O'DONNELL v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GEORGIA MILITARY COLLEGE AND GEORGIA MILITARY PREP SCHOOL et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING 8 Motion to Dismiss and GRANTING 11 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Plaintiff's 16 Request for Oral Argument is DENIED as unnecessary. Because the Court has dismissed the § 1983 cl aims initially giving rise to this Court's original jurisdiction and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims, the remainder of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is hereby REMANDED to Baldwin County Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE C ASHLEY ROYAL on 6/29/2016. (tlh)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
ROSE O’DONNELL,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GEORGIA
:
MILITARY COLLEGE AND GEORGIA
:
MILITIARY PREP SCHOOL; RANDALL A. :
NEW; GEORGE HOGAN, SR.; REV. TONY :
FRALEY; DORIS RENFROE; KEN VANCE; :
ALBERTO C. MARTINEZ, JR.; RICHARD :
CASE NO. 5:15‐CV‐389‐CAR
BENTLEY; GEORGIA MILITARY COLLEGE;:
Lieutenant General WILLIAM CALDWELL, :
IV, individually and in his official capacity as :
President of Georgia Military College; PAM :
GRANT, individually and in her official
:
:
Capacity Principal of Georgia Military
College Prep School; DAVID F. LEWIS,
:
individually and in his official capacity as :
Senior Army Instructor at Georgia Military :
College Prep School; Major LARRY MARTIN :
individually and in his official capacity as
:
an Instructor at Georgia Military College Prep:
School; and Sfc. CHRIS SWARS, individually
:
and in his official capacity as an Instructor at :
Georgia Military College Prep School,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________
:
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Rose O’Donnell, a high school student‐cadet at Georgia Military College
Prep School, filed this action alleging Defendants violated her substantive due process
rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and certain state tort laws for forcing her to engage
in “excessive and unduly severe” physical exercises during a “Bullring” disciplinary
session. 1 Currently before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
federal claims. Upon review of applicable law, the Complaint, and the Motions and
responses thereto, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to establish a deprivation of a
constitutional right, and thus, the Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 8 & 11] are GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Request for Oral Argument [Doc. 16] is DENIED as unnecessary. The Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law
claims, and those claims are REMANDED to the Superior Court of Baldwin County.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of these Motions, the Court accepts all factual allegations in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.
At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was a high school student‐cadet in
her junior year in the Georgia Military Prep School at Georgia Military College.
Plaintiff, during her normal course of activities as a high school student‐cadet, accrued
ten demerits which warranted punishment under the GMC Prep Student Handbook.
Under the GMC Handbook, ten demerits issued for violations of student rules such as
school uniform violations and tardiness will result in the student‐cadet being subjected
1
Am. Compl., ¶14 [Doc. 4].
2
to one hour of “Retraining,” which is more commonly referred to as “Bullring.” The
Handbook outlines Bullring hours as including marching or some form of work around
campus supervised by an assistant military instructor.
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on October 29, 2013, Plaintiff attended one hour of
Bullring under the direct supervision of Defendants Martin and Swars, who demanded
Plaintiff complete “excessive and unduly severe” physical exercises.2 The physical
punishment Defendants Martin and Swars forced Plaintiff to complete included two
timed quarter‐mile runs, approximately 30 repetitions of burpees, approximately 60
push‐ups, and a certain distance of lunges. The instructors repeatedly told Plaintiff she
would have to complete the entire hour over again if she did not complete the required
exercises. As Plaintiff visibly struggled with each task, the other cadets were forced to
do jumping jacks until Plaintiff was able to complete each set. While attempting to
complete the required the push‐ups, Plaintiff informed Defendants Martin and Swars
she was physically unable to finish. Martin and Swars then demanded she complete the
push‐ups in “male” form or she would have to re‐do the entire hour. In fear of the
consequences and as a result of the verbal and environmental pressures, Plaintiff
completed the regimen.
As a result of the physical punishment, Plaintiff suffered injuries including
rhabdomyolysis, which is a physical breakdown of muscle; debilitating muscle fatigue;
2
Id.
