STINER v. METRO HEALTH MEDICAL CENTER et al
Filing
18
ORDER Dismissing Plaintiff's case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and terminating as moot 13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and 16 MOTION to Dismiss Complaint. Ordered by U.S. District Judge C ASHLEY ROYAL on 2/27/14. (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
CARLETHA STINER,
Plaintiff,
v.
METRO HEALTH MEDICAL
CENTER, et al.,
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CIVIL ACTION
No. 5:13‐CV‐445 (CAR)
Defendants.
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ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
The instant action arises from pro se Plaintiff Carletha Stiner’s allegations that
various medical institutions and physicians misdiagnosed her with breast cancer and
conspired to conceal their mistake. On January 10, 2014, the Court directed Plaintiff to
amend her pleadings and clarify the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this case.1 In
response, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. 12], which lists the following bases
for federal question jurisdiction: 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); 42
U.S.C. § 1986; 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)‐(c); 42 U.S.C. § 9658; 42 U.S.C. § 13981; 42 U.S.C. § 107; 42
U.S.C. § 10001(1), (3); 18 U.S.C. § 831(a), (b); 18 U.S.C. § 832(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1621; 18 U.S.C. §
1622; 18 U.S.C. § 114; 18 U.S.C. § 241; 18 U.S.C. § 242; 18 U.S.C. § 249(2); 18 U.S.C. § 373; 18
U.S.C. § 113(1)‐(4), (6); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; and 42 U.S.C. § 9501. Plaintiff does not attempt to
1 See generally Order on Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 11].
invoke diversity jurisdiction; she does not allege the parties’ citizenship or a specific
amount in controversy.
Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and relevant legal
authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s federal
claims are wholly insubstantial and frivolous, and, therefore, this case must be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 Approximately half of the statutes cited in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint define criminal conduct and punishment under Title 18 of
the United States Code and do not create a private right of action.3 Other cited statutes
prohibit unlawful discrimination or class‐based violence; however, none of Plaintiff’s
factual allegations suggest Defendants acted with discriminatory animus.4 Plaintiff’s
citations to the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”) are equally unfounded; Plaintiff does not allege any of the Defendants
committed an environmental tort prohibited by CERCLA.5 The remaining statutes either
2 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682‐83 (1946). The Court has liberally construed all of Plaintiff’s
allegations. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (“Pro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,
therefore, be liberally construed.”).
3 Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 838 (1961). In Bonner
v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding
precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down as of September 30, 1981. See 18
U.S.C. § 831(a), (b); 18 U.S.C. § 832(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1621; 18 U.S.C. § 1622; 18 U.S.C. § 114; 18 U.S.C. §
241; 18 U.S.C. § 242; 18 U.S.C. § 249(2); 18 U.S.C. § 373; 18 U.S.C. § 113(1)‐(4), (6).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1986; 42 U.S.C. § 13981; Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)‐(c); 42 U.S.C. § 9658.
2
do not exist or do not provide civil remedies. 6 In short, Plaintiff’s federal claims have no
plausible foundation in fact or law.7 Consequently, Plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants’ pending
Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 13, 16] are TERMINATED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of February, 2014.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
BBP
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 107 (does not exist); 42 U.S.C. § 10001(1), (3) (no cause of action); 42 U.S.C. § 9501
(same); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (same).
7 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1998).
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