RESPRESS v. NAVICENT HEALTH INC et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Defendants Cheryl Varnadoe, Rhonda Hampton, and Teresa Walston's Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claim s against them are dismissed. However, Defendant Navicent Health, Inc.'s Motion is DENIED without prejudice to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to recast her Complaint. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file a more definite statement of her claims and recast her Complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE C ASHLEY ROYAL on 8/1/2016. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
FLORETTA RESPRESS
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
NAVICENT HEALTH, INC., CHERYL :
VARNADOE, RHONDA HAMPTON, :
and TERESA WALSTON,
:
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________ :
CIVIL ACTION
No. 5:15‐CV‐430 (CAR)
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Floretta Respress, proceeding pro se, filed this employment discrimination
and retaliation suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., against Defendants Navicent Health, Inc., Cheryl Varnadoe, Rhonda Hampton,
and Teresa Walston. 1 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having
considered the Motion, the pleadings, and the applicable law, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 11] is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part without prejudice.
Specifically, Defendants Cheryl Varnadoe, Rhonda Hampton, and Teresa Walston’s
Motion is GRANTED, as Title VII relief is not available against individual employees.
However, Defendant Navicent Health, Inc.’s Motion is DENIED without prejudice to
1 Plaintiff improperly identified the three individuals as “Cheryl H. Varnador,” “Ronda Hampton,” and
“Terri Walston.”
provide Plaintiff an opportunity to recast her Complaint. Pursuant to Rule 12(e), the
Court ORDERS Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement of her claim(s) and recast
her Complaint within twenty‐one (21) days of the date of this Order.
LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all well‐pleaded facts in a
plaintiff’s complaint.2 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”3 A claim is plausible where the plaintiff alleges
factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”4 The plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff
allege sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” that supports a plaintiff’s claims.5
When determining the adequacy of the allegations in the complaint, the Court
remains mindful that “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”6 Nevertheless,
2 Sinaltrainal v. Coca‐Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
4 Id.
5 Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556.
6 Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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“[e]ven with pro se litigants, ‘conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or
legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.’”7
BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2015, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against
Defendants Navicent Health, Cheryl Varnadoe, Rhonda Hampton, and Teresa Walston
alleging Defendants retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff claims she
was retaliated against due to “speaking up about how [she] was treated.”8 Specifically,
Plaintiff claims Defendants treated her unfairly, lied about her performance, and reduced
her work hours after she complained of discriminatory treatment concerning policies and
procedures.9 Plaintiff also seems to assert a discrimination claim under Title VII, stating
Defendants discriminated against her “due to the nature of who [she is].”10 However,
Plaintiff does not indicate what type of discrimination occurred.11 Defendants now seek
dismissal, arguing Plaintiff failed to state a claim for retaliation or discrimination under
Title VII.
7 United States v. Korman, No. 07‐80998‐Civ., 2008 WL 5662165, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2008) (quoting
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005)).
8 Pl. Compl., [Doc. 1], at p. 2.
9 Id.
10 Pl. Compl., Cover Letter, [Doc.1‐1] at p. 1.
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Pl. Compl., [Doc. 1], at p. 2. Plaintiff only checked the box for “other” with regard to the type of
discrimination and then asserted her retaliation claim.
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DISCUSSION
Title VII Claims against Individual Defendants
Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII against Defendants Cheryl Varnadoe,
Rhonda Hampton, and Teresa Walston as individual employees of Navicent Health.
However, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held “[t]he relief granted under Title VII is
against the employer, not [against] individual employees whose actions would constitute a
violation of the Act.”12 Thus, relief under Title VII is not available against individual
employees.13
Accordingly, Defendants Varnadoe, Hampton, and Walston’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against them are dismissed.
Title VII Claims against Defendant Navicent Health
Plaintiff also asserts Title VII retaliation and discrimination claims against
Defendant Navicent Health. Defendant seeks dismissal of these claims for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Under Rule 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”14 Rule 10(b) further provides that the claims
in a complaint must be stated “in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable
12 Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Hinson v. Clinch Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that “[i]ndividual capacity suits
under Title VII are ... inappropriate”).