3
physical exhaustion; excruciating muscle pain which required an extended
hospitalization to prevent renal failure; permanent loss of normal muscle strength in
Plaintiff’s arms; and the onset of anxiety and other psychological conditions stemming
from the severity of Plaintiff’s injuries and their effect upon Plaintiff’s daily life.
Plaintiff originally filed suit in Baldwin County Superior Court seeking to
recover damages from Defendants under Georgia law for negligence and vicarious
liability and under § 1983 for alleged violations of the United States Constitution.
Defendants properly removed the case to this Court pursuant to the Court’s federal
question jurisdiction over her § 1983 claims.
In addition to the two instructors who personally conducted the Bullring—
Defendants Martin and Swars—Plaintiff also asserts § 1983 claims against GMC’s Board
of Trustees and members of the Board and the Administration, including individual
Board members New, Hogan, Fraley, Renfroe, Vance, Martinez, and Bentley
(collectively, the “Board Defendants”); as well as President Caldwell, Principal Grant,
and Senior Army Instructor Lewis (collectively, the “Administration Defendants”). All
Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all well‐pleaded facts in a
4
plaintiff’s complaint.3 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”4 A claim is plausible where the
plaintiff alleges factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”5 The plausibility standard
requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence” that supports a plaintiff’s claims.6
ANALYSIS
Defendants move to dismiss the following claims:
A. Federal and State Individual Capacity Claims against the Board Defendants
Plaintiff agrees her asserted federal and state claims against the individual
Board Defendants are improper, as the proper state entity is the Board of Trustees.
Thus, all claims against Defendants NEW, HOGAN, FRALEY, RENFROE,
MARTINEZ, and BENTLEY are hereby DISMISSED.
B. Claims against Individual Defendants under the Georgia Torts Claims Act
Plaintiff also agrees that her claims brought under the Georgia Tort Claims Act
against the individual Defendants are properly asserted only against the Board of
Sinaltrainal v. Coca‐Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).
5 Id.
6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
3
4
5
Trustees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50‐21‐25(b) because all Defendants were acting in
their official capacity. Thus, all claims under the Georgia Tort Claims Acts asserted
against Defendants CALDWELL, GRANT, LEWIS, MARTIN, and SWARS are hereby
DISMISSED.
C. § 1983 Substantive Due Process Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants’ conduct
violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.7 Section 1983
provides a private cause of action against those who, under color of law, deprive a
citizen of the United States of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.”8 A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 claim against a governmental
entity or person in his individual or official capacity. 9 Plaintiff clarifies she does not
assert any § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities;
she only asserts these claims against them in their individual capacities. Thus, based
on Plaintiff’s clarifications and the Court’s earlier rulings, Plaintiff asserts her § 1983
claims against the Board of Trustees; the Administrative Defendants—Caldwell,
In her Complaint, Plaintiff also asserts violations of her Fifth Amendment substantive due process
rights, but she appears to concede these claims must be dismissed, as she fails to address Defendants’
Fifth Amendment arguments made in their Motions to Dismiss. Even if Plaintiff does not concede her
Fifth Amendment claims must be dismissed, the Court finds she has abandoned them; thus, Plaintiff’s
Fifth Amendment claims are hereby DISMISSED. See Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v.
City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000); Black v. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n. 1 (5th Cir.
2006) (finding plaintiff abandoned claim by failing to defend it in response to a motion to dismiss).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
9 Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991).
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Grant, and Lewis—in their individual and official capacities; and the two instructors
directly involved—Martin and Swars—in their individual capacities. The Court will
address each of these claims.
1. §1983 Claims against Defendants in their Individual Capacity—Qualified
Immunity
Defendants Caldwell, Grant, Lewis, Martin, and Swars argue qualified
immunity shields them against § 1983 liability because their conduct did not violate
Plaintiff’s clearly established Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.
As explained below, the Court agrees.
“[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued
in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”10
As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, “[w]hen properly applied, [qualified
immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.”11 “The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out
their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing
10
11
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193‐94 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015).
