DELONEY v. POWELL et al
Filing
49
ORDER DENYING 47 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE C ASHLEY ROYAL on 3/14/2016. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
DANNY E DELONEY,
Plaintiff
v.
DEPUTY WARDEN POWELL, et. al.,
Defendants
_________________________________
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL No: 5:14‐cv‐00290‐CAR‐CHW
PROCEEDINGS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983
BEFORE THE U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
In April 2014, Plaintiff Danny E. Deloney brought a prior Section 1983 action in
the Southern District of Georgia, alleging that he had been placed in administrative
segregation and then in the “special management unit” of the Georgia Diagnostic and
Classification State Prison without notice or a hearing. Doc. 33‐2, pp. 2–7. The
Southern District dismissed Plaintiff’s prior Section 1983 action for both failure to
exhaust and failure to state a claim in an Order dated July 8, 2014. Doc. 33‐3, pp. 2–4.
Plaintiff filed the instant action, in August of 2014, in this Court. Doc. 1. Upon
recommendation from the Magistrate Judge, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s case,
based on the doctrine of res judicata. Docs. 44; 45; see also O’Berry v. State Attorneys
Office, 241 F. App’x 654 (11th Cir. 2007) (setting‐out the elements of res judicata).
Judgment was entered on March 23, 2015. Doc. 46. Plaintiff filed a “Declaration of
Danny Deloney in Support of Reconsideration to submit Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Reconsideration in Amending the Complaint”
which this Court cosntrues as a Motion for Reconsideration on the District Court’s
Entry of Judgment on July 17, 2015. Doc. 47.
In the Motion, Plaintiff states that he is a “mental health prisoner” that has
“very limited comprehending ability,” including a limited ability to understand “law
terminology.” Id. Plaintiff further states he has very limited access to the law library,
and that he is in the process of exhausting his administrative remedies. Id. He states he
has a ninth grade reading level, could not comprehend “qualified immunity,” and
completed the instant motion only with the help of “jail house lawyers.” Id. For these
reasons, Plaintiff requests that he Court reconsider his case and the entry of judgment
against him.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), “the court may relieve a party ...
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if the party can show (1) a “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”; (2) “newly discovered evidence ...”; (3)
“fraud ..., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party”; (4) that “the
judgment is void”; (5) that “the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged ...”;
or (6) “any other reason that justifies relief.” Id. Because Plaintiffʹs Motion does not
argue the existence of any mistake, newly discovered evidence, misconduct by the
opposing party or void judgment, the Court must presume Plaintiff believes that his
2
education and access to counsel presents extraordinary circumstances to justify a
reopening of the case under Rule 60(b)(6). See Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440, 442 (11th
Cir. 1996) (“The vacation of a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary
remedy.”) (citing Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1400 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiff’s education and access to counsel are not grounds for vacating
judgment. This Court has already denied Plaintiff’s request for counsel as “no right to
counsel exists in civil rights actions.” Wright v. Langford, 562 F. Appʹx 769, 777 (11th Cir.
2014) (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)). “Although a court
may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff, it has
broad discretion in making this decision, and should appoint counsel only in
exceptional circumstances.” Wright, 562 F. Appʹx at 777 (citing Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320).
Appointment of counsel in a civil case is a “privilege that is justified only by
exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or
complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d
1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987)
and Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir.1985)). The Eleventh Circuit
explained “the key” to assessing whether counsel should be appointed “is whether the
pro se litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his or her position to the
court. Where the facts and issues are simple, he or she usually will not need such
help.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. Appʹx 456, 457 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks,
3
983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)).
This Court found no “exceptional circumstances” warranting the appointment
of counsel during the course this case, despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests. See Docs.
2; 8; 12; 20; 23; 43; 45. While the Court understands that Plaintiff is incarcerated, the
Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld district courtsʹ refusals to appoint counsel to
prisoners. Id. (citing Smith v. Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst., 597 F. Appʹx 1027, 1030 (11th
Cir. 2015); Wright, 562 F. Appʹx at 777; Faulkner v. Monroe Cty. Sheriffʹs Depʹt, 523 F.
Appʹx 696, 702 (11th Cir. 2013); McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. Appʹx 456, 457 (11th Cir. 2010);
Sims v. Nguyen, 403 F. Appʹx 410, 414 (11th Cir. 2010); Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1091, 1096;
Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174). Even if this case were still pending, it would not be so complex
legally or factually to prevent Plaintiff from presenting “the essential merits of his
position” to the Court. Thus, no grounds exist for reconsideration, and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 47) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 14th day of March, 2016.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?