KELSEY v. BIBB COUNTY GEORGIA et al

Filing 60

ORDER denying 49 Motion ; denying 51 Motion ; denying 52 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; denying 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is ordered and adjudged that Plaintiff shall take nothing by his Amended Complaint and judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE LESLIE J ABRAMS on 9/10/2015. (bcl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
KAMERON KELSEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIBB COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, BIBB COUNTY
LAW ENFORCEMENT CENTER, JERRY
MODENA, and NATHANIEL JORDAN,
Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 5:14-CV-82 (LJA)

ORDER
Before the Court are the following motions filed by Plaintiff Kameron Kelsey: (1)
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23); (2) Motion for an Expedited Ruling (Doc. 49); (3)
Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 51); and (4) Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 52). For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND1
I.

Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging violations of his constitutional rights relating to his arrest and subsequent conviction
for armed robbery. Plaintiff alleges that on June 8, 2001, Defendant Nathaniel Jordan
unlawfully searched his car and seized certain evidence without a valid warrant. Plaintiff
alleges that he was illegally arrested for robbery and possession of marijuana with the intent
The relevant facts are derived from the Amended Complaint (Doc. 14), Defendants’ Answer to the
Amended Complaint (Doc. 16), Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23), Defendants’ Response
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41), and the record in this case. Where applicable, the
factual summary also contains undisputed and disputed facts derived from the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, all of which are construed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs as the nonmoving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

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to distribute and, as a result, was unlawfully detained for six months under a false federal
hold. Plaintiff maintains that he should have been released seventy-two hours after his arrest.
On December 12, 2001, Plaintiff alleges that he was released on bond for the
marijuana charge and cleared from the federal hold on the robbery charge. Thereafter,
Plaintiff alleges that the Macon Telegraph falsely reported that he had been arrested and
charged with armed robbery. From February 25, 2002 until November 5, 2002, Plaintiff
appears to allege that Defendants fabricated the warrants that served as the basis for the
search of his car and residence on June 8, 2001. Plaintiff also appears to contend that on
November 13, 2013, he discovered that the search warrants had been fabricated or
adulterated.
On November 5, 2002, Plaintiff was indicted and charged with armed robbery,
burglary, and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Plaintiff proceeded to trial on
the armed robbery charge and the marijuana charge. Following a jury trial, on July 11, 2003,
Plaintiff was found guilty of armed robbery and acquitted of the marijuana charge. Plaintiff
was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment followed by five years of probation.
Following his conviction, Plaintiff made numerous unsuccessful attempts in state
court to have his conviction vacated. Plaintiff was denied a new trial (Doc. 41-1), and the
Georgia Court of Appeals upheld his conviction. (Doc. 41-2.) In 2008, Plaintiff pursued
habeas corpus relief, which resulted in a full evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 41-3.) On November
4, 2010, the court denied Plaintiff a writ of habeas corpus, finding that: (1) “none of
[Plaintiff’s] constitutional right have been violated by his arresting officer,” (2) “[Plaintiff]
had a fair and legal trial;” (3) “[Plaintiff] has shown neither deficient performance by
appellate counsel, nor any resulting prejudice in order to make out an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim;” and (4) “[Plaintiff] has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that his conviction is invalid because his constitutional rights were violated in obtaining the
judgment.” (Doc. 41-4 at 1.) The Supreme Court of Georgia subsequently denied review of
the court’s order on January 9, 2012. (Doc. 41-5.) Plaintiff was released from prison on
January 5, 2013.

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On February 27, 2014, Plaintiff commenced this action, alleging constitutional
violations related to his 2001 arrest and detention.2 (Doc. 14 at ¶¶ 15-57, 62-65.) Plaintiff has
also asserted claims of defamation related to the alleged false reporting of his arrest and
charge of armed robbery in 2001 and 2002. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-60.) As a result of these alleged
violations, Plaintiff seeks $100,000,000 in compensatory damages and $400,000,000 in
punitive damages. (Id. at ¶ 74.) In addition, Plaintiff apparently has asserted a claim for
injunctive relief against the Defendant Bibb County Board of County Commissioners.3 (Id. at
¶¶ 66-68.)
Prior to any discovery, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on October 10, 2014,
contending that discovery had closed and that there were no genuine issues of material fact.
(Doc. 23.) Since then, Plaintiff has filed numerous briefs and motions, including a Motion
for an Expedited Ruling (Doc. 49), a Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 51), and a Motion to
Appoint Counsel (Doc. 52). On August 4, 2015, Plaintiff also began filing “Judicial Notices,”
increasing his demand for punitive damages by $100,000,000 a week until the Court rules on
his Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Docs. 54-59.)
II.

