WALTON v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Filing
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ORDER denying 1 Motion for Order Pursuant to Customer Challenge Provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3410 seeking to quash subpoena.Ordered by Judge C. Ashley Royal on 10/3/13 (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
ROBERT P. WALTON, III,
Movant,
v.
:
:
:
:
:
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, :
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, :
:
Respondent.
:
:
No. 5:13‐CV‐302 (CAR)
ORDER ON MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
Before the Court is Movant Robert P. Walton III’s pro se “Motion for Order
Pursuant to Customer Challenge Provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3410” [Doc. 1], seeking to quash Respondent’s subpoena of his
financial records. Respondent filed a timely response to the Motion [Doc. 3]. After
thoroughly considering the Motion and the applicable law, Movant’s Motion [Doc. 1]
is DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent is currently conducting an investigation into missing money from a
registry bag, thought to have been stolen from the mail at a postal facility where
Movant works. In furtherance of the investigation, Respondent issued a subpoena
duces tecum to Robins Federal Credit Union on July 29, 2013, requesting information
regarding accounts held by Movant. On August 15, 2013, Respondent mailed Movant
a copy of the subpoena as well as a customer notice stating that the financial records
were being sought for the purpose of aiding an investigation by the Inspector General
“regarding U.S. Postal Service funds.” Additionally, Respondent provided Movant
with challenge forms and instructions, advising him of his right to object to the
subpoena and outlining the proper procedure for doing so.
On August 22, 2013, Movant timely filed the present Motion, essentially
requesting the Court to quash the subpoena. In support of his Motion, Movant argues
some of the records sought are not relevant to Respondent’s investigation, and
Respondent failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act (the “RFPA”). Respondent argues that the records are relevant to a
legitimate law enforcement inquiry, and it has substantially complied with the notice
requirements of the RFPA.
DISCUSSION
“The RFPA provides only three grounds on which the district court may quash
a subpoena: (1) the agencyʹs inquiry is not a legitimate law enforcement inquiry or (2)
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the records requested are not relevant to the agencyʹs inquiry or (3) the agency has not
substantially complied with the RFPA.”1 The Court discusses each of these issues in
turn as they relate to the subpoena in this case.
I. Legitimacy of Law Enforcement Inquiry
Movant does not directly question the legitimacy of Respondent’s investigation
in his Motion. Moreover, as pointed out by Respondent, the Inspector General Act of
1978 gives Respondent broad power to conduct these types of investigations and
specifically grants Respondent the power to subpoena documents relevant to such
investigations.2 Given this broad grant of authority and the undisputed
representations in Respondent’s brief of a purported theft, the Court finds the
Respondent is engaged in a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.
II. Relevancy of Financial Records
As to the second issue, Movant argues some of the records requested are not
relevant to the investigation. The Court disagrees.
Although Respondent has the ultimate burden of proving the financial records
are relevant, “the initial burden of production is on the movant to offer proof of facts
which show that the documents requested have no connection with the subject matter
Sandsend Fin. Consultants, Ltd. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 878 F.2d 875, 882 (5th Cir. 1989); see also 12
U.S.C. § 3410(c)).
2 See 5 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 4(a)(1), 6(a)(4).
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of the investigation.”3 Movant has failed to provide any factual basis for his assertion
that the records are irrelevant. Movant appears to argue some of the accounts he
holds jointly with his wife are irrelevant because his wife is not under investigation.
However, the fact that the accounts are jointly held has no bearing on the relevancy
analysis because Movant still has access to these accounts. Moreover,
[f]or purposes of an administrative subpoena, the notion of relevancy is
a broad one. An agency can investigate merely on the suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is
not. So long as the material requested touches a matter under
investigation, an administrative subpoena will survive a challenge that
the material is not relevant.4
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the records sought by Respondent are
clearly relevant to the investigation of the missing registry bag funds. As averred by a
special agent for Respondent, the theft occurred at the postal facility where Movant
works, and “[Respondent] has reason to believe that [Movant] was involved in the
theft.”5 Because Movant’s financial records could shed light on his suspected
participation in the theft, the Court finds the financial records sought are relevant to
the investigation.
