
(Doc. 63 at ¶ 94). At the hearing, both parties presented evidence, including testimony
from Bloodworth and Cho.10 (Doc. 63 at ¶ 95). At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge
Pelletier granted Cho’s application for adjustment of status to a lawful permanent
resident. (Doc. 63 at ¶ 96).
On September 12, 2012, Bloodworth filed an administrative claim with FPS for
$250,000 in damages resulting from alleged violations of his constitutional rights.11
(Docs. 1-1 at 3; 62-3). Because the agency did not make a final disposition of
Bloodworth’s claim within six months of the filing date, Bloodworth filed a new complaint
with the Court on March 28, 2013 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).12 (Doc. 1).
Bloodworth has attempted to amend his complaint twice, but both motions were
denied.13 (Docs. 18, 47-50, 59). The Government now seeks summary judgment on all
claims alleged in Bloodworth’s complaint.14
10
During Cho’s testimony, Judge Pelletier had to invoke the rule of sequestration and remove Bloodworth
from the courtroom because he interrupted the proceedings multiple times. (Doc. 66 at 134:5-24).
11
Bloodworth initially filed a complaint with this Court on January 17, 2012, but the Court dismissed his
complaint for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Bloodworth v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 5:12-cv20 (M.D. Ga. August 10, 2012) (Doc. 28).
12
The Department of Homeland Security eventually denied the claim on April 8, 2013. (Doc. 62-14).
13
In his recently filed document entitled, “Case Background and Plaintiff’s Litigation Observations,”
Bloodworth accused the Court of “stat[ing] in its own Order that some type of communications between
the Court and the [Government] took place that [Bloodworth] was not included in and was not informed of
until those communications had already occurred previous to December 20, 2013.” (Doc. 68 at ¶ 12).
The Court did not make this statement in its Order nor did any improper ex parte communications take
place between the Court and the Government. Rather, all statements by the Government referenced in
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment must be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A factual dispute is genuine only if ‘a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta,
281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real
Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)). The burden rests with the moving party to
prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 281
F.3d at 1224. The party may support its assertion that a fact is undisputed by “citing to
the Court’s Order (Doc. 47) regarding Bloodworth’s motion to amend his complaint were taken from the
Government’s discovery status report (Doc. 40 at 7), which was filed on the docket, or the status
conference held on December 20, 2013, which Bloodworth attended (Doc. 46).
14
Also in his “observations,” Bloodworth states that “[t]he United States Attorney has visited the Court’s
law clerk on several occasions and has made several phone calls to the Court or law clerk seeking advice
on tactical strategy for her case management and has received instructions from the [C]ourt on how and
when to file motions in this case or even if she should file a motion at all.” (Doc. 68 at ¶ 13). The
Assistant United States Attorney has never visited any of the Court’s law clerks nor has she spoken with
any of the Court’s law clerks on the phone. The Assistant United States Attorney has always
appropriately contacted the Court’s courtroom deputy, in accordance with ordinary Court procedures,
regarding the appropriate time for responding to Bloodworth’s motions or whether a response from her
was required. The Court does not discuss “tactical strategy” with counsel or pro se litigants under any
circumstances.
Further, Bloodworth inexplicably states in his “observations” that he did not receive “a single item of
discovery from the [United States] Attorney in [his] case.” (Doc. 68 at ¶ 15). During Bloodworth’s
deposition, however, the Assistant United States Attorney reviewed their correspondence and the
information exchanged during the discovery process. (Doc. 65-1). For example, the Assistant United
States Attorney asked, “Let me show you my Defense Exhibit 15, United States’ responses to plaintiff’s
discovery. Do you recall receiving that?” (Doc. 65-1 at 8:15-17). Bloodworth responded, “Yes, I
remember this one well. I remember this one well.” (Doc. 65-1 at 8:18-19). Any discovery disputes in
this case were addressed at the status conference held on December 20, 2013 (Doc. 46) and in this
Court’s Order following the conference (Doc. 47). Neither Party filed any motion or status update with the
Court regarding further discovery issues after that Order was entered.
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particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
“If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must
establish all essential elements of the claim or defense in order to obtain summary
judgment.” Anthony v. Anthony, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing
Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438). The moving party must carry its burden
by presenting “credible evidence” affirmatively showing that, “on all the essential
elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury
could find for the nonmoving party.” Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438. In
other words, the moving party’s evidence must be so credible that, if not controverted at
trial, the party would be entitled to a directed verdict. Id.
