GRAY v. DEAL et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING without prejudice 1 Complaint. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 6/3/2015. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
NAPOLEON GRAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOVERNOR NATHAN DEAL, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-169 (MTT)

ORDER
The Court previously granted Plaintiff Napoleon Gray leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and ordered him to amend his complaint because it did not comply with Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” (Doc. 4). Specifically, the Court
ordered that the amended complaint
include a short and plain statement of the facts showing he is entitled to
relief in separately numbered paragraphs. The complaint should be
organized by claim and should specify exactly what actions each named
Defendant did (or failed to do) and how these actions or inactions support
each asserted claim. The Plaintiff must also include a demand for the
type of relief he is seeking.
(Doc. 4 at 2-3). The Plaintiff was warned that failure to comply with the Court’s order
would result in the dismissal of his case. The Plaintiff has now amended his complaint
(Doc. 5), but the amended complaint does not comply with the Court’s order. There are
no separately numbered paragraphs, the Plaintiff does not specify what claim(s) he is
asserting (beyond passing references to § 1983), and the complaint does not contain a
short and plain statement showing he is entitled to relief. Nevertheless, because the

Plaintiff attempted to comply with the Court’s order and because pro se pleadings are to
be liberally construed, the Court will evaluate the amended complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because the Court informed the Plaintiff that his amended complaint would
supersede and replace his initial complaint, the Court considers only the allegations in
the amended complaint. The Plaintiff alleges that in July 2013 he met with Houston
County Sheriff Cullen Talton and Chief William Rape and informed them he knew of
“illegal land deal[ ]s” involving the Houston County Board of Commissioners and the
Warner Robins City Council. Though it is not clear from the complaint, the Plaintiff
appears to link this alleged unlawful activity to the Houston County Sheriff’s Department
and former Houston County District Attorney Kelly Burke. The Plaintiff also told Sheriff
Talton and Chief Rape that he knew they were “[setting] him up” but that he has been
“[setting] them up a long time ago.” The two allegedly became angry with the Plaintiff,
told him to leave, and told him he should stay in “Davis Jurisdiction.”1 After his
confrontation with Sheriff Talton and Chief Rape, the Plaintiff was afraid they would “be
coming for [him]” because he “knew [too] much.” Exactly what the Plaintiff knew is not
clear.
The complaint next references two seemingly unrelated events that occurred
later in July:2 (1) the Plaintiff’s attempt to get help paying his light bill because he was in
bankruptcy, and (2) going with his mother to Warner Robins to a doctor’s appointment
and to run an errand. After getting in a fight with his mother, the Plaintiff attempted to

1

The Court assumes this reference is to Sheriff David Davis in Bibb County.

2

Though the Plaintiff says the first event took place on July 17, 2014, he refers to the “next day” as July
18, 2013.

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walk back to Macon from Warner Robins. However, his “feet gave out on [him]” after
about half a mile, so he called 911 to get an ambulance to take him to the hospital. The
Plaintiff alleges that when the ambulance finally found him, the paramedic called
dispatch and told them the Plaintiff had tried to kill himself in an effort to set the Plaintiff
up. When he got to the Houston County Hospital, he did not receive food or a shower
the first night. Additionally, the Warner Robins Police Department allegedly forcemedicated him,3 though the medication ended up lowering his blood pressure so he
could be transferred to a mental hospital. Once he was transferred, the Plaintiff alleges
he got the treatment he needed.
Though it is not clear how soon this occurred after his hospitalization, the Plaintiff
next alleges he got a call “on a cell phone that is not in [his] name” from a Houston
County Sheriff’s deputy informing him that Houston County Chief Magistrate Judge
Robert Turner, Sheriff Talton, and Chief Rape were trying to set him up. Apparently the
“set up” was an incident report dated July 30, 2013, stating that Magistrate Judge
Turner complained of receiving harassing communications at his office. The Plaintiff is
listed as the suspect.
On September 9, 2014,4 the Plaintiff allegedly went to the Houston County
Sheriff’s Department pretending that he wanted to “take a warrant on several people,”
but he was really trying to catch someone in the Sheriff’s Department in an act of
“p[e]rjury.” The Plaintiff alleges that Deputy D.D. Jones, the Sheriff’s deputy who wrote
the incident report, lied about what the Plaintiff told him at the direction of his supervisor,

3

The Plaintiff has not sued any of the hospital staff or any member of the Warner Robins Police
Department.

4

The incident report attached to the complaint lists the date as October 9, 2014.

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Ronnie Harlowe. He then alleges that Jones and Harlowe threatened him to get him to
leave and that an unmarked car followed him out of Houston County. Neither Jones nor
Harlowe are defendants in this action. The Plaintiff is seeking $150 million in damages
for “physical and [m]ental stress.”
Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to
dismiss the case if it (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
A complaint is also subject to dismissal when it does not contain sufficient factual
matter to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In
making the above determination, all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed
as true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). “[C]onclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts
will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188
(11th Cir. 2002). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When a plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, his pleadings may be held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will be liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, where there are dispositive
issues of law, a court may dismiss a claim regardless of the alleged facts. Marshall

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Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted).
It appears the Plaintiff is attempting to allege violations of his constitutional rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail in a § 1983 action, the Plaintiff must show “(1)
that [an] act or omission deprived [him] of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the act or omission was done by a
person acting under color of law.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 992 F.2d at 1174
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).5 The Plaintiff has sued Governor
Nathan Deal, Attorney General Samuel Olens, Houston County Sheriff Cullen Talton,
Houston County LEC Detention Center, and Houston County Board of Commissioners.
The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against any
Defendant and is therefore subject to dismissal. It is unclear exactly how the Plaintiff is
alleging his constitutional rights have been violated. Though the Plaintiff alleges some
vague threats have been made against him by Defendant Sheriff Talton, he has not
alleged facts to plausibly suggest Sheriff Talton violated his constitutional rights,
conspired to violate his constitutional rights, or is somehow responsible for the conduct
attributed to non-defendants in his complaint. Most of the conduct alleged does not
involve any of the Defendants. In fact, the only Defendant mentioned in the complaint in

5

Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State … , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress … .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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any detail is Sheriff Talton.6 Finally, Houston County LEC Detention Center is not an
entity capable of being sued, and thus the claims against it are subject to dismissal on
this ground alone. See Brannon v. Thomas Cnty. Jail, 280 F. App’x 930, 934 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2008); Smith v. Dekalb Cnty. Jail, 2014 WL 129509, at *1 (N.D. Ga.).
Because the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the
case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of June, 2015.

S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

The complaint mentions the alleged “illegal land deal[ ]s” involving the Houston County Board of
Commissioners but says no more about it.

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