HUNTER v. MACON COUNTY GEORGIA et al

Filing 10

ORDER GRANTING 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and DENYING 6 Motion to Amend/Correct. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 7/24/2015. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
RODNEY D. HUNTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
MACON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT and CHARLES M.
CANNON, In His Official Capacity as
Sheriff Only,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-137 (MTT)

ORDER
Defendants Macon County Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff Charles M. Cannon
have moved to dismiss Plaintiff Rodney D. Hunter’s complaint for failure to state a
claim. (Doc. 4). In response, the Plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint. (Doc. 6).
For the following reasons, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the
Plaintiff’s motion to amend is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 25, 2013, the Plaintiff, a trusty inmate under the supervision of the
Macon County Sheriff’s Department, was requested by the Macon County Sheriff to
climb a ladder and remove a bat that was hanging from the ceiling in a county building.
(Doc. 1-1, ¶ 5). After the Plaintiff climbed the ladder, the Sheriff handed him a broom to
remove the bat. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 6). As the Plaintiff swung the broom at the bat, the ladder
slipped, and the Plaintiff fell approximately 20 feet to the ground. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7). The
Sheriff and one of his deputies were holding the ladder while the Plaintiff attempted to

remove the bat, but they “both failed to secure the ladder,” causing the Plaintiff to fall.
(Doc. 1-1, ¶ 7). The Plaintiff broke his ankle, tibia, and fibula as a result of the fall.
(Doc. 1-1, ¶ 8). Because of his injuries, the Plaintiff had metal screws placed in his
ankle, has had three surgeries, and will likely need further surgery. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 9). The
Plaintiff alleges the fall resulted in permanent disability to his ankle. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 10).
The Plaintiff has sued the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
violations of his constitutional rights. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges his due process
rights were violated when the Sheriff “command[ed] him to perform a duty, or task, for
which he was not qualified, for which the Sheriff’s Department has a policy or custom
requiring inmates to perform.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 13). He further alleges the Sheriff’s
Department had a policy of requiring trusties to “perform all types of duties, regardless
of whether they had specific training or abilities to perform the duties instructed, at the
sole discretion of the Sheriff, or his employee, and that [trusties] were requested to do
any and all type activities.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 15).
The Plaintiff also alleges the Sheriff was deliberately indifferent to his safety by
failing to “instruct the Deputy Sheriff that Plaintiff inmate should not be instructed, or
required, to perform duties for which he had neither been trained nor had knowledge in
how to perform and in abandoning the holding of [the] ladder at the time that the
incident took place.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 21-22). Additionally, the Plaintiff alleges the Sheriff
knew that his Deputy Sheriff was engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive and reasonable risk of constitutional injuries to citizens in
general, and specifically to the Plaintiff in this case, at the time he required
the Plaintiff to climb the ladder, over 20 feet tall, to remove a bat from the
ceiling.1
1

The Plaintiff earlier alleges that the Sheriff—not the deputy—was the person who instructed
the Plaintiff to climb the ladder and remove the bat from the ceiling. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 5).
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(Doc. 1-1, ¶ 23).
The Plaintiff filed this case in the Superior Court of Macon County on March 23,
2015, alleging claims for constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983 against the Macon
County Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff Charles M. Cannon in his official capacity.
(Doc. 1-1). The Defendants removed the case to this Court on April 20, 2015, and have
now moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. (Docs. 1; 4). In response, the Plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint.
(Doc. 6).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
To avoid dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as
true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “where the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[C]onclusory allegations,
unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not
prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir.
2002). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and

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the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a
claim regardless of the alleged facts. Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas
Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
B. Motion to Amend Standard
Leave to amend should be “freely give[n] ... when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court “need not, however, allow an amendment (1) where there
has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment would cause undue
prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment would be futile.” Bryant v.
Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962)). “[D]enial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the complaint as
amended is still subject to dismissal.” Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255,
1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
C. Claims Against Macon County Sheriff’s Department
The Defendants contend all claims against Macon County Sheriff’s Department
should be dismissed because the Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity capable of
being sued under Georgia law. The issue of whether a government entity is capable of
being sued is determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17(b)(3); accord Lawal v. Fowler, 196 F. App’x 765, 768 (11th Cir. 2006). Under
Georgia law, only three classes of legal entities are capable of being named in a
lawsuit: (1) natural persons; (2) artificial persons (a corporation); and (3) quasi-artificial
persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue. Lawal, 196 F. App’x at 768