“If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is entitled to summary
judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, ‘come[s] forward with significant,
probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.’” Id. (quoting
Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1991))
(alteration in original). However, “credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge. ... The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). Thus, the Court “‘can only grant summary judgment if everything in the
record demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.’” Strickland v. Norfolk
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S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805
F.2d 940, 952 (11th Cir. 1986)).
In contrast, “[w]hen the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material
negating the opponent's claim.’” Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1437 (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party “simply may
show … that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Id. at 1438 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Assuming the moving party
has met its burden, the non-movant must then show a genuine dispute regarding any
issue for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 281
F.3d at 1224-25 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ
from the standard applied when only one party files a motion. See Am. Bankers Ins.
Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). “Cross-motions for
summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary
judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts
that are not genuinely disputed.” United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th
Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court will consider each
motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose
motion is under consideration. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., 408 F.3d at 1331.
B.
Claims Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act
In his Form 95, the only claim Bloodworth arguably raised was a denial of access
to the immigration court. Thus, the Government contends the claims Bloodworth raises
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in his complaint for assault, battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed. With regard
to Bloodworth’s claim that he was denied access to court, the Government contends, as
discussed below, that this constitutional claim is not cognizable under the FTCA. Even
if that claim could be raised pursuant to the FTCA, the undisputed facts show
Bloodworth was not improperly denied access to court.
The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity “for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA permits claims against the
United States “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.” Id.
A FTCA action may not be brought in court “unless the claimant shall have first
presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been
finally denied by the agency in writing [or the agency fails to make a final disposition of
the claim within six months from the date the claim is filed.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). “The
FTCA requires that each claim and each claimant meet the prerequisites for maintaining
a suit against the government.” Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th
Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). Filing a proper administrative claim is a
“jurisdictional requirement.” Id. at 1324. In enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), Congress
intended the administrative claim requirement to give agencies the opportunity to settle
suits prior to litigation, which “would ʻease court congestion and avoid unnecessary
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litigation, while making it possible for the Government to expedite the fair settlement of
tort claims asserted against the United States.’” Burchfield v. United States, 168 F.3d
1252, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
While Bloodworth filed an administrative claim with the appropriate federal
agency, he did not present all of the claims he asserts in this Court in his administrative
claim or in the attachments submitted with his claim. (Doc. 71). Rather than presenting
the facts relevant to his claims, Bloodworth stated, “[T]he Form 95 does not allow for a
detailed presentation of this claim.” (Doc. 71 at 3). Bloodworth did identify six
occasions during 2011 (May 25, June 8, June 29, July 7, September 14, and October
28) when he was denied access to the immigration court. (Doc. 71 at 4). However,
under the “Personal Injury / Wrongful Death” portion of the form directing the claimant to
“[s]tate the nature and extent of each injury … which forms the basis of the claim[,]”
Bloodworth wrote “not applicable” and “damages for violations of law.” (Doc. 71 at 5).
Nor did Bloodworth identify an amount of damages related to personal injury. (Doc. 71
at 5).
In his response to the Government’s motion, he does not contest the
Government’s argument that his claims are jurisdictionally barred because he did not
file an appropriate Form 95. Nor does Bloodworth argue that his administrative claim
sufficiently encompasses his FTCA claims. It is not enough that Bloodworth simply filed
a form. To satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), a claimant must do two things: (1) provide the
appropriate agency with written notice of his claim sufficient to enable the agency to
investigate and (2) give the agency a sum certain value of the claim. Id. (citation
omitted). The claimant is not required to provide the agency with every possible theory
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of recovery or every relevant factual detail, but the agency cannot be expected “to
undertake an independent search for injuries or theories of liability that are not closely
related to the matters described in the claim.” Id. at 1255-56 (citations omitted).
Further, “a claim may be so vague or lacking in detail that the agency cannot be
expected to initiate any investigation at all.” Id. at 1257 (citations omitted).
While Bloodworth met the second requirement by identifying a sum certain in his
administrative claim, his claim was so vague and lacking in detail that the agency could
not have been reasonably expected to search for injuries and theories of liability that
were in no way identified in his claim. Bloodworth’s claim states only that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was denied access to the immigration court
on six occasions. There are no facts to suggest any other tortious or negligent conduct
occurred in conjunction with the denials to attend court.