7
litigation.”12 Qualified immunity is immunity from suit and should be resolved as
early as possible in the case.13
When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the initial burden is on the
defendant to show that “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.”14 Once the defendant satisfies that burden,
the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that (1) a violation of a constitutional right
occurred, and (2) that right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation.15
Here, it is clear Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary
authority. Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to prove their conduct violated her
clearly established Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.
a. Constitutional Violation
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”16 Embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment is the
protection of both procedural and substantive due process. The substantive
component of the Due Process Clause “protects individual liberty against ‘certain
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231‐32 (2009).
14 Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.
15 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
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government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.’”17 This protection is “intended to prevent government officials from abusing
their power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.”18
The substantive due process clause imposes affirmative duties of care on the
state only in limited circumstances: (1) where the state takes a person into custody,
confining her against her will, and (2) when the government’s actions can be
characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking in the constitutional sense.19 The
Supreme Court has tightly restricted the scope of substantive due process claims and
has expressed its reluctance to expand its scope.20 The Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit “have both said repeatedly that the Fourteenth Amendment is not a
‘font of tort law’ that can be used, through section 1983, to convert state tort claims
into federal causes of action.”21
(1) Duty Created by Custodial Relationship
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
331 (1986)).
18 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
19 See Doe v. Braddy, 673 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198‐99; and Collins, 503 U.S.
at 128.
20 Collins, 503 U.S. at 125 (citation omitted) (“[G]uideposts for responsible decision making in this
unchartered area [expansion of substantive due process] are scarce and open‐ended. The doctrine of
judicial self‐restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground
in this field.”).
21 Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento, 523
U.S. at 848).
17
9
Plaintiff first argues Defendants’ constitutional duty of protection arises through
her involuntary custodial relationship with Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff contends
the Bullring session was mandatory punishment for violations of school rules, and thus,
the Court must analyze her claims under the less rigorous deliberate indifference
standard used to analyze substantive due process claims of persons in state custody.
The Court, however, is unpersuaded and agrees with Defendants this argument
“stretches the limits of the term ‘involuntary’ confinement far past its intended due
process boundaries.”22
A duty of protection arises where the state has a custodial relationship with an
individual, but such a duty arises from such circumstances such as incarceration in
prison or involuntary commitment in a mental institution.23 In general, schools do not
have a custodial relationship with their students because public schools generally lack
the requisite control over children to impose such a duty of care.24 Schools do not place
the kind of restraints on students’ liberty that prisons place on inmates,25 mental health
institutions place on committed patients,26 or foster homes place on involuntarily placed
children.27 “Children in foster homes, unlike children in public schools, are isolated; no
persons outside the home setting are present to witness and report mistreatment. The
Defendants’ Reply Brief, p. 3 [Doc. 20].
Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 982 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
24 See id.; Wyke v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 569 (11th Cir. 1997).
25 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
26 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1982).
27 See Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987).
22
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children are helpless. Without investigation, supervision, and constant contact required
by statute, a child placed in a foster home is at the mercy of the foster parents.”28
That Plaintiff was in “mandatory punishment” does not render her relationship
with the school custodial. She was not a prisoner or involuntarily committed mental
patient or foster child, helpless and at the mercy of the prison, mental facility, or foster
home; she was a sixteen year old student attending a public military school, a school
she chose to attend rather than her geographically designated school. Participating in
the Bullring session was required for her to stay in the school of her choice; it was not
an involuntary confinement. Thus, because Plaintiff was not in a custodial relationship,
Defendants’ conduct must rise to the arbitrary and conscience‐shocking level for
Plaintiff to maintain her constitutional claim.
(2) Conduct that Shocks the Conscience
In non‐custodial relationships, the government can be held liable under the
substantive due process clause “only where an official’s act or omission is ‘arbitrary[] or
conscience‐shocking.’”29 “’Numerous cases in a variety of contexts recognize it as a last
line of defense against those literally outrageous abuses of official power whose very
variety makes formulation of a more precise standard impossible.’”30 Conduct by a
Tylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 731, 797 (11th Cir. 1987).