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(citing Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 258 Ga. 317, 368 S.E.2d 500, 502
(1988)). A sheriff’s office does not fall into any of the categories and therefore is not
capable of being sued. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992); Ashley v.
Chafin, 2009 WL 3074732, at *3 (M.D. Ga.).
The Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to substitute “the Macon County
Sheriff’s Department, a political subdivision of the Macon County Board of
Commissioners, Charles M. Cannon, in his official capacity as Sheriff only” for the
current Defendants. (Doc. 6 at 1).2 The Defendants contend the amendment is futile
because the complaint as amended would still be subject to dismissal. Whether the
county would be a proper party depends on whether the Sheriff in his official capacity
was acting as a county or State official.
If Sheriff Cannon is acting as a county official when engaging in the activities
alleged in the complaint, then the Plaintiff’s suit against the Sheriff in his official
capacity3 would essentially be a suit against the county itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits … generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Pompey v. Broward Cnty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1545 n.2 (11th
Cir. 1996). Therefore, the Plaintiff would need to show a policy or custom of the county
was the moving force behind his constitutional injuries in order to recover. See Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Skop v.
City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1145 (11th Cir. 2007).

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Based on the Plaintiff’s motion, it appears he is viewing the parties being sued as a single
defendant.

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He has not sued the Sheriff in his individual capacity.
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On the other hand, if Sheriff Cannon is acting as an arm of the State when
engaging in the activities alleged in the complaint, then the county would not be a
proper party to the suit because the Plaintiff has only alleged misconduct on the part of
the Sheriff and his deputies. Additionally, if Sheriff Cannon is acting as an arm of the
State, he is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 when sued in his official
capacity for damages, and thus, the claims against him would be subject to dismissal.
See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Edwards v. Wallace
Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir 1995). Therefore, the Court turns to the
claims against Sheriff Cannon in his official capacity.
D. Claims Against Sheriff Cannon in His Official Capacity
The Defendants contend Sheriff Cannon was acting as an arm of the State.4 To
determine whether a sheriff or other entity acts as an arm of the State, courts consider:
“(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over
the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for
judgments against the entity.” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).5
“Whether a defendant is an ‘arm of the State’ must be assessed in light of the particular
function in which the defendant was engaged when taking the actions out of which
liability is asserted to arise.” Id. at 1308. The relevant functions are Sheriff Cannon’s

4

The Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.

5

Though this test is typically employed to determine whether a sheriff or other entity is acting as
an arm of the State for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes, it is also applicable in
considering whether an entity is a “person” under § 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70, 71 (holding
that states and state officials sued in their official capacity are not “persons” and that this
principle applies “to States or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for
Eleventh Amendment purposes”); Bell v. Houston Cnty., Ga., 2006 WL 1804582, at *11-*12
(M.D. Ga.) (citing Manders in determining whether sheriff was a “person” under § 1983).
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policy on appropriate tasks for trusty inmates, his enforcement of this policy, and
training his deputies in this regard.
In conducting the above analysis, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly found that
a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State when promulgating policies at county jails.
See Scruggs v. Lee, 256 F. App’x 229, 231-32 (11th Cir. 2007) (establishing policies for
“processing detainees arrested without a warrant”); Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v.
Toombs Cnty., Ga, 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005) (“promulgating policies and
procedures governing conditions of confinement at [a jail]”); Manders, 338 F.3d at 1328
(“establishing use-of-force policy at the jail and in training and disciplining his deputies
in that regard”). Further, the Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that a Georgia
sheriff’s “authority and duty to administer the jail in his jurisdiction flows from the State,
not [the county].” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1315.
The Court thus concludes that Sheriff Cannon was acting as an “arm of the
State” in promulgating and carrying out the policy on tasks for trusty inmates and
training his deputies in that regard. Therefore, a suit against Sheriff Cannon in his
official capacity for damages is not a suit against a “person” pursuant to § 1983. Based
on that conclusion, the Macon County Board of Commissioners is not a proper party to
this lawsuit, and the Plaintiff’s complaint as amended would still be subject to dismissal.
See Youngs v. Johnson, 2008 WL 4816731, at *9 (M.D. Ga.) (holding that because
sheriff was acting on behalf of the State when promulgating inmate
classification/placement policy, sheriff was not a county policymaker for that claim and
the county was entitled to summary judgment).

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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) is
GRANTED, and the Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 6) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 24th day of July, 2015.

S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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