Prior Federal Lawsuits
During and following his incarceration, Plaintiff filed numerous actions in Federal

Court based on the same nucleus of facts. In 2008, he filed three § 1983 actions within days
of each other against Linda Pierce and Bobby Peters, seeking $10,000,000 in damages. On
November 28, 2008, he commenced the first action in the Northern District of Georgia. See
Kelsey v. Pierce, No. 1:08-CV-3651 (N.D. Ga.) (“Kelsey I”). On December 1, 2008, he
commenced the second action in this Court. See Kelsey v. Pierce, 4:08-CV-460 (M.D. Ga.)
(“Kelsey II”). And, on December 8, 2008, he filed the third action, again in the Northern
District of Georgia. Kelsey v. Pierce, No. 1:08-CV-3719 (N.D. Ga.) (“Kelsey III”).
On December 19, 2008, Kelsey III was administratively closed because it was
duplicative of Kelsey I. Kelsey v. Pierce, No. 1:08-CV-3719, Doc. 3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2008).
On, January 14, 2009, this Court dismissed Kelsey II, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s finding
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 1, 2014. (Doc. 14.)
Although Plaintiff refers to “The Board” throughout his pleading, is not entirely clear that Plaintiff is
referring to Defendant Bibb County Board of County Commissioners when he uses this phrase, as he also
refers to the “Macon-Bibb County Commission” in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14 at ¶ 3.)

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that Plaintiff’s action was barred because his conviction had not been invalidated and a
judgment in his favor would imply that the conviction was not valid. Kelsey v. Pierce, 4:08-CV460, Docs. 4, 6 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2009) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
Lastly, on April 9, 2009, Kelsey I was dismissed on the basis of improper venue. Kelsey v. Pierce,
No. 1:08-CV-3651, Doc. 5 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2009).
On March 22, 2013, Plaintiff commenced a fourth § 1983 action in the Northern
District of Georgia against the Macon Judicial Circuit, the Macon Police Department, and
numerous individuals, including Defendant Jordan. See Kelsey v. Macon Judicial Circuit, No.
1:13-cv-924 (N.D. Ga.). Plaintiff subsequently moved for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice, stating that he was unaware at the time he commenced the action that the
Northern District was not the proper venue but had since learned that the Middle District
was the proper venue. See id. at Doc. 26. The court granted Plaintiff’s motion on July 16,
2013.
On August 12, 2013, Plaintiff commenced a fifth § 1983 action in this Court against
the same Defendants named here, as well as numerous other individuals, alleging
constitutional violations related to his 2001 arrest and subsequent confinement and
conviction. See Kelsey v. Board of County Commissioners, 5:13-CV-285 (M.D. Ga.). The Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous, noting that the complaint was “a quintessential
shotgun pleading that the Eleventh Circuit has condemned repeatedly.” Kelsey v. Board of
County Commissioners, 5:13-CV-285, Doc. 4 at *3 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 2013) (citing Magluta v.
Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)). The Court further found that “to whatever
extent the Plaintiff [was] attempting to allege a § 1983 claim for false arrest or malicious
prosecution, his claim [was] time barred.” Id. Notably, the Court warned Plaintiff that “pro se
plaintiffs have ‘no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless
litigation, and abuse already overload court dockets.’” Id. (quoting Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d
386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988)). The instant action is Plaintiff’s sixth § 1983 complaint arising out
of his 2001 arrest and subsequent conviction for armed robbery.

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MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND EXPEDITED RULING
I.

Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a party to move for summary judgment

when the party contends no genuine issue of material fact remains and the party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. “Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir.
2013). “A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.” Grimes v.
Miami Dade Cnty., 552 F. App’x 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229
F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if it is a legal element of the
claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.”
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “It is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965
F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the initial burden of showing, by reference to the record, that there
is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (1986); Barreto v. Davie
Marketplace, LLC, 331 F. App’x 672, 673 (11th Cir. 2009). The movant can meet this burden
by presenting evidence showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact, or by
demonstrating to the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence
in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is
required “to go beyond the pleadings” and identify “specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must
do more than summarily deny the allegations or show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.” Matsuhita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations and internal quotations

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omitted). Instead, the nonmovant must point to evidence in the record that would be
admissible at trial. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012).
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all evidence and factual
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict in its favor. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. However, the Court must grant summary
judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
II.

Analysis
A.

Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested on June 8, 2001, and unlawfully
imprisoned until December 12, 2001. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are barred
by the statute of limitations.
“All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute
of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been
brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Lovett v. Ray, 327
F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Federal courts apply their forum state’s statute of
limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). In
Georgia, where Plaintiff commenced this action and where the alleged wrongs occurred, the
applicable limitations period for personal-injury actions is two years. O.G.C.A. § 9-3-33; see
also Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1182 (“Georgia’s statute of limitations is two years.”). Although state
law dictates the appropriate statute of limitations, “[f]ederal law determines when the statute
of limitations begins to run.” Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1182. A § 1983 claim accrues, and the statute
of limitations begins to run, “from the date the facts which would support a cause of action
are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his
rights.” Brown v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quotations omitted).
Plaintiff asserts that the limitations period was tolled during his incarceration and,
therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until January 5, 2013. Plaintiff also

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contends that his claims did not accrue until November 13, 2013, when he allegedly
discovered that the warrants used to search his car and residence were invalid. Plaintiff is
mistaken on both fronts.
First, “[t]olling of the limitations period in a § 1983 action is generally determined by
reference to state law.” Thompson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 485 F. App’x 345, 347 (11th Cir. 2012)
(Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 94 (2007)). It is well-settled that “Georgia law does not permit
tolling of the limitations period based on a litigant’s incarceration status.” Watkins v. Haynes,
No. No. 12-CV-50, 2013 WL 1289312, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2013) (citing O.C.G.A. § 9–
3–90(b)); see also Larson v. Grayer, No. 09-CV-1501, 2010 WL 3730971, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
20, 2010) (noting that the Georgia legislature amended O.C.G.A. § 9–3–90 in 1984 “by
deleting prisoners from the groups of people protected by the tolling provision”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s contention that the limitations period was tolled during his
incarceration fails as a matter of law.
Second, false arrest and false imprisonment claims brought pursuant to § 1983 accrue
when the claimant is detained pursuant to a legal process. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 397; see also
Jones v. Union City, 450 F. App’x 807, 809 (11th Cir. 2011) (“False arrest claims brought
pursuant to § 1983, where arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, accrue when the
claimant is detained pursuant to a legal process.”). The facts supporting Plaintiff’s claims
were apparent when he was arraigned on the armed robbery and marijuana charges and
made aware of the case against him. At that time, Plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge
the warrants and to seek suppression of any unlawfully obtained evidence. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claims accrued when he was arraigned and pled not guilty to the indictment on
December 11, 2002 (Doc. 41-12 at 3). See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (nothing that “false
imprisonment ends once the victim is . . . arraigned on charges”). At the very latest,
Plaintiff’s claims accrued when he was convicted of armed robbery on July 11, 2003, as a
reasonably prudent person would have investigated the validity of the warrants while
preparing for trial and discovered any improprieties. See Salas v. Pierce, 297 F. App’x 874, 87778 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that plaintiff’s “claims that the police arrested him without
probable cause . . . should have been apparent to [him] on or before the date he was

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sentenced”). Accordingly, because Plaintiff did not commence this action within two years
of when his claims accrued, his Section 1983 claims are time-barred.
Furthermore, even if timely brought, Plaintiff’s claims would still fail. In Heck, the
Supreme Court held:
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a
§ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (internal footnotes omitted).
It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. As such, no cause of action yet exits under § 1983, and Plaintiff has thus failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Furthermore, if the Court allowed Plaintiff to
proceed with his claims, any subsequent judgment entered in his favor would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction. See Weaver v. Geiger, 294 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir.
2008) (finding that “allegation of an invalid basis for the search warrant [] amounts to the
kind of attack on the factual basis for a conviction that [the Eleventh Circuit] ha[s] deemed
impermissible under Heck”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed.
B.

State Law Claims

Plaintiff has also brought a claim for defamation against Defendant Jordan for
allegedly publishing his arrest on June 12, 2001, and publishing the indictment on November
5, 2002. As with Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, Plaintiff’s defamation claim is time-barred.
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9–3–33, actions for injuries to reputation “must be brought
within one year after the right of action accrues.” “A suit for slander or defamation is one

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for injury to the reputation.” Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Pardue, 713 S.E.2d 456, 463 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011). A cause of action for defamation accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run,
“on the date of the publication of the defamatory act.” Captiva RX, LLC v. Daniels, No. 5:14CV-265, 2014 WL 5428295, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2014) (citation omitted). Therefore, in
order to be timely, Plaintiff was required to file his action “on the first anniversary of the
date of publication.” Pardue, 713 S.E.2d at 464.
The alleged defamatory statements were made on June 12, 2001, and November 5,
2002. Because Plaintiff did not file this action until February 27, 2014, more than ten years
past the one year anniversary of these statements, his claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.
C.

Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff has also moved for injunctive relief against “The Board.” Plaintiff
characterizes his claim as a “MUST STOP,” alleging that The Board is the source behind a
conspiracy militia that is using modern day technology to hack his phones, intercept his calls,
tamper with his mail, and run surveillance through unmarked vehicles and bribed taxpayers.
(Doc. 14 at ¶ 66.) Plaintiff also alleges that The Board has illegally authorized the use of an
Electromagnetic Field (“EMF”), which, according to Plaintiff,

is “another form of a

tracking device that is invisible to the naked eye, that sends out radioactive waves, electrospectrum clouds, and infrared light to deteriorate Plaintiff and his mother’s body tissue, and
has caused injury to Plaintiff’s neck and upper back, and caused injury of a poisonous sisk
[sic] to arise in Plaintiff’s mother’s mouth that had to be surgically removed in March of
2011.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that The Board’s use of this “Intelligent High Technology” is the
same strategy that was used against Aaron Alexis – “The Navy Yard Shooter” – in retaliation
for challenging his pay and benefits, and that the use of the EMF ultimately caused Alexis’
violent actions. (Id. at ¶ 67.) In his Motion for an Expedited Ruling, Plaintiff further alleges
that he needs immediate action on his case because “Aviation Aircraft is currently and steady
[sic] flying at a low altitude over Plaintiff’s duplex, forming X’S in the sky to send Plaintiff a
sign and a message of the KKK (White Supremacy Power) in the geographical area [of]
Georgia.” (Doc. 49 at ¶ 9.)

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“In this Circuit, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to
be granted unless the movant clearly established the burden of persuasion as to each of the
four prerequisites.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations,
citations and alterations omitted). To meet this burden, the movant must show that: “(1) it
has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered
unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Id. “For a permanent injunction, the
standard is essentially the same, except that the movant must establish actual success on the
merits, as opposed to a likelihood of success.” KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d
1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff has neither demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits nor actual
success on the merits. Instead, Plaintiff has made speculative and conclusory allegations with
no factual support. Plaintiff’s claims are of the kind that the Supreme Court has deemed
“factually frivolous” and “clearly baseless” and subject to dismissal under the screening
process set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (citation
omitted). The Court described this category of allegations as encompassing those “that are
fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Id. at 32-33 (internal citations omitted). As the Court
stated, “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the
level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable
facts available to contradict them.” Id. at 33.
Plaintiff’s allegations are similar to those made by the plaintiff in Taylor v. Wardworth,
No. 07-CV-281, 2007 WL 1266363, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 30, 2007). There, the plaintiff
alleged that his neighbors and police were sending out “bad spirits and vibes designed to get
Plaintiff in trouble, that these same people [were] stalking and harassing him, and that law
enforcement officials [were] threatening to kill him unless he leaves town.” Id. The court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims as frivolous, characterizing them as “the types of claims
which should be subject to dismissal because they rise to the level of the irrational and reflect
the thoughts of a paranoid and/or delusional individual.” Id.

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In addition to the allegations stated above, Plaintiff has alleged that “[a]n unknown
suspicious old Caucasian (white male) walked straight across from [his] duplex with a
smartphone programming and setting off tracking signals on [his] vehicle with intentions of
causing to provoke plaintiff to snap and incriminate himself.” (Doc. 49 at ¶ 7.) Similarly,
Plaintiff has alleged that this is “a matter of life and death” and that if the Court does not
promptly rule on his motion, it faces “the possibility of retaliation from Plaintiff.” (Id. at
¶ 24.) Plaintiff’s claims are not only “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional,” they “reflect the
thoughts of a paranoid and/or delusional individual.” 2007 WL 1266363, at *2; see also Dillard
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-CV-3875, 2013 WL 754781, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2013)
(finding that the plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy and “a campaign of harassment against
plaintiff by the FBI are ‘fantastic’ and ‘delusional’ . . . . [and] wholly incredible and
irrational”); Dunn v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Florida, No. 14-CV-529, 2014 WL 6909382,
at *2 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2014) (characterizing as “fantastic or delusional” Plaintiff’s “claims
that someone has taken control over his thoughts through hypnosis over the telephone, and
thus he is not responsible for his actions”); Williams v. Karf, No. CV410-221, 2010 WL
5624650, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2010) (finding that allegations of “government conspiracy
with malicious intent to do bodily harm” by unknown government agents who sought to
“abuse plaintiff with electronic devices” were factually frivolous), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. Williams v. Karpf, No. 10-CV-221, 2011 WL 201770 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2011);
Craven v. Florida, No. 6:08-CV-80-ORL-19, 2008 WL 2856830, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. July 22,
2008).
While the § 1915 frivolity review is not applicable here as Plaintiff is not proceeding
in forma pauperis, the underlying rationale is instructive. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s
allegations are factually frivolous and clearly baseless, and that they fail to establish either a
likelihood of success on the merits or actual success on the merits. Accordingly, Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for injunctive relief.
Based the forgoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. As such,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) is DENIED and Plaintiff’s Motion for
an Expedited Ruling (Doc. 49) is DENIED.

