GAMBLE v. CHATHAM et al

Filing 64

ORDER ADOPTING 62 Report and Recommendations; GRANTING 47 Motion for Summary Judgment; and DENYING 56 Motion to Amend/Correct. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 8/18/2016. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
EZEKIEL GAMBLE, JR.,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
) CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-113 (MTT)
Warden BRUCE CHATMAN, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________ )
ORDER
In his Order and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles denies
several motions filed by the Plaintiff and recommends granting the Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment (Doc. 47) and denying the Plaintiff’s motion to supplement and
provide injunctive relief (Doc. 56). (Doc. 62). The Plaintiff has filed an objection to the
Order and Recommendation, which the Court has considered. (Doc. 63).
Despite his thorough response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
(Doc. 50-1), the Plaintiff does not object to any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s
thorough treatment of his claims. Instead, the Plaintiff’s sole argument appears to be
that the Magistrate Judge erred by denying his motion for appointment of counsel.1
(Docs. 61; 62 at 30-31; 63 at 1). Because the Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of
counsel was a non-dispositive pretrial matter referred to the Magistrate Judge, the Court
will construe this portion of the Plaintiff’s objection as one pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

1

The Plaintiff also mentions that the Magistrate Judge granted his motion to “Deny or at Least Stay
Defendants’ Reply Brief” but still “entertained” the Defendants’ reply brief. (Doc. 63 at 1). The Magistrate
Judge construed the Plaintiff’s motion as one for leave to file a surreply brief, granted it, and considered
the Plaintiff’s surreply brief. (Doc. 62 at 30). To the extent the Plaintiff is objecting to the Magistrate
Judge’s treatment of his motion, he has failed to show that the Magistrate Judge erred.

72(a).2
“Appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right.” Fowler v.
Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990). In the Eleventh Circuit, “[i]t is a privilege
that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal
issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.”
Id. The Plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel in the very beginning of this case.
(Doc. 8). At that time, the Magistrate Judge denied the Plaintiff’s request, finding that
the Plaintiff had “clearly articulated the factual allegations underlying his claims, and the
applicable legal doctrines [were] readily apparent at [that] stage of the litigation.” (Doc.
9 at 2). Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge made clear that he was “cognizant of
Plaintiff’s condition” and would, “on [his] own motion, … consider assisting Plaintiff in
securing legal counsel” in the event it became “apparent that counsel is necessary to
avoid prejudicing Plaintiff’s rights.” (Id. at 2-3). Almost four months after the Plaintiff
responded to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff filed another
motion for appointment of counsel, asking the Magistrate Judge to “[p]lease appoint
counsel to handle necessary actions to ensure that my well-founded claims receive the
attention they deserve.” (Doc. 61 at 1). The Magistrate Judge denied the motion on the
ground that “[n]o exceptional circumstances justifying appointment of counsel are found
in this action.” (Doc. 62 at 31).
In his objection, the Plaintiff says he is “severely mentally ill” and argues that
2

Rule 72(a) provides:
When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense is referred to a
magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must promptly conduct the
required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision. …
The district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any
part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.

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“had counsel been appointed,” his “claims would have received the attention that they
deserve [and] the outcome would have been different.” (Doc. 63 at 1). The Plaintiff
does not otherwise explain why counsel should be appointed, nor does he address the
Magistrate Judge’s determination that there are no exceptional circumstances in this
case that would justify the appointment of counsel. Although the Plaintiff suffers from a
number of disorders, the Plaintiff aptly prosecuted his case and responded to the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, citing to the record, case law, and the
Defendants’ arguments. (Doc. 50-1). This suggests, at the very least, he could explain
why he is entitled to appointment of counsel. It also suggests that this case does not
present any exceptional circumstances justifying appointment of counsel. See, e.g.,
Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1096 (holding that the plaintiff’s pleadings and conduct
demonstrated he “was capable of representing himself adequately”). In any event, the
Plaintiff has failed to show the existence of any such circumstances, much less that the
Magistrate Judge’s decision was contrary to law.
The Court has reviewed the Recommendation, and the Court accepts and adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. The
Recommendation is ADOPTED and made the order of this Court. Accordingly, the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 47) is GRANTED, and the Plaintiff’s
motion to supplement and provide injunctive relief (Doc. 56) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 18th day of August, 2016.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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