White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 128).
30 Hatfield v. O’Neill, 534 F. App’x 838, 844 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hall v. Towney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th
Cir. 1980)).
28
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government actor that would amount to an intentional tort under state law would not,
without more, rise to the level of the constitutional violation. 31 “[O]nly the most
egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.”32
“[T]he constitutional concept of conscience shocking duplicates no traditional category
of common‐law fault, but rather points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it,
only at the ends of the tort law’s spectrum of culpability.”33 While no precise rubric
exists, conduct “intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government
interest” is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience‐shocking level.34
Plaintiff does not argue her punishment was imposed with no legitimate
disciplinary purpose. Indeed, no one disputes Plaintiff accrued the demerits necessary
to justify punishment under the school policy. Instead, Plaintiff claims Defendants’
conduct amounted to corporal punishment imposed in an unconstitutionally excessive
manner. Defendants contend their conduct does not constitute corporal punishment
because Defendants did not apply physical force to Plaintiff.35 However, “[t]he key
inquiry is not what form the use of force takes but whether the use of force is ‘related to
Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1048 (11th Cir. 2002).
Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1305.
33 Id. at 846.
34 Davis, 555 F.3d at 982 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
35 See Hatfield, 534 F. App’x at 844 (“Corporal punishment in schools typically refers to the application of
physical force by a school official to punish a student for some type of school‐related punishment.”)
(citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977)).
31
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[the student’s] misconduct at school and . . . for the purpose of discipline.’”36 The Court
will assume Defendants’ conduct meets this definition for purposes of summary
judgment.
Broadly speaking, “excessive corporal punishment, at least where not
administered in conformity with a valid school policy authorizing corporal punishment.
. . may be actionable under the Due Process Clause when it is tantamount to arbitrary,
egregious, and conscience‐shocking behavior.”37 To show the allegedly excessive
corporal punishment is conscience‐shocking, a plaintiff must prove at a minimum that
“(1) a school official intentionally used an amount of force that was obviously excessive
under the circumstances, and (2) the force used presented a reasonably foreseeable risk
of serious bodily injury.”38
To determine whether the amount of force used is obviously excessive, the Court
considers the totality of the circumstances.39 Among other things, the Court looks to “(1)
the need for the application of corporal punishment, (2) the relationship between the
need and amount of punishment administered, and (3) the extent of the injury
inflicted.”40
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Bd. of Seminole County, Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 599 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neal,
229 F.3d at 1073).
37 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
38 Neal, 229 F.3d at 1075.
39 Id.
40 Id.
36
13
In considering the need for the use of force, the Court “look[s] at the
circumstances surrounding [Defendants’] use of force to determine whether the force is
capable of being construed as an attempt to serve pedagogical objectives.”41 Here,
forcing Plaintiff to engage in physical exercise as punishment for violating school rules
“is capable of being construed as an attempt” to maintain discipline and ensure future
compliance with school rules.42 Plaintiff had accrued demerits for violating school rules,
thus providing Defendants with a legitimate reason to use force. Although Defendants
could have used alternative disciplinary methods, Defendants’ use of force was
disciplinary and thus not “wholly unjustified by a government interest.”43
Next, the Court must consider the relationship between the need for the use of
force and the amount of force administered. Here, Defendants were acting with a
disciplinary purpose based on Plaintiff’s accrual of the requisite demerits warranting
school punishment. The punishment itself consisted of one hour of excessive physical
exercise which included timed sprints, lunges, burpees, pushups, and verbal abuse.
Although Defendants could have punished Plaintiff “in a less harmful manner, the
amount of force at issue here was not totally unrelated to the need for the use of force.”44
T.W. ex rel. Wilson, 610 F.3d at 600 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
43 Peterson, 504 F.3d at 1336.
44 T.W. ex rel. Wilson, 610 F.3d at 601 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); compare Hatfield v.
O’Neill, 534 F. App’x 838, 847‐48 (11th Cir. 2013) (force obviously excessive where teacher struck
profoundly mentally and physically handicapped child on the head in a place where she was particularly
vulnerable due to her previous surgery for no legitimate reason) (emphasis in original).
