MOODY v. SHOULTS et al

Filing 57

ORDER ADOPTING 53 Report and Recommendations and DENYING 43 Defendant Soultes's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Pla intiff's 54 motion for leave to amend is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for undue delay and futility, so that the Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan and his already-dismissed claims against Defendant Shoultes is denied, but his motion for leave to amend his complaint as to his surviving claims against Defendant Shoultes is granted. Further, the Plaintiff's 54 motion for injunctive relief is DENIED. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 6/20/2017. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

JEREMY MOODY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMANTHA SHOULTES, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15-CV-325(MTT)

ORDER
United States Magistrate Judge Charles H. Weigle recommends denying
Defendant Shoultes’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute (Doc. 43) and
dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan. Doc. 53.
Defendant Shoultes does not object to the Recommendation. The Plaintiff does not
object but instead requests leave to amend and requests “3 hr law library time weekly
location main prison.” Doc. 54. The Court has reviewed the Recommendation, and the
Court accepts and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Magistrate Judge. The Recommendation is ADOPTED and made the order of this
Court. Accordingly, Defendant Shoultes’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 43) is DENIED, and
the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan are DISMISSED without
prejudice. Further, the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. 54) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part for undue delay and futility, so that the Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to amend his claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan and his alreadydismissed claims against Defendant Shoultes is denied, but his motion for leave to

amend his complaint as to his surviving claims against Defendant Shoultes is granted.
To the extent the Plaintiff moves for injunctive relief (Doc. 54), that motion is also
DENIED.
I. LEAVE TO AMEND
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) requires “the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave” in order to amend a complaint after 21 days following the
defendant’s responsive pleading. Leave to amend should be granted “freely . . . when
justice so requires.” Id. “A district court need not, however, allow an amendment (1)
where there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment would
cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment would be futile.”
Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
A.

Claims Against Defendant Shoultes Not Already Dismissed
The Court must construe the Plaintiff’s filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728,
731 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Given Mays’s motion to vacate and supplemental notice were
filed pro se, we construe them liberally.” (citation omitted)).
Liberally construed, some portions of the Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint
arise from the same circumstances as his surviving claims against Defendant Shoultes:
Defendant Shoultes’s alleged throwing of feces at the Plaintiff and causing the Plaintiff a
head injury when the Plaintiff reacted. See generally Doc. 1. The Court finds that these

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amendments should be allowed. First, unlike with respect to the other claims, the
Plaintiff has not defied the Court’s direct order to amend these claims. See Doc. 38
(ordering the Plaintiff to amend his claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan);
Doc. 47 (ordering the Plaintiff to amend his claims against Defendant Shoultes for
deliberate indifference to medical needs and in Defendant Shoultes’s official capacity).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not unduly delayed with respect to this
amendment. Cf. Ludy v. Nelson, 2015 WL 1347219, at *1 (M.D. Ga.) (finding undue
delay when nothing suggested the new “allegations and theory of recovery were
unknown to the Plaintiff at the time he filed his original complaint or his previous motions
to amend” and the plaintiff had multiple opportunities to amend).
Second, the Court finds that Defendant Shoultes will not be unduly prejudiced by
amendment as to these claims. Defendant Shoultes argues that the Plaintiff’s proposed
amendments as a whole “would prejudice Defendant” because discovery has
commenced, but Defendant Shoultes fails to argue that these amendments, which
relate to circumstances already part of the original complaint, create undue prejudice.
Doc. 56 at 5. Indeed, Defendant Shoultes characterizes these amendments as
“essentially . . . the same . . . as the original Complaint,” only objecting to them as
“unnecessary.” Id. at 6. And third, the Court does not find that these amendments are
futile, as the proposed amendments relate to the already-surviving claims against
Defendant Shoultes. Construing the pro se Plaintiff’s filings liberally, the Court finds that
these amendments are permissible.

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B.

Other Claims
The proposed amended complaint’s claims against Defendants Whiters and

Jordan and the previously-dismissed claims against Defendant Shoultes, however, are
denied due to the Plaintiff’s undue delay and the futility of the amendments.
1.

Undue Delay

The Magistrate Judge originally recommended dismissing without prejudice the
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan for failure to state a claim.
Doc. 10 at 1. The Court agreed that the Plaintiff had failed to state a claim against
Defendants Whiters and Jordan, but on August 19, 2016, the Court rejected the
Recommendation and granted the Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint (Doc. 32)
because (1) the events underlying the claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan
occurred in September 2013, likely barring the Plaintiff from refiling his complaint due to
the relevant two-year statute of limitations and thus making the dismissal likely with
prejudice; and (2) the Plaintiff had not yet had a chance to amend his complaint. Doc.
38. The Court ordered the Plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a claim against
Defendants Whiters and Jordan within 21 days. Id. at 2. The Plaintiff failed to do so
until now, and he has failed to justify this ten-month delay. The amendments as to
Defendants Whiters and Jordan are accordingly denied for undue delay. See
Carruthers v. BSA Advert., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming the
lower court’s denial of a motion to amend for undue delay when the plaintiff moved to
amend six months after the district court’s deadline for amendments and offered no
explanation for the delay or for why the interests of justice required leave to amend);
see also Ludy, 2015 WL 1347219, at *1.