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MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
Plaintiff has moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer this matter to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. (Doc. 51.) Plaintiff
asserts that this action should be transferred there because the undersigned “is new on the
federal bench and inexperienced” and “is too influenced and controlled by politics.” (Doc.
51 at 3.) Plaintiff also asserts that the Northern District of Georgia “is a more quality and
luxurious court with structure” that will honor his emergency motions. (Id. at 4.) Lastly,
Plaintiff asserts that “GOD” has revealed to him “a courtroom with a judge’s mallet frozen,
which represents ‘no justice in this District of Georgia and no interest in justice.’” (Id.)
Plaintiff further asserts the “GOD” has revealed to him “keys covered with dirt, which is
plaintiff has the keys to the courthouse with an ‘open-shut case’ that has been covered up
for over a decade and is steady [sic] being covered up with no interest to justice.” (Id.)
Section 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer a civil action to any other
district in which it might have been brought for “the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. U.S.C. § 1404(a). “The threshold inquiry on a § 1404(a)
motion is whether the transferee district is a district where the action originally might have
been brought.” C.M.B. Foods, Inc. v. Corral of Middle Georgia, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1286 (M.D.
Ala. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, before considering the factors justifying
a transfer under Section 1404(a), the Court must determine whether the action could have
been brought in the Northern District of Georgia.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in one of the
following:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the
subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as
provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject
to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
In his Motion, Plaintiff admits that all of the Defendants reside in the Middle District of
Georgia. (Doc. 51 at 2.) Furthermore, the Amended Complaint makes clear that the events

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giving rise to this action occurred in the Middle District of Georgia. (See Doc. 14.)
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this action could have been brought in the
Northern District of Georgia. Plaintiff is certainly aware of the fact that venue is not proper
in the Northern District of Georgia as he voluntarily dismissed his action filed there on the
basis of improper venue. See Kelsey v. Macon Judicial Circuit, No. 1:13-cv-924, Doc. 26 (N.D.
Ga. July 8, 2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer (Doc. 51) is DENIED.
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
In general, a “civil plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, but a district court
may appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” Vickers v.
Georgia, 567 F. App’x 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320
(11th Cir.1999)). Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only by “exceptional
circumstances, such as the presence of facts and legal issues which are so novel or complex
as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.” Id. (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189,
193 (11th Cir.1993)). “A district court has broad discretion in determining whether such
circumstances exist.” Id. (citing Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 713 F.3d 1059, 1063 (11th Cir.
2013)).
Plaintiff contends that he “is in need of a ‘Caucasian’ appointed attorney to represent
[him] in this rare case because of the damages at large and political reasons involving the
distribution of wealth to an African-American in the country, especially in the state of
Georgia.” (Doc. 52 at 1.) Plaintiff further contends that licensed attorneys receive more
favorable treatment than pro se litigants, and that pro se litigants are at a disadvantage because
they are held to the same standard as licensed attorneys. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff’s contentions are
unavailing.
First, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings and filings are held to a less
stringent standard than documents drafted by an attorney and are liberally construed. See
Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” (quoting Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998))).
Second, there is no support for Plaintiff’s contention that motions filed by licensed attorneys

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are given preferential treatment or addressed more promptly by the Court. Lastly, Plaintiff’s
subjective beliefs regarding prejudices against African-Americans in Georgia do not qualify
as an exceptional circumstance justifying the appointment of legal counsel. Likewise,
Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions regarding the complexity of his case are insufficient to
demonstrate that the essential facts and legal doctrines are so novel or complex as to require
the assistance of a trained practitioner. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel
(Doc. 52) is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
In light of the forgoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23), Motion
for an Expedited Ruling (Doc. 49), Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 51), and Motion for
Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 52) are DENIED. Furthermore, it is hereby ORDERED
and ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall take nothing by his Amended Complaint (Doc. 14),
and JUDGMENT shall be entered in favor of Defendants. The Court also reiterates its
prior warning that pro se litigants do not a have a “license to harass others, clog the judicial
machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Patterson,
841 F.2d at 387.
SO ORDERED, this 10th day of September, 2015.
/s/ Leslie J. Abrams
LESLIE J. ABRAMS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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