WILLIAMS v. GEO CORRECTIONS AND DETENTION et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by GRADY R WILLIAMS, JR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 1 Complaint filed by GRADY R WILLIAMS, JR. Plaintiff's RLUIPA and First Amendment claims shall proceed, it is recommended that all other claims should be dismissed. Order directing service by the USMS. Ordered by US Magistrate Judge STEPHEN HYLES on 3-25-15. (mpm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
GRADY R. WILLIAMS, JR.,
:
:
Plaintiff.
:
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VS.
:
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GEO GROUP and Warden FREDRICK :
HEAD,
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Defendants.
:
:
NO. 5:15-CV-51-CAR-MSH
ORDER & RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff GRADY R. WILLIAMS, JR., an inmate at Riverbend Correctional Facility
(“RCF”), has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2). In compliance with this
Court’s prior Order (ECF No. 5), Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his trust fund account
statement (ECF No. 6). As said statement reflects that Plaintiff has no spendable money
in his account, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and waives the initial
partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is nevertheless obligated to
pay the Court’s $350.00 filing fee, as is discussed below. The Clerk of Court is directed to
send a copy of this Order to the business manager at Plaintiff’s place of incarceration.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a federal court is required to conduct an initial
screening of a prisoner complaint “which seeks redress from a governmental entity or
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officer or employee of a governmental entity.” Section 1915A(b) requires a federal court
to dismiss a prisoner complaint that is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted”; or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”
A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual
allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.”
Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993).
A complaint fails to state a claim
when it does not include “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and that the complaint
“must contain something more . . . than a statement of facts that merely creates a
suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must
be viewed as true.
Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Tannenbaum v. United States,
In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.
1581 (11th Cir. 1995).
Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579,
If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide
factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, then the complaint is subject to
dismissal.
See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal of a section 1983 complaint because the plaintiffs factual
allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the
standard in section 1915A “shall” be dismissed on preliminary review).
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff, a Rastafarian, who took a “Nazerite vow to maintain his facial hair,”
alleges that the Defendants required him to shave against his religious beliefs. According
to Plaintiff, he keeps his facial hair at a reasonable length and groomed, and this practice
does not pose a risk to prison security or hygiene. Alleging violations of his rights under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc et seq., the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause, Plaintiff sues RCJ Warden Fredrick J. Head and the GEO Group, 1 a private
corporation that operates RCJ for the Georgia Department of Corrections. Plaintiff seeks
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Plaintiff named “GEO Corrections and Detention” as a Defendant, and the undersigned has amended the caption
of this case so as to show the correct name of this entity. The Clerk shall also amend the docket accordingly.
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monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.
A. Dismissed Claims
1. Equal Protection
Plaintiff has failed to allege a colorable equal protection claim. Plaintiff merely
asserts that the Defendants “fail[ed] to provide Plaintiff with equal protection under the
law, by [] making special rules without reason” (ECF No. 1, p. 8). To state a valid equal
protection claim, a Plaintiff must allege that “(1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners
who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious
discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other
constitutionally protected basis.” Sweet v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 467 F.3d
1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001)).
There is no suggestion in his complaint that Plaintiff was treated differently from other
similarly situated inmates. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff complains about treatment that
is the same as all other inmates. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s equal
protection claim be DISMISSED.
2. Due Process
As to his due process claim, Plaintiff summarily alleges that “Defendants’ actions
created a[] liberty interest to the Plaintiff, in violation of the Due Process Clause.” In
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Supreme Court found that a prisoner can
be deprived of his liberty so as to be entitled to due process under the Constitution in only
two instances: (1) when the punishment “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence"
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or (2) if the punishment "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484.
Even if Plaintiff’s allegations are construed liberally in his favor, he has not alleged
a colorable due process claim.
There is no suggestion that either of the Sandin
requirements for the existence of a liberty interest is present in the instant case. Requiring
Plaintiff to shave does not affect the length of his sentence nor does the shaving
requirement impose atypical and significant hardship on Plaintiff in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s due
process claim be DISMISSED.
B. Remaining Claims – First Amendment and RLUIPA
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits prison officials
from imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise of an inmate’s “sincerely held”
religious belief, unless their actions or restrictions are “reasonably related to legitimate
penalogical interests.”
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 428 U.S. 342, 348-53 (1987).
RLUIPA likewise “protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to
their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and
accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721
(2005); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853 (2015) (finding the denial of a religious
accommodation under the Arkansas DOC’s grooming policy violates RULIPA where the
policy to not allow half inch beards for religious purposes did not further a compelling
interest and was not the least restrictive means to prevent specified concerns).
