SCLG LLC v. JONES

Filing 6

ORDER DENYING 5 Motion for Hearing and DENYING 5 Motion for Recusal. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 7/28/2015. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

SCLG LLC and LARRY EALY,
Petitioners,
VS.
RICHARD K. JONES,
Respondent.
_______________________________

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL NO. 5:15-CV-0204-MTT

ORDER
Currently before the Court is Petitioner Larry Ealy’s post-judgment “Motion for
Rehearing” and “Disqualification of the Judge” (Doc. 5), which the Court liberally
construes to be a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and
also possibly a separate motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
I.

Motion for Rehearing

Under Rule 60(b), “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding” if the party can show (1) a “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect”; (2) “newly discovered evidence . . .”; (3) “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party”; (4) that “the judgment is void”; (5) that “the judgment
has been satisfied, released or discharged . . .”; or (6) “any other reason that justifies relief.”
Id. Because Petitioner’s Motion does not argue the existence of any mistake, newly
discovered evidence, misconduct by the opposing party or void judgment, the Court
presumes Petitioner believes that there are extraordinary circumstances to justify a

reopening of the case under Rule 60(b)(6). See Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440, 442
(11th Cir. 1996) (“The vacation of a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary
remedy.”) (citing Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1400 (11th Cir.1987)).
In this case, Petitioners SCLG, L.L.C. and Larry Ealy filed an application for habeas
corpus relief “on behalf of” Lance Ealy, a prisoner convicted in the United States District
Court for Southern District of Ohio.

After conducting a preliminary review of the

application, this Court determined that Petitioners had not established standing to litigate
this action on behalf of Lance Ealy. Though both shared the same last name, there was
nothing in the application to suggest that Lance Ealy was unable to litigate his own cause.
See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990). Furthermore, the Court found
that, even if Petitioners could establish standing to bring the present suit on behalf of Lance
Ealy, venue was not proper in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Because Lance Ealy
was convicted in federal court, any motion for habeas relief must be directed to the court in
which he was convicted, the Southern District of Ohio.

The application was thus

dismissed without prejudice to Lance Ealy’s right to file an appropriate motion or petition
for habeas relief, on his own behalf, in his federal criminal case: U.S. v. Ealy,
3:13-cr-00175-MRB-1 (S.D. Ohio).

In a footnote, the Court additionally warned

Petitioners – after noting that they had filed a similar habeas action in this Court on behalf
of Helen Greene, see SCLG, LLC v. Green, 5:15-cv-173, ECF No. 1 (M.D.Ga. May 15,
2015, – that the unauthorized practice of law could lead to civil and criminal sanctions.1

1

The footnote specifically stated, “The Court also notes that Petitioners SCLG and Larry
E. Ealy have filed another action in this Court on the behalf of Helene Green. See SCLG
-2-

Petitioner Larry Ealy has now filed the present motion seeking relief from the
dismissal and judgment. He believes the Court erred by suggesting that he was involved
in the “unauthorized practice of law after forming its opinion from another record not
involving this matter.” From this, the Court presumes that Petitioner may object to the
footnote reference to his other case pending in this Court. The mention of the other case
was not error, however: “A court may take judicial notice of its own records and the
records of inferior courts.” United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 (11th Cir.
1987). More importantly, the Court’s apparently unheeded warning was not the basis for
dismissal. The petition was dismissed for lack of standing and venue.
According to his Motion, Petitioner also appears to believe that the Court
erroneously relied on extrajudicial knowledge of Petitioner’s recent arrest and a criminal
investigation into his unauthorized practice of law when dismissing his application. His
motion includes a copy of a June 3, 2015, press release from Sheriff David Davis (Doc.
5-1), stating that Larry Ealy had been arrested for “unauthorized practice of law.” Mr.
Ealy was apparently accused of “presenting and/or identifying himself as an attorney in the
Bibb County Superior Court Clerk’s Office and the U.S. Federal Court Clerk’s Office” on
or about May 1, 2015. Id. The release further states that Mr. Ealy

LLC v. Davis, 5:15-cv-173-MTT. Petitioners are advised that, although a prisoner may
seek legal assistance from others, non-attorneys may not practice law in this Court. See
M.D. Ga. Loc. R. 83.1.1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654. See also, Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553,
558 (2d Cir.1998). The fact that Petitioners describe themselves as a “Special Legality
Group” in this case suggests that Petitioners may be holding themselves out as a person or
entity entitled to practice law in this State and/or render legal services or advice. If true,
Petitioners could be held in contempt of court and subject to criminal prosecution. See
O.C.G.A. § 15–19–51.” See Order (Doc. 3) at 2.
-3-

(1) Filed and/or assisted in filing numerous court documents, to include: civil
suit(s); writs; motions; etc. on behalf of [others ;]
(2) Identified himself as an attorney representing [others] in this
investigation and/or has provided them counsel in the presence of the
Clerk’s Office[; and]
(3) . . . [I]s not a duly licensed attorney in the State of [Georgia].
Id.
Whether Mr. Ealy engaged in the unauthorized practice of law clearly was not a
factor in the dismissal of the Petition. Again, the Petition was properly dismissed for lack
of standing and venue.
Therefore, after having fully considered Petitioners’ “Motion for Rehearing,” the
Court finds that Mr. Ealy has failed to identify any valid basis for reopening this case under
Rule 60(b). His Motion for Rehearing is accordingly DENIED.
II.

Motion for Disqualification

Petitioner also apparently moves for disqualification of the judge under 28 U.S.C. §
455. (See Doc 5 at 3.)

Petitioner either (1) believes that the undersigned erred by failing

to recuse himself from the case under § 455 before entering the dismissal order because of
his suspected knowledge of Petitioner’s arrest; or (2) seeks to have the undersigned now
recuse himself from ruling on the present motion for the same reason. The first argument
is of course the same as the one addressed under Rule 60. In an abundance of caution,
however, the Court will reconsider the argument in light of § 455.2

2

“Although § 455 does not speak to vacating a judgment, Rule 60(b)(6), in conjunction
with § 455, does provide “a procedure whereby, in appropriate cases, a party may be
relieved of a final judgment.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d
1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 863 (1988)).
-4-

The standard for recusal under § 455 is “whether an objective, fully informed lay
observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge's impartiality.” Christo v.
Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). “[A]n allegation of bias sufficient to
require disqualification must demonstrate that the bias is personal,” “stemmed from an
extrajudicial source” and “result[ed] in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” Jaffe v. Grant, 793 F.2d 1182,
1188-89 (11th Cir. 1986).
Here, Petitioner’s unsupported suspicions and self-serving allegations would not
cause an objective observer to question the Court’s impartiality in this case. There is no
evidence that the Court had extrajudicial knowledge of any fact affecting the outcome of
this case or that the dismissal was based on anything other than what the Court learned
from its preliminary review of Petitioner’s application.

Also, the “extrajudicial”

knowledge about which the Petitioner complains—that Larry Ealy may have engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law—is knowledge readily apparent from the Petition. Larry
Ealy filed in his name and on behalf of “SGLG-LLC” a lawsuit seeking relief for Lance
Ealy. Finally, once again, whether Larry Ealy has engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law had no bearing on the issues at hand. Petitioners’ application was properly dismissed
for lack of standing and venue. Either cause standing alone was sufficient to support the
dismissal. The Motion for Disqualification is thus also DENIED.

-5-

III.

Conclusion

Petitioners’ post-judgment “Motion for Rehearing” and “Disqualification of the
Judge” (Doc. 5) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of July, 2015.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

-6-