Even if Bloodworth had complied with 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the Government
argues that Bloodworth has not shown any employee acting within the scope of his or
her employment committed any of the intentional or negligent acts alleged. The Court
agrees. Bloodworth has not produced any evidence to demonstrate a factual dispute
exists regarding his alleged FTCA claims. The evidence produced by the Government
shows Bloodworth violated multiple immigration court procedures, was warned about
his behavior several times, and left the building before he could be forcibly removed on
May 25, 2011. Bloodworth has not presented any evidence that he was assaulted,
falsely imprisoned, intentionally or negligently subjected to emotional distress, or that
his privacy was invaded. Accordingly, the Government is entitled to summary judgment
on Bloodworth’s FTCA claims.
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C.
Claims for Constitutional Violations
Bloodworth has also brought constitutional tort claims pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment for alleged unreasonable searches and detentions and the Fifth
Amendment for alleged violations of his rights to equal protection and due process.15
But the FTCA does not waive the United States’ immunity for constitutional violations.16
See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994) (“Applying these principles to this
case, we conclude that Meyer's constitutional tort claim is not ‘cognizable’ under
§ 1346(b) because it is not actionable under § 1346(b)—that is, § 1346(b) does not
provide a cause of action for such a claim.”).
Even if Bloodworth’s constitutional violation claims were properly before the
Court, Bloodworth has failed to establish the elements of his claims or show a genuine
issue of material fact exists. It is undisputed that Bloodworth was not allowed into the
immigration court on multiple occasions.17 However, there is undisputed evidence in
the record showing the agents responsible for preventing Bloodworth from entering the
building had legitimate reasons to do so, including Bloodworth’s disruptive behavior and
failure to follow court procedures.
15
Bloodworth calls the next to last paragraph of his complaint his “Third Cause of Action.” (Doc. 1 at 5).
However, that paragraph sets forth only facts and opinions rather than any cognizable legal claims and,
therefore, does not merit discussion.
16
Although plaintiffs may pursue Bivens claims against federal employees for constitutional violations,
there are no individual defendants in this case because Bloodworth never successfully amended his
complaint to join any individual defendants.
17
Bloodworth seems to argue at various points in the record that the filing of his first federal lawsuit on
January 17, 2012 is what finally allowed him to gain access to the immigration court. (See, e.g., Doc. 651 at 59:9-24). However, Bloodworth does not attempt to reconcile his argument with the fact that he was
allowed to attend Cho’s hearing on December 8, 2011.
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Further, Bloodworth has not shown he had an unequivocal right to be present for
his wife’s immigration proceedings. There is no doubt that the United States citizen
spouse, or other qualifying relative, of an illegal alien who is applying for a waiver while
in removal proceedings is a vital witness.18 Judges Cassidy and Pelletier expressed the
importance of Bloodworth’s presence for the 601 hearings, and the transcript of Cho’s
immigration proceedings clearly shows Judge Cassidy attempted to instruct Cho’s
various attorneys what steps to take to ensure Bloodworth was present or could at least
testify through some means. However, Bloodworth has cited no authority showing he
had an unqualified right to be present at the hearing in light of his disruptive actions.
With regard to Bloodworth’s equal protection claim, he has not adduced any
evidence, or even pled any allegations, regarding discrimination on the basis of any
protected characteristic. Nor has Bloodworth produced any evidence that he was
unlawfully searched and detained. Accordingly, the Government is entitled to summary
judgment on Bloodworth’s claims for violations of his constitutional rights.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bloodworth’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED, and the Government’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.19
18
Bloodworth submitted declarations from two of his wife’s former attorneys to this effect. (Docs. 55-1;
55-2).
19
On May 6, the day before the entry of this Order, Bloodworth filed a “Motion for Hearing on Current
Matters.” (Doc. 73). The Court cannot tell exactly why Bloodworth wants a hearing, but it is possible to
read his motion to raise a question as to the authenticity of the copy of his administrative claim tendered
by the Government. The Government’s statement of undisputed facts contains detailed allegations about
Bloodworth’s administrative claim. (Doc. 63 at ¶¶ 97-103). These allegations incorporate Exhibit A to the
Government’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 62-3). Exhibit A is a copy of Bloodworth’s Form 95.
As noted, Bloodworth failed to respond to the Government’s statement of undisputed facts and thus those
facts are admitted. In addition, the Government filed separately, along with an affidavit of authenticity, a
copy of Bloodworth’s administrative claim. (Doc. 71). Accordingly, to the extent Bloodworth’s motion for
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SO ORDERED, this the 7th day of May, 2014.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
a hearing attempts to contest the authenticity of the administrative claim he filed, it is without merit.
Certainly there is no reason for a hearing. Bloodworth’s motion for a hearing is DENIED.
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