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Similarly, on February 15, 2017, the Court ordered the Plaintiff to redraft his
complaint within 14 days if he believed he could allege facts sufficient to cure the
deficiencies in his complaint as to his claims against Defendant Shoultes for deliberate
indifference to medical needs and official capacity. Doc. 47 at 3. The Plaintiff failed to
amend until now, and he has failed to justify his delay. Accordingly, the motion to
amend those claims is also dismissed for undue delay.
2.

Futility

In the alternative, “denial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the
complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal,” and these claims are denied as
futile. Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
a.

Defendant Jordan

The proposed amended complaint alleges only that Defendant Jordan “served as
the H-House sergeant at the GA Dia Class prison at the time of the events at issue in
this complaint. She is sued for damages in her individual capacity.” Doc. 55 at 3. The
Plaintiff fails to state a theory of liability against Defendant Jordan, and the Plaintiff fails
to allege facts connecting Defendant Jordan with the Plaintiff’s injuries. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Jordan fail for futility because, even liberally
construed, they fail to state a claim.
b.

Defendant Whiters

In his proposed amended complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Whiters
was deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s medical needs. Doc. 55 at 6. But the
Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant Whiters “refused to further investigat[e]” Defendant

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Shoultes’s conduct and “refus[ed] to provide the surv[e]illance video evidence with the
grievance report.” Id. at 6-7. To prove deliberate indifference to medical needs, the
Eleventh Circuit requires a Plaintiff to show “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the
defendant[‘s] deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that
indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07
(11th Cir. 2009). The Plaintiff has failed to allege how his injuries were exacerbated by
Defendant Whiters’s alleged investigative failures. Even construing his allegations
liberally, the Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant Whiters for which relief
may be granted.
c.

Dismissed Claims Against Defendant Shoultes

The Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint also fails to state a claim for the
previously dismissed claims against Defendant Shoultes: deliberate indifference to
medical needs and official capacity claims. Even liberally construed, the proposed
amended complaint fails to allege the Mann elements of deliberate indifference to
medical needs. Further, the Plaintiff specifies that Defendant Shoultes “is sued for
damages in her individ[u]al capacity.” Doc. 55 at 2. Accordingly, in the alternative
these claims in the proposed amended complaint also fail for futility.
II. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
As discussed above, the Court must construe the Plaintiff’s filings liberally. But
to the extent the Plaintiff requests preliminary injunctive relief in the form of more library
time, the Plaintiff’s request must be denied, even liberally construing his filing, for the
reasons discussed in the Court’s previous denial of such a motion. See Doc. 50 at 2-3.
First, the Plaintiff has failed to show a harm which requires relief, as preliminary

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injunctions are only available upon a demonstration of “(1) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) that the
threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the potential harm to the defendant; and (4)
that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325,
1329 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Second, preliminary injunctions relating to
prison conditions “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct
the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means
necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see Thomas v. Bryant, 614
F.3d 1288, 1320 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that this “need-narrowness-intrusiveness
limitation governs the initial entry of an injunctive relief in prison litigation cases”). The
Court must also “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the
operation of a criminal justice system . . . and shall respect . . . principles of comity.” 18
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The Plaintiff’s brief motion (Doc. 54), like his prior motion
requesting similar relief (Doc. 49), does not meet these requirements. He has not
shown that he is entitled to injunctive relief, and he has not shown that his requested
relief is appropriately drawn and outweighs other considerations.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 53), Shoultes’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute (Doc. 43) is DENIED,
and the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan are DISMISSED
without prejudice.1 The Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. 54) is GRANTED

1

The applicable two-year statute of limitations appears to bar the Plaintiff from refiling his federal claims.
Therefore, the dismissal is, in effect, possibly with prejudice as to those claims. Justice v. United States,
6 F.3d 1474, 1482 n.15 (11th Cir. 1993); Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1981). That is the
reason the Court afforded the Plaintiff the opportunity to amend. Doc. 38. Because the Plaintiff unduly

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in part and DENIED in part for undue delay and futility, so that the Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to amend his claims against Defendants Whiters and Jordan and his alreadydismissed claims against Defendant Shoultes is denied, but his motion for leave to
amend his complaint as to his surviving claims against Defendant Shoultes is granted.
Further, the Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 54) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of June, 2017.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

delayed in failing to timely amend and in the alternative his proposed amendments as to these claims are
futile, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813-14 (11th Cir.
1985) (holding that dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion when the court gave the pro
se plaintiff a chance to amend).

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