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There remain substantial issues of fact and law associated with Plaintiff’s First
Amendment and RLUIPA claims. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations in his favor,
the undersigned finds that it is appropriate to allow said claims to go forward so that the
Defendants may file responsive pleadings.2
III. SUMMARY
After conducting a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the undersigned
finds that it would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA
claims against the Defendants. It is therefore ORDERED that service be made on the
GEO Group and Warden Fredrick Head, and that they file an Answer, or such other
response as may be appropriate under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28
U.S.C. § 1915, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Defendants are also reminded of the
duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses, and of the possible imposition of expenses for
failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d).
It is RECOMMENDED, however, that Plaintiff’s equal protection and due process
claims be DISMISSED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file
written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections,
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District
Judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to
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Although it is possible that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing
this action, the issue is not clear from the face of Plaintiff’s complaint. See Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 215 (2007). The Defendants may raise the exhaustion issue in their responsive
pleadings.
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which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by
the District Judge for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a]
party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a
report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to
factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and
the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection,
however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of
justice.”
DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE
During the pendency of this action, all parties shall at all times keep the Clerk of this
Court and all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of their current address. Failure to
promptly advise the Clerk of any change of address may result in the dismissal of a party’s
pleadings.
DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION
Plaintiff must diligently prosecute his complaint or face the possibility that it will be
dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute.
Defendants are advised that they are expected to diligently defend all allegations made
against them and to file timely dispositive motions as hereinafter directed. This matter
will be set down for trial when the Court determines that discovery has been completed and
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that all motions have been disposed of or the time for filing dispositive motions has passed.
FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY AND
CORRESPONDENCE
It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, and
correspondence with the Clerk of Court. A party need not serve the opposing party by
mail if the opposing party is represented by counsel.
In such cases, any motions,
pleadings, or correspondence shall be served electronically at the time of filing with the
Court. If any party is not represented by counsel, however, it is the responsibility of each
opposing party to serve copies of all motions, pleadings, and correspondence upon the
unrepresented party and to attach to said original motions, pleadings, and correspondence
filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate of service indicating who has been served and
where (i.e., at what address), when service was made, and how service was accomplished
(i.e., by U.S. Mail, by personal service, etc.).
DISCOVERY
Plaintiff shall not commence discovery until an answer or dispositive motion has
been filed on behalf of the defendants from whom discovery is sought by the plaintiff.
The Defendants shall not commence discovery until such time as an answer or dispositive
motion has been filed. Once an answer or dispositive motion has been filed, the parties
are authorized to seek discovery from one another as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The deposition of the Plaintiff, a state/county prisoner, may be taken at any
time during the time period hereinafter set out provided prior arrangements are made with
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his custodian. Plaintiff is hereby advised that failure to submit to a deposition may
result in the dismissal of his lawsuit under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery (including depositions and the service of
written discovery requests) shall be completed within 90 days of the date of filing of an
answer or dispositive motion by the defendant (whichever comes first) unless an extension
is otherwise granted by the court upon a showing of good cause therefor or a protective
order is sought by the defendants and granted by the court. This 90-day period shall run
separately as to Plaintiff and each Defendant beginning on the date of filing of each
Defendant’s answer or dispositive motion (whichever comes first). The scheduling of a
trial may be advanced upon notification from the parties that no further discovery is
contemplated or that discovery has been completed prior to the deadline.
Discovery materials shall not be filed with the Clerk of Court.
No party shall be
required to respond to any discovery not directed to him/her or served upon him/her by
the opposing counsel/party.
The undersigned incorporates herein those parts of the
Local Rules imposing the following limitations on discovery:
except with written
permission of the court first obtained, INTERROGATORIES may not exceed
TWENTY-FIVE (25) to each party, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
THINGS
under Rule 34 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed
TEN (10) requests to each party, and REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS under Rule 36 of the
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed FIFTEEN (15) requests to each
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party.
No party shall be required to respond to any such requests which exceed these
limitations.
REQUESTS FOR DISMISSAL AND/OR JUDGMENT
The Court shall not consider requests for dismissal of or judgment in this action,
absent the filing of a motion therefor accompanied by a brief/memorandum of law citing
supporting authorities. Dispositive motions should be filed at the earliest time possible,
but in any event no later than one hundred-twenty (120) days from when the discovery
period begins, unless otherwise directed.
DIRECTIONS TO CUSTODIAN OF PLAINTIFF
In accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Plaintiff’s custodian is hereby
directed to remit to the Clerk of this Court each month twenty percent (20%) of the
preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s inmate account until the $350.00 filing
fee has been paid in full, provided the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. Transfers
from Plaintiff’s account shall continue until the entire filing fee has been collected,
notwithstanding the earlier dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
PLAINTIFF’S OBLIGATION TO PAY FILING FEE
If Plaintiff is hereafter released from custody, he shall remain obligated to pay any
remaining balance due of the above filing fee; Plaintiff shall continue to remit monthly
payments as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Collection from Plaintiff of
any balance due by any means permitted by law is hereby authorized in the event Plaintiff
fails to remit payments.
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SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 25th day of March, 2015.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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