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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to a single set of circumstances.”15 In addition to these procedural requirements, a
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.’”16 A claim is “facially plausible” when it is supported
with facts that “allow [ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”17
Plaintiffʹs Complaint, accompanied with her Cover Letter, does not comply with the
above requirements. The Complaint omits crucial facts regarding what policies and
procedures Plaintiff complained of and how they were discriminatory. Indeed, it’s unclear
to the Court and Defendant whether Plaintiff complained of discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national original, as she only says she was treated unfairly and
discriminated against “due to the nature of who [she is].”18 Additionally, the Complaint
only lists a retaliation claim, but the attached Cover Letter suggests both discrimination
and retaliation claims without separating out the facts for each claim.19
Currently, Plaintiffʹs Complaint does not give Defendant sufficient notice of the
claims asserted against it, and it does not give the Court an adequate basis for determining
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
17 Id.
18 Pl. Compl., Cover Letter, [Doc.1‐1] at p. 1.
19 See Ledford v. Peeples, 657 F.3d 1222, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffsʹ complaint is a ‘shotgun’ pleading in
that it lumps multiple claims together in one count”); see also Starship Enter. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cnty.,
Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (describing the problems caused by shotgun pleadings); Ankh Meduty
v. Ga. Dep’t of Admin. Services, No. 1:12‐cv‐3240‐JEC, 2013 WL 11332719, at *2 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 30, 2013) (requiring the plaintiff to recast his complaint because the original complaint was a shotgun
pleading) (citing Giles v. Wal‐Mart Distrib. Ctr., 359 F. App’x. 91, 93 (11th Cir. 2009)).
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whether Plaintiff has a “plausible claim” for relief.20 Although Defendant “did not
expressly request the remedy available to [it] under Rule 12(e), [requesting a more definite
statement,] the Court has the ‘inherent authority’ to act on its own and sua sponte direct a
plaintiff to replead a complaint to provide a more definite statement of the claims.”21
Thus, rather than dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will give Plaintiff
an opportunity to restate her claim so that it complies with the federal rules and pleading
standard.22 Prior to submitting the restated claim, Plaintiff should review Rules 8, 10, and
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As required by the applicable rules, Plaintiffʹs restated Complaint should include all
of the facts necessary to evaluate whether Plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief against
Defendant. To state a cognizable discriminatory termination claim in violation of Title VII,
Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified
for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was replaced
by a person outside her protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly‐
20 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
21 Hooper v. City of Montgomery, 482 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1338 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (“If a defendant needs more
information to answer a complaint, the proper response is for that defendant to move for a more definite
statement under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than to move for dismissal.”
(citing Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees Cent. Fla. Comm., 77 F. 3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996))).
22 See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 716 F.3d 535, 557 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting the district
courtʹs power to order a more definite statement sua sponte) (citing Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d
902, 907 (11th Cir. 1996)); see also Severe v. Bank of America, No. 1:13‐cv‐2724‐WSD, 2014 WL 988872, at *5, n.3
(N.D. Ga. March 14, 2014) (“The Court must allow a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint
at least once before dismissing the action with prejudice if a more carefully drafted Complaint could state a
claim.” (citing Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds, by Wagner v.
Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (not addressing pro se plaintiffs))).
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situated individual outside his protected class.23 While Plaintiff is not required to
specifically plead these requirements in her amended complaint, she must “provide
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional race discrimination.”24
Additionally, to prove she was discharged in retaliation for complaining to human
resources of discriminatory treatment, Plaintiff must show (1) she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a causal relationship
exists between her protected activity (complaining to human resources) and the adverse
action (her reduced work hours).25 To establish she engaged in a protected activity,
Plaintiff must show she opposed a practice forbidden under Title VII, such as race or sex
discrimination, or she made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a
Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing.26 Again, although Plaintiff is not required
to specifically plead these requirements in her Complaint, she must provide enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest retaliation.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 11] is GRANTED in
part, and DENIED in part without prejudice. Specifically, Defendants Cheryl Varnadoe,
Rhonda Hampton, and Teresa Walston’s Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims
23 Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
24 Davis v. Coca‐Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008).
25 Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).
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against them are dismissed. However, Defendant Navicent Health, Inc.’s Motion is
DENIED without prejudice to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to recast her Complaint.
The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file a more definite statement of her claims and recast her
Complaint within twenty‐one (21) days of the date of this Order.
SO ORDERED, this 1st day of August, 2016.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CML/ssh
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