41
42
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Finally, to determine whether the corporal punishment was obviously excessive,
the Court must consider the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries. Here, Plaintiff suffered
rhabdomyolysis (physical breakdown of her muscles), “debilitating muscle fatigue”,
physical exhaustion, “excruciating muscle pain which required extended
hospitalization to prevent renal failure,” and permanent loss of normal muscle strength
in her arms.45 While the extent and nature of Plaintiff’s injuries is an important factor in
the analysis, “it is indeed only one factor in our analysis.”46 Although Plaintiff’s alleged
injuries are serious, the conduct causing these injuries is simply not tantamount to
arbitrary, egregious, and conscience‐shocking behavior. After considering the totality of
the circumstances, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish Defendant’s use of force was
obviously excessive.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim Defendants
“subjectively intended to use an obviously excessive amount of force in circumstances
where it was foreseeable that serious bodily injury would result.”47 “In short, the
standard is shock the conscience and totality of circumstances; and when some reason
exists for the use of force, constitutional violations do not arise unless the teacher inflicts
serious physical injury upon the student.”48 Here, Defendants had a disciplinary reason
Am. Compl. ¶ 17.
Wilson, 610 F.3d at 601; see also Neal, 229 F.3d at 1076.
47 Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000).
48 Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2007).
45
46
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to use of force, and the physical injuries Plaintiff suffered are not severe enough to
maintain a constitutional claim. The allegations are insufficient to establish Defendants’
intended to use obviously excessive physical exercise in circumstances where it was
foreseeable serious bodily injury would result. The physical exercise Plaintiff endured
happened at the end of October. Plaintiff makes no allegations Defendants disregarded
excessively high temperatures or intentionally deprived Plaintiff of water or rest.
Ultimately, in analyzing Eleventh Circuit case law in which corporal punishment
has given rise to a potential constitutional violation, this Court cannot find Defendants’
alleged conduct rises to arbitrary and capricious. In Neal, a high school coach
intentionally struck a student with a metal weight lock, knocking the student’s eye out
of its socket.49 In Kirkland, a high school principal struck the student with a metal cane
in the head, ribs, and back to cause a large knot and continuing migraine headaches. By
contrast, in Peterson,50 the court concluded that choking a student until he lost his
breath and sustained blue and red bruises and a scratch on his neck was not obviously
excessive because the extent of the student’s bodily injuries were not serious.51
Id.at 1071.
504 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007).
51 Id. at 1334‐35, 1337.
49
50
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Eleventh Circuit case law illustrates how rigorous conscience‐shocking conduct
is,52 and the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint do not rise to that level.
Simply put, Plaintiff’s allegations are not “so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as to
literally shock the conscience of the court.”53 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “when
someone not in custody is harmed because too few resources were devoted to their
safety and protection, that harm will seldom, if ever, be cognizable under the Due
Process Clause.”54 This case is no exception. Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to
state a claim that Defendants deprived her of a constitutional right; thus, her federal
claims must be dismissed.55
b. Clearly Established Law
Even if Defendants’ alleged conduct did amount to a violation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, qualified immunity still protects Defendants because any such
rights were not clearly established. “For a constitutional right to be clearly established
the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable [official] would
See, e.g., Dacosta, 304 F.3d 1045 (college instructor’s conduct did not rise to conscience‐shocking level
where instructor slammed door on student’s arm causing the glass to shatter, knocked student back by
swinging the door violently, and shoving plaintiff’s face); Nix v. Franklin County School District, 311 F.3d
1373 (11th Cir. 2002) (no constitutional deprivation where student died after touching an exposed live
wire in teacher’s electromechanical class during a voltage‐reading demonstration); compare Neal, 229 F.3d
1069 (court found high school coach’s conduct conscience shocking where he intentionally struck a
student with metal weight, knocking student’s eye out of its socket, as form of punishment); Kirkland, 347
F.3d 903 (court found high school principal’s conduct conscience shocking where he struck student with
metal cane in head, ribs, and back for disciplinary reasons).
