NOLLEY v. NELSON et al
Filing
54
ORDER adopting 50 Report and Recommendations; granting in part and denying in part 21 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; denying 35 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 46 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 48 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 19 Motion to Amend/Correct. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE C ASHLEY ROYAL on 3/29/16 (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
DARNELL NOLLEY,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
:
No. 5:15‐CV‐75 (CAR)
CYNTHIA NELSON, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
ORDER ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF
THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge [Doc. 50] to grant‐in‐part and deny‐in‐part Defendants Gregory
McLaughlin, Tevonza Bobbitt, Samuel Ridley, Stephen Bostick, and Dorian Giles’s Pre‐
Answer Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 21]; to deny Plaintiff’s Motions to Supplement [Docs.
19, 35, 46, 48]; and to deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief [Doc. 31‐
1]. In particular, the Magistrate Judge recommends this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant McLaughlin in his official capacity and Plaintiff’s claims for
compensatory and punitive damages, but allow Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
claims against Defendants in their individual capacities for nominal damages to go
forward. Defendant has filed an Objection [Doc. 52] to the Recommendation. Plaintiff
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has not.1 After considering Defendant’s Objection and conducting a de novo review of
the matters raised therein, the Court adopts as modified the findings and conclusions of
the Magistrate Judge for the reasons outlined below.
Defendants’ sole objection is that the Magistrate Judge improperly considered
factual allegations outside of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendants contend that the
Magistrate Judge erred in its finding that Plaintiff sufficiently stated a Fourteenth
Amendment claim against Defendant Giles because he signed Plaintiff’s Tier II
assignment Memo. Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge, in making his
Recommendation, improperly considered Plaintiff’s statement that Defendant Giles
“signed the memo at issue in the place reserved exclusively for the Tier II counselor, i.e.,
Defendant Bostick” because Plaintiff made this statement in his Response brief, not his
Complaint.2
Defendants are correct that in ruling on a Motion Dismiss in this Circuit, the
Court should not look beyond the “four corners of the complaint.”3 However, the
1 Plaintiff filed a letter requesting the Court rule on his pending motions, but makes no
objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation. See [Doc. 51].
2 Pl.’s Obj. [Doc. 52] at 6.
3 Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir.2010); Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555
F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating “[a] courtʹs review on a motion to dismiss is ‘limited to the
four corners of the complaint.’”)
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Court is instructed to construe pro se Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally. 4 Here, Plaintiff’s
Response Brief contained an additional fact beyond those alleged in his Complaint. The
Magistrate Judge, however, need not have considered Plaintiff’s additional allegation.
Plaintiff’s original allegation that Defendant Giles signed ʺthe place reserved exclusively
for the Tier II Counselor,ʺ sufficiently states a claim. In Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
Defendant Giles contends Plaintiffʹs allegations that he was a counselor at Macon State,
was unauthorized to participate in Tier II classifications, provided Plaintiff with the
Assignment Memo, and that the Memo contained his signature are insufficient to state a
claim. However, this argument is unpersuasive. In liberally construing Plaintiff’s
allegations, 5 Plaintiff avers that Defendant Giles took part in his classification process,
despite being unauthorized to do so. Defendant Giles points to no legal authority
supporting his arguments that such allegations, when liberally construed, fail to
sufficiently state a claim. These objections, therefore, are without merit.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s
findings and conclusions. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS‐IN‐PART AND DENIES‐
IN‐PART Defendants Gregory McLaughlin, Tevonza Bobbitt, Samuel Ridley, Stephen
Bostick, and Dorian Giles’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 21]. Plaintiff’s claims against
4 See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998 (Pro se Pleadings are held
to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed).
5 See, e.g., Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that courts are bound to
liberally construe pro se filings).
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Defendant McLaughlin in his official capacity and Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory
and punitive damages are DISMISSED; but Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims
against Defendants in their individual capacities for nominal damages may go forward.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions to Supplement [Docs. 19, 35, 46, 48], and
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief [Doc. 31‐1]. Thus, the
Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge [Doc. 50] is hereby
ADOPTED and MADE THE ORDER OF THE COURT.
SO ORDERED, this 29th day of March, 2016.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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