WILLIAMS v. OCMULGEE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT et al
Filing
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ORDER Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE C ASHLEY ROYAL on 11/4/15. (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
GRADY R. WILLIAMS, JR.,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
VS.
:
:
OCMULGEE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT :
et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
________________________________ :
NO. 5:15-CV-00139-CAR-CHW
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Grady R. Williams, Jr., who is currently incarcerated at Riverbend
Correctional Facility in Milledgeville, Georgia, has filed a recast complaint (ECF No. 5),
seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Court’s previous order.
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner “seek[ing] redress from a governmental entity or [an]
officer or employee of a governmental entity,” the Court is required to conduct a
preliminary screening of his recast complaint.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
After
conducting this review, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim. His
Recast Complaint is accordingly DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
I.
Standard of Review
When conducting preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107,
1110 (11th Cir. 2006). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a
prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller
v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and
“claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally
cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In
other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under §1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or
omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a
statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting
under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir.
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1995).
If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual
allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See
Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
II.
Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff, a state inmate, contends that he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in Baldwin County, Georgia, which is in the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit. Plaintiff alleges
that the state court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate this petition because the
indictment Plaintiff challenged therein “does not have touching itself a ‘certificate of
authority’ reflecting its authenticity as valid true bill indictment.” (Recast Compl. 2, ECF
No. 6.) Plaintiff further contends that his indictment “was not returned in open court and
publicly entered upon the minutes of the proceedings of that court.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff
apparently asserts that Defendant Wingfield, a superior court judge, failed to recognize
this and wrongfully dismissed Plaintiff’s habeas petition. Id. The basis for Plaintiff’s
claims against “the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit” and Assistant Attorney General Vicki
Bass is unclear.
Plaintiff’s claims fail for a number of reasons. First, Defendant Wingfield is
entitled to judicial immunity. “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from
damages under section 1983 for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial
capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” McBrearty v. Koji,
348 F. App’x 437, 439 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). “A judge does not act in the ‘clear
absence of all jurisdiction’ when he acts erroneously, maliciously, or in excess of his
authority, but instead, only when he acts without subject-matter jurisdiction.”
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Id.
According to Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case, Defendant Wingfield’s allegedly
unconstitutional action was the dismissal of Plaintiff’s habeas petition. The fact that
Plaintiff believes Defendant Wingfield erroneously concluded he had jurisdiction to rule
on Plaintiff’s habeas petition does not mean Defendant Wingfield acted in the absence of
all jurisdiction. See Davis v. Self, 547 F. App’x 927, 931 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(rejecting argument that “judges may be held liable for damages any time they incorrectly
find in favor of jurisdiction”). Defendant Wingfield is therefore entitled to judicial
immunity.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bass are unclear from Plaintiff’s recast
complaint, and they may be dismissed for that reason alone. See, e.g., Douglas v. Yates,
535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 1999) (dismissal appropriate if complaint fails to state
facts sufficient to connect a defendant to an alleged constitutional violation). In addition,
a prosecutor is generally “entitled to absolute immunity for acts undertaken ... in
preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the
course of [her] role as an advocate for the State.” Mastroianni v. Bowers, 173 F.3d 1363,
1366 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has also failed to allege a basis for holding the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit
liable. The Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit is not a “person” who is subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Mumford v.
Zieba, 4 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state court is not a person under §
1983). Plaintiff’s claim against the Ocmulgee County Judicial Circuit thus fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
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Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had sued the appropriate parties, Plaintiff is also
precluded from recovering the relief sought in his recast complaint. The United States
Supreme Court has held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the
district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994). Plaintiff is essentially alleging in his recast complaint that the indictment
that led to his conviction was invalid and that Defendants failed to recognize its
invalidity. (See Recast Compl. 2-3.) If these allegations were to result in a successful
judgment on Plaintiff’s behalf, that judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed unless he
“can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck,
512 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff has made no such showing. Accordingly, his claims are Heckbarred and must be DISMISSED without prejudice.
III.
Conclusion
In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations, even when liberally construed and read in his favor,
fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Complaint must be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
SO ORDERED, this 4th day of November, 2015.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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