53 Neal, 229 F.3d at 1075.
54 White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999).
55 Id.
52
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understand that what he is doing violates the law.”56 “The relevant, dispositive inquiry
in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”57 In
other words, the issue is whether the law gave the [official] “fair warning” that his
conduct was unconstitutional.58 When determining whether the law is clearly
established, factually similar cases are “usually . . . needed to demonstrate that officials
were fairly warned that their application of force violated the victimʹs constitutional
rights.”59 In conducting the clearly‐established analysis, “the district court should
compare the facts of the case before the court that allege a constitutional deprivation
with those cases that the party opposing the motion contends show the clearly
established nature of the law.”60 To find such cases, the Court must look only “to law as
decided by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Supreme Court of
[Georgia].”61
No case law gave Defendants fair warning their actions would violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. The Eleventh Circuit has dismissed claims of students who have
endured arguably more severe punishment than Plaintiff in this case. In T.W. ex rel.
Bates v. Harvery, 518 F.3d 133 (11th Cir. 2008).
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
58 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
59 Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003).
60 Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 559 (11th Cir. 2015).
61 Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2013).
56
57
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Wilson,62 a teacher on four different occasions (1) sat on a student to restrain him, (2)
forced him to the floor in an inappropriate position, (3) twisted his arm and shoved him
into a wall, and (4) pinned his arms behind his back, all causing transient pain, minor
bruising and psychological trauma. The court found the teacher’s conduct was not
obviously excessive to support the student’s claim of a violation of his substantive due
process rights. In Peterson, the court also dismissed the constitutional claim where a
teacher choked a student, causing him to temporarily struggle to breathe and leaving
blue and red bruises and a scratch on his neck.
In cases where the Eleventh Circuit has found excessive corporal punishment
claims to be legally sufficient to sustain a constitutional claim, the conscience‐shocking
conduct was far worse than in the case here. In Kirkland, the principal repeatedly struck
a non‐resisting student with a metal cane, including once on the head.63 In Neal, a coach
struck a student in the eye with a weight lock, knocking the eye out of its socket.64 Both
Neal and Kirkland involved direct, intentional physical abuse that resulted in
immediate and severe physical injuries to the student. Plaintiff’s allegations here do not
rise to this level.
Moreover, Plaintiff did not point to nor did this Court find any case considering
whether forced physical exercise imposed as punishment in a school setting is corporal
610 F.3d 588, 603 (11th Cir. 2010).
374 F.3d at 904.
64 229 F.3d at 1076.
62
63
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punishment or arbitrary and capricious. The Eleventh Circuit has addressed physical
exercise in the realm of voluntary high school football practice.
In Davis v. Carter65, the Eleventh Circuit found the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity after subjecting a high school student to an intense and
unreasonable voluntary summer football practice that caused the student to collapse
and die the next morning. The plaintiffs alleged the coaches failed to provide enough
water to keep the student hydrated, ignored signs and the student’s complaints that he
was becoming dehydrated, subjected him to rigorous conditioning drills at the end of a
two‐hour practice, and failed to attend to the student until after a team meeting even
though he had collapsed in the middle of the drills.66 The Court found the allegations
pointed to the conclusion the coaches merely acted with deliberate indifference, which
is insufficient to reach the “conscience shocking” level required to establish a
constitutional violation.67 Although not a corporal punishment case, and thus
distinguishable because this Court is considering Defendants’ conduct here to be
corporal punishment for purposes of this Motion, Davis remains illustrative in the
clearly established analysis. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has stated “that students will
be able to state a claim only where the alleged corporal punishment truly reflects the
kind of egregious official abuse of force that would violate substantive due process
555 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 980‐81.
