CHAUNCEY v. GILLS et al
Filing
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ORDER dismissing as moot 19 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint filed by WILLIAM M CHAUNCEY, granting in part 22 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint filed by WILLIAM M CHAUNCEY, denying 21 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by WILLIAM M CHAUNCEY. ORDER Directing Service re 1 Complaint filed by WILLIAM M CHAUNCEY, 22 MOTION to Amend/Correct. The Clerk is directed to add Officer Haire as a Defendant in this case. The USMS is directed to serve Defendant Haire at Wilcox State Prison. Ordered by US Magistrate Judge STEPHEN HYLES on 11-17-14. (mpm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
WILLIAM M CHAUNCY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SERGEANT MICHAEL GILLS, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 5:14-CV-133-CAR-MSH
42 U.S.C. § 1983
ORDER
This case is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment right prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff sues
Defendant Gills, a sergeant at the Georgia Department of Corrections, for an allegedly
illegal use of force against Plaintiff while he was an inmate at Wilcox State Prison.
Plaintiff has three motions currently pending—two motions to amend the complaint (ECF
Nos. 19 & 22), and a motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 21). Each is discussed in turn.
DISCUSSION
In his first motion to amend, Plaintiff seeks to clarify a mistake in his interpretation
of the deadline for Defendant Gills to file his Answer to the Complaint. (First Mot. to
Amend 1.) Defendant Gills timely filed his Answer on October 14, 2014. (ECF No. 20.)
Therefore, Plaintiff’s first motion to amend is moot.
In his second motion to amend the complaint, Plaintiff asks to make two changes to
his complaint. (Second Mot. to Amend 1.) First, Plaintiff seeks to clarify that he is suing
Defendant Gills in both his individual and official capacities. Second, Plaintiff seeks to
add Officer Haire as a defendant in his individual and official capacities. Officer Haire
was mentioned in Plaintiff’s original complaint but not specifically named as a defendant.
As to the first issue, the Court notes that Plaintiff did not specifically state in his
complaint whether he is suing Defendant Gills in his official capacity, individual capacity,
or both. The Court construed his Complaint as bringing a claim for damages against
Defendant Gills in his individual capacity only, and allowed that claim to proceed. The
Court finds that it would be futile to amend the Complaint to reflect a claim against
Defendant Gills in his official capacity because any claim against Defendant Gills in his
official capacity would be subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity since Defendant
Gills is an employee of the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”).
Official capacity suits for damages against employees of a state agency are suits
against the state agency. Hobbs v. Roberts, 999 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir. 1993). A suit
against a governmental entity which is considered an “arm of the state”—such as the
GDOC—is a suit against the State. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70
(1989); see Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that § 1983
actions for damages against GDOC are barred because GDOC is not person capable of
being sued under § 1983 and because of Eleventh Amendment immunity). Neither a State
nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. See Will, 491
U.S. at 71. Therefore, any claim against Defendant Gills in his official capacity does not
state a claim under § 1983.
Only Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Gills in his
individual capacity shall proceed in this case.
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As to Plaintiff’s motion to add Officer Haire as a defendant in this case, the Court
will allow Plaintiff’s amendment. In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that Officer Haire
accompanied Defendant Gills in placing Plaintiff in the shower while handcuffed.
(Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff then states that after Defendant Gills allegedly shoved
Plaintiff to the ground while handcuffed and “started beating [Plaintiff] in the face,”
Officer Haire “came in and kneed [Plaintiff] in the face.” (Id.) These allegations, taken
as true, make out a colorable Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Haire, and the
Court finds that it is in the interests of justice to allow Plaintiff to add Officer Haire, in his
individual capacity, as a defendant in this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Again, because
Officer Haire is an employee of the GDOC, he is immune from suit under § 1983 in his
official capacity, and only Plaintiff’s claim against him in his individual capacity shall
proceed.
It is hereby ORDERED that service be made on Defendant Haire. The Defendant
shall file an Answer or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Defendant is reminded of the duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses, and of the
possible imposition of expenses for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d).
Finally, Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),
the district court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.” However, there is “no absolute constitutional right to the appointment of
counsel.” Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987). Appointment of
counsel is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances. Lopez v. Reyes,
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692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982). In deciding whether legal counsel should be provided,
the Court should consider, among other factors, the merits of Plaintiff’s claim and the
complexity of the issues presented. Holt v. Ford, 682 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff has set forth the essential factual allegations underlying his claims, and the
applicable legal doctrines are readily apparent. Plaintiff therefore has not alleged the
exceptional circumstances justifying appointment of counsel under Holt. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s First Motion to Amend (ECF No.
19), is dismissed as moot, Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Amend (ECF No. 22) is granted in
part so as to allow Plaintiff to add an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Haire in
his individual capacity, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 21) is denied.
The Clerk is directed to add Officer Haire as a Defendant in this case and it is ordered that
service of process be made upon Defendant Haire by the U.S. Marshal’s Service.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of November, 2014.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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