JONES et al v. CAPE et al

Filing 35

ORDER DENYING 34 Motion to Disqualify Judge. Ordered by U.S. District Judge MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 4/28/2014. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
CLYDE KENNARD JONES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WILLIAM “BILLY” CAPE, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 5:14-CV-145 (MTT)

ORDER
Before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify this Judge and Magistrate
Judge Stephen Hyles. (Doc. 34). For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
In this action, the Plaintiffs seek relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and
various federal and state constitutional provisions based on the Defendants’ alleged civil
rights violations in Plaintiff Daron Thomas’s state criminal proceedings in Pulaski
County Superior Court. Among the issues they raise are the provision of inadequate
appointed counsel for Thomas, the exclusion of witnesses from Thomas’s trial
proceedings, the suspension of Thomas’s right to pursue a writ of habeas corpus, and
his allegedly unlawful imprisonment.1 Aside from Thomas, the other Plaintiffs in this
case appear to be the witnesses who were allegedly excluded from his trial
proceedings. In a separate action, Thomas has also filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which appears to raise issues that overlap with

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Thomas is currently incarcerated at Washington State Prison.

this case. See Thomas v. Cape, No. 5:14-cv-20 (MTT). The Plaintiffs now move to
disqualify this Judge and Judge Hyles from presiding over this case based on
proceedings in Thomas’s habeas case.
II. DISCUSSION
The Plaintiffs seek to disqualify this Judge and Judge Hyles under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455. Pursuant to this statute, a judge shall disqualify himself under specific
circumstances, including in relevant part “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Thus, a judge must disqualify himself “in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” “[w]here he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,” or under any of the other specific
circumstances outlined in the statute. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a), (b); Christo v. Padgett, 223
F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). “Under § 455, the standard is whether an objective,
fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge's
impartiality.” Id. Moreover, “it is well settled that the allegation of bias must show that
the bias is personal as distinguished from judicial in nature.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d
1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000).
Here, the Plaintiffs have not shown Judge Hyles or this Judge to be personally
biased or prejudiced against them. The Plaintiffs contend Defendant Cape received
special favors in Thomas’s habeas case when Judge Hyles dismissed Cape from that
action because he was no longer the state officer that had custody of Thomas. (Doc.
34-1 at 2). The Plaintiffs also question the Court’s jurisdiction over Cape in Thomas’s

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habeas case and contend this Judge is supporting Judge Hyles’s allegedly improper
conduct. (Doc. 34-1 at 3).
But the Plaintiffs complain only about legal conclusions and rulings in Thomas’s
habeas case with which they disagree. They have not alleged any facts that would
convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists on the part of this Judge or
Judge Hyles, nor have they provided any argument or evidence that an objective, fully
informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the Court’s impartiality.
This is primarily because the Plaintiffs’ perception of prejudice is grounded in prior
decisions they dislike. As the Supreme Court has observed, this does not indicate bias:
[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion. In and of themselves…they cannot possibly show
reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest
circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism
required…when no extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably,
they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal. Second, opinions
formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in
the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (internal citation omitted).
Thus, even though the Plaintiffs are unhappy with how Thomas’s habeas case is
unfolding and believe there to be legal error of some variety, they have not advanced
proper grounds for recusal in this case. They have not suggested any personal or
extrajudicial source exists that would prejudice this Court against them. Indeed, the
Plaintiffs’ complaints are of the type most appropriately made by Thomas on appeal in
his habeas action. Accordingly, this Court sees no basis for this Judge or Judge Hyles
to be disqualified from presiding over this case.
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III. CONCLUSION
Because the Plaintiffs have not presented any objective evidence of this Court’s
bias or partiality, their motion to disqualify (Doc. 34) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of April, 2014.

S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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