67 Id. at 984.
65
66
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protections in other, non‐school contexts.”68 Thus, even if Defendants’ conduct
constituted excessive corporal punishment, Defendants are still entitled to qualified
immunity because their actions did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established rights.
1.
§ 1983 Claims against the Board and Administrative Defendants
In order to impose § 1983 liability on a governmental entity, a plaintiff must
show: (1) her constitutional rights were violated; (2) the municipality had a custom or
policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) the
policy or custom caused the violation.69 Because this Court has found Plaintiff’s
allegations fail to state a claim for a violation of her constitutional rights, her § 1983
claims against the Board and the Administrative Defendants fail. However, even if
Plaintiff did sufficiently allege Defendants violated her substantive due process rights,
her supervisory liability claims against the Board and the Administrative Defendants
would still fail.
In order to state a section 1983 claim against a local government entity, a plaintiff
“must identify a specific deprivation of a federal right and the local government policy
or custom that caused the deprivation of the federal rights.”70 A local government entity
may not be found liable under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
Neal, 229 F.3d at 1076.
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989)).
70 Chaney v. Fayette Cnty. Public Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1318 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (citing Bd. of Cnty.
Com’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
68
69
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agents, even when that injury results in a constitutional violation.71 Instead, “a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the government entity has a custom or practice or allowing the
particular constitutional violation.”72 To do this, a plaintiff generally must show “a
persistent and widespread practice.”73 Plaintiff here fails to state such allegations.
To support her supervisory liability claims, Plaintiff merely alleges the Board
and the Administrative Defendants “established an official policy and custom on the
use of physical punishment at Georgia Military College that was the moving force in the
excessive, malicious, sadistic, and shocking physical punishment administered on the
Plaintiff by Defendants Martin and Swars as described in this Complaint.”74 The
Complaint describes only one incident, and Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to establish
this incident was part of widespread unconstitutional conduct. Moreover, there are no
allegations these Defendants directed Martin and Swars’ conduct or were even aware of
the alleged unconstitutional conduct and failed to stop it. To survive a motion to
dismiss, Plaintiff must do more than point to conclusory allegations. She must “plead[]
factual content that allows the court to draw on the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”75 Plaintiff’s allegation of a “policy and
custom on the use of physical punishment” is conclusory and fails to adequately state a
Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Daniel v. Hancock Cnty. Sch. Dist., 626 F. App’x 825, 832 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Grech v. Clayton Cnt., 335
F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003)).
73 Id. (citing Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994)).
74 Am. Compl., ¶ 30.
75 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
71
72
22
supervisory liability claim. “Alleging vaguely that a policy, custom or practice exists is
not enough; rather plaintiff must specifically identify which policy or practice, if any,
caused the alleged injuries.”76 Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 supervisory liability claims must
be dismissed.
D. Remaining State Law Claims
Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court must now determine
whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.77 The Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over non‐diverse
state law claims if:
(1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which
the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) The district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
Searcy v. Ben Hill Cnty. Sch. Dist., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1341 (M.D. Ga. 2014) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
77 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article
II of the United States Constitution.”).
76
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(4) In exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.78
Additionally, in deciding whether or not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
pendent state law claims under § 1367(c), a court should also consider the interest of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the litigants, and comity.79
Here, all of the federal claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction
must be dismissed. “When the district court has dismissed all federal claims from a
case, there is a strong argument for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state law claims.”80 The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly stated that
“[s]tate courts, not federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state law.”81 Having
fully considered the matter, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s state law claims should be
determined by the Georgia courts. Thus, the Court finds it appropriate to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 8 & 11] are
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Request for Oral Argument [Doc. 16] is DENIED as
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
See Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994).
80 Arnold v. Tuskegee Univ., 212 F. App’x 803, 811 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Carnegie‐Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988)).
81 See, e.g., Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.2d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997).
78
79
24
unnecessary. Because the Court has dismissed the § 1983 claims initially giving rise to
this Court’s original jurisdiction and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, the remainder of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
is hereby REMANDED to Baldwin County Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).
SO ORDERED, this 29th day of June, 2016.
SSH
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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