Breakey v. Inspector Gen. of U.S. Depʹt of Agric., 836 F. Supp. 422, 425 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (referencing
Hancock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D. 209, 211 (D.D.C. 1980)).
4 Sandsend Fin. Consultants, Ltd., 878 F.2d at 882 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
5 Bankston Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5.
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III. Substantial Compliance with RFPA Notice Requirements
Finally, Movant argues the Court should quash the subpoena because
Respondent did not substantially comply with the RFPA notice requirements. The
RFPA states a government agency may obtain financial records via an administrative
subpoena only if,
a copy of the subpoena or summons has been served upon the customer
or mailed to his last known address on or before the date on which the
subpoena or summons was served on the financial institution together
with . . . notice which shall state with reasonable specificity the nature of
the law enforcement inquiry[.]6
Pursuant to this authority, Movant argues the notice he received was untimely and
not reasonably specific as to the nature of the investigation.
A. Untimeliness of Notice
First, Movant argues the notice was untimely because he received the notice on
August 16, 2013, a mere six days before the bank had to produce the records.
Although Movant was not served with the subpoena and accompanying documents
“on or before the date” on which Respondent issued the original subpoena, the Court
finds this is an insufficient basis on which to grant his Motion.
12 U.S.C. § 3405(2).
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The RFPA requires substantial, not strict, compliance by the government
agency issuing the administrative subpoena.7 The purpose behind the notice
provisions is to allow the customer the opportunity to object to the subpoena before
the government agency obtains access to such records. Notice is insufficient if the
customer does not have this opportunity.8 As evidenced by the present Motion, the
notice provided Movant with ample opportunity to object prior to production of the
documents, and thus the notice served its statutory purpose.
Furthermore, the subpoena issued to the bank stated that the bank would not
be required to produce the records unless Respondent first tendered a Certificate of
Compliance with the RFPA, certifying that Respondent had served Movant with
notice of the subpoena and provided Movant with the statutory time period in which
to object. Given these procedural safeguards, the Court finds the delay of notice in
this case is an insufficient ground upon which to quash the subpoena.
B. Reasonable Specificity of Notice
Second, Movant argues the notice did not reasonably specify the nature of the
law enforcement inquiry for which the records were requested. The notice so
See 12 U.S.C. § 3410(c) (“If the court finds . . . that there has not been substantial compliance with the
provisions of this chapter, it shall order the process quashed”).
8 See Botero‐Zea v. United States, 915 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[F]ailure to provide [Plaintiff]
with notice and an opportunity to dispute the production of records pursuant to such subpoenae
constituted a violation of the [RFPA]”).
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provided states that Respondent is seeking the records for “an Office of Inspector
General investigation . . . regarding U.S. Postal Service Funds.” As noted by
Respondent, merely stating the records are needed for an Inspector General
investigation is not reasonably specific.9 However, the tailoring of the present notice
specifically to “U.S. Postal Service funds” is reasonably specific within the meaning of
the RFPA. Moreover, Respondent’s brief and affidavit in support thereof filed in this
proceeding further elaborate on the purpose for which these records were requested
and cure any defect in the previous notice, if any so existed.10
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds Respondent issued the
subpoena in furtherance of a legitimate law enforcement inquiry, the records sought
are relevant to the inquiry, and Respondent substantially complied with the RFPA.
Accordingly, the Motion [Doc. 1] is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of October, 2013.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
ADP/ssh
Chang v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 82 F. Supp. 2d 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
See Breakey, 836 F. Supp. at 427 (referencing Rodriguez v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 159,
162 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (“[E]ven if customer notice is deficient, information in governmentʹs response to
challenge states nature of inquiry with sufficient specificity”).
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