BRIDGES v. PERFORMANT RECOVERY INC
Filing
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ORDER DENYING 26 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE C ASHLEY ROYAL on 8/26/2016. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
STERLING BRIDGES, on behalf of :
himself and all others similarly
:
situated
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
CIVIL ACTION
v.
:
NO. 5:15‐CV‐38 (CAR)
:
PERFORMANT RECOVERY, INC.
:
:
Defendant.
:
_________________________________ :
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Sterling Bridges’ Motion for Reconsideration of this
Court’s Order [Doc. 24] granting Defendant Performant Recovery, Inc.’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. In that Order, the Court found Defendant’s debt collection
letters did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et
seq. Plaintiff now requests this Court reconsider its findings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60 and Local Rule 7.6. As explained below, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration [Doc. 26] is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On February 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant, a debt collection
agency, claiming two letters sent to Plaintiff regarding the collection of debt violated the
FDCPA. The First Letter, dated February 7, 2014, stated on the back of the letter:
If this is the first notice you receive, be advised that:
UNLESS YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER
RECEIVING THIS NOTICE THAT YOU DISPUTE THE VALIDTY OF THIS
DEBT OR ANY PORTION THEROF, THIS OFFICE WILL ASSUME THIS
DEBT IS VALID. IF YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE IN WRITING WITHIN 30
DAYS FROM RECEIVING THIS NOTICE, THIS OFFICE WILL OBTAIN
VERIFICATION OF THE DEBT OR OBTAIN A COPY OF A JUDGMENT
AND MAIL YOU A COPY OF SUCH JUDGMENT OR VERFICIATION. IF
YOU REQUEST THIS OFFICE IN WRITING WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER
RECEIVING THIS NOTICE, THIS OFFICE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH
THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR, IF
DIFFERENT FROM THE CURRENT CREDITOR.1
While the body of the Second Letter, dated March 4, 2014, stated:
Unless you notify Performant Recovery, Inc., within 30 days after receiving
this notice that you dispute the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof,
this office will assume the debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing
within 30 days from receiving this notice, we will obtain verification of the
debt or obtain a copy of judgment and mail you a copy of such verification or
judgment. If you request us in writing within 30 days after receiving this
notice, we will provide you with the name and address of the original
creditor, if different from the current creditor. This is an attempt to collect a
debt by a debt collector, and any information obtained will be used for that
purpose.2
SEE THE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION
Plaintiff alleged the Second Letter overshadowed or was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s right
to dispute the debt during the original 30‐day period stated in the First Letter, and the
Second Letter misrepresented that Plaintiff had an additional 30 days to dispute the debt;
thus, the letters violated the FDCPA.
On December 14, 2015, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pl. Compl., [Doc. 1‐1].
2 Pl. Compl., [Doc. 1‐2].
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pleadings, finding the letters do not violate the FDCPA. Specifically, this Court found the
Second Letter did not overshadow the 30‐day period but instead extended the period
allowed to dispute the debt. Additionally, Defendant’s letters were not false or
misleading, as the letters did not diminish Plaintiff’s rights to dispute the debt and
included the required FDCPA notices. Plaintiff now requests the Court to vacate and
amend its order due to “mistake and other reasons.”3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Local Rule 7.6 cautions that “[m]otions for reconsideration shall not be filed as
a matter of routine practice.”4 “Reconsideration is appropriate ‘only if the movant
demonstrates (1) that there has been an intervening change in the law, (2) that new
evidence has been discovered which was not previously available to the parties in
the exercise of due diligence, or (3) that the court made a clear error of law.’”5 “[A]
motion for reconsideration does not provide an opportunity to simply reargue an issue
the Court has once determined. Court opinions are not intended as mere first drafts,
subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigantʹs pleasure.”6 Ultimately, “[w]hether
to grant a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the district
Pl.’s Mtn. for Reconsideration, [Doc. 26] at p. 1. The Court notes Plaintiff did not attach the
reverse side of the document to this Motion.
4 M.D. Ga., L.R. 7.6.
5 Bingham v. Nelson, No. 5:08‐CV‐246 (CAR), 2010 WL 339806, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2010) (quoting
McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1222–23 (M.D. Ga. 1997)).
6 Am. Assʹn of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
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court.”7
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the Court’s finding that “[e]ach letter simply states Plaintiff may
dispute the debt within 30 days from the receipt of that letter” was incorrect because the
reverse side of the Second Letter contained the qualifying statement, “[i]f this is the first
notice you receive, be advised that….”8 Plaintiff contends the Second Letter tells
consumers they have 30 days from receipt of the Second Letter to exercise their rights, but
at the same time says they only have those rights if it is the first notice they received; thus,
confusing consumers as to their rights under the FDCPA.9 According to Plaintiff, the
Court may have overlooked this fact because, though stated in his Complaint, Plaintiff
failed to attach the reverse side of the Second Letter to the Complaint or any other
document submitted to the Court. However, the Court disagrees.
Plaintiff’s Complaint never alleged the reverse side of the Second Letter had the
qualifying statement, “if this is the first notice you receive, be advised that….” Instead,
Plaintiff’s Complaint simply states, “[u]pon information and belief, all written
correspondence that Defendant mails to consumers in connection with the collection of
debts contain the 15 U.S.C. 1692g notices on the reverse side, irrespective of whether they
Hankerson v. Drew, No. 1:13–cv–1790–WSD, 2014 WL 2808218, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2014) (citing
Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 805‐806 (11th Cir. 1993)).
8 Id.
9 Id. at p. 1‐2.
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are initial communication.”10 The Complaint fails to allege Defendant’s debt collection
letters all contain the qualifying statement, and Plaintiff fails to make this argument in his
Response to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.11 Indeed, Plaintiff’s
Response only states the qualifying statement is on the back of the First Letter.12 Plaintiff
cannot now claim the Court “overlooked” that the Second Letter contained a contradiction
when Plaintiff never alleged there was a qualifying statement on the Second Letter, never
made this argument in its Response, and still has not presented the reverse side of the
Second Letter as evidence to support this argument.13
Plaintiff is simply attempting to take a second “bite at the apple,” which is not the
purpose of a motion for reconsideration.14 The Court finds Plaintiff has not made the
requisite showing that the law has changed, new evidence has been discovered, the Court
made a clear error of law, or the Order was manifestly unjust. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. 26] is DENIED.
Pl. Compl., [Doc. 1] at para. 32 (emphasis added).
11 The Court notes Plaintiff’s Response does mention in the “Statement of Relevant Facts” section
that all correspondences contain “these notices on the reverse side,” but Plaintiff does not clarify
which notice it is referring to―the notice on the back of First Letter, with the qualifying statement,
or the notice in the Second Letter, without the qualifying statement. Additionally, the notice
directly above this sentence is from the Second Letter, leading the Court to conclude Plaintiff’s
concern was that each letter gave a consumer 30 days to dispute the debt, not that the letter
contradicted itself and caused confusion. See [Doc. 18] at p. 2‐3.
12 See [Doc. 18] at p. 6.
13 See Groover v. Michelin North America, Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1256 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“Additional
facts and arguments that should have been raised in the first instance are not appropriate grounds
for a motion for reconsideration.”).
14 See Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 667 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A district courtʹs denial of
reconsideration is especially soundly exercised when the party has failed to articulate any reason
for the failure to raise an issue at an earlier stage in the litigation.”).
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SO ORDERED, this 26th day of August, 2016.
CML/ssh
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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