CHATMAN v. HANCOCK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al

Filing 24

ORDER entered in Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-149 dismissing Ms. Chatman's Petition for Preliminary Injunction. Ordered by U.S. District Judge MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 4/21/2014. Entered on docket for 5:13-cv-375 per Judge Treadwell. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
STEPHAINE Y. CHATMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
HANCOCK COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-149 (MTT)

ORDER
Before the Court is the Plaintiff’s “petition for em[e]rgency injunctive relief, and
temporary restraining order pursuant to 28 U.S. Code 1651 and 28 U.S. Code 2283.”
(Doc. 1). The Plaintiff previously filed suit in the Superior Court of Hancock County
against her former employer, the Hancock County School District, and twice amended
her complaint to add other claims and defendants. The case was removed to this Court
on the basis that some of the Plaintiff’s claims arose under federal law. After the
Plaintiff amended her complaint for a third time to remove all federal claims, the Court
granted her motion to remand the case on January 10, 2014. Chatman v. Hancock
Cnty. Sch. Dist., et al., 5:13-CV-375 (MTT), Doc. 22. The Plaintiff objects to a Rule Nisi
issued by the superior court after remand (Doc. 1-4) and seeks either a writ of
prohibition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 or an injunction to prevent the scheduled
hearing on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The Plaintiff fundamentally misunderstands the nature of remand. As to
enjoining the ongoing superior court proceeding, “A court of the United States may not

grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (emphasis added). The Plaintiff has
pointed to no exception that would permit this Court to enjoin the superior court
proceeding. By remanding the case, this Court declined to continue exercising
jurisdiction. Nor is an injunction necessary to effectuate the remand order; its sole
purpose was to send the case back to the superior court.
A writ of prohibition is likewise not an appropriate remedy. The All Writs Act
“empowers a federal court-in a case in which it is already exercising subject matter
jurisdiction-to enter such orders as are necessary to aid it in the exercise of such
jurisdiction.” In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1651. As noted above, the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over
the Plaintiff’s state law claims. Further, it would be improper for this Court to issue a
writ of prohibition to the Superior Court of Hancock County, which is not a subordinate
court. See Siler v. Storey, 587 F. Supp. 986, 987 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED, this 21st day of April, 2014.

S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT