STERLING v. SELLERS et al
Filing
82
ORDER GRANTING in part 59 MOTION for Summary Judgment. The Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims under the Georgia Constitution. Those claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 12/17/2018. (kat)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
RICO STERLING,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
WARDEN ERIC SELLERS,
:
et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
________________________________ :
CASE NO. 5:16-CV-00013-MTT
ORDER
In its Order granting in part and denying in part the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the Court noted that Plaintiff Sterling’s claims under the Eighth
Amendment and under the Georgia Constitution had gone unaddressed. Doc. 78 at 1819. Because the Eighth Amendment claim appeared frivolous, the Court ordered
Sterling to show cause why the claim should not be dismissed. Id. Sterling did not
respond, and the Eighth Amendment claim was dismissed. Doc. 80. Regarding the
claims under the Georgia Constitution, the Court ordered simultaneous briefing
addressing those claims. Doc. 78 at 19. The Defendants have submitted their brief.
Doc. 81. The deadline for filing those briefs was November 15, 2018. Even considering
the prison mailbox rule 1 and allowing for delays in prison mailings, Sterling has not filed
a brief within the required time.
1
Under the “prison mailbox rule,” a prisoner's complaint, or in this case brief, is deemed to be filed on the
date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); United States
v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012).
In their brief, the Defendants argue the protections of the Georgia Constitution
are unenforceable by courts. They state that “[t]here is no cognizable cause of action
for a violation of the Georgia Constitution,” and again that “Georgia law thus does not
provide any cause of action for the violation of a right protected by the Georgia
Constitution.” Doc. 81 at 4. Because of this, “the Plaintiff cannot state a viable claim”
for the violation of his rights. Id. They also argue these claims are barred by sovereign
immunity and official immunity.
Because sovereign immunity and official immunity bar Sterling’s state law claims
under the Georgia Constitution, the Court need not address the argument that there is
no cause of action for violating the Georgia Constitution. See McConnell v. Dep't of
Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 19, 805 S.E.2d 79, 80 (2017) (noting that because sovereign
immunity is jurisdictional, courts should address it as a threshold matter).
Under current Georgia law, state sovereign immunity bars all claims against
officers in their official capacities, whether for injunctive relief or damages, absent a
waiver. Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 444, 801 S.E.2d 867, 892 (2017). Sterling does
not point to an applicable waiver here, so his official-capacity claims are barred.
Sterling’s claims against the officers in their individual capacities are governed by
the doctrine of official immunity, which applies when officers are performing their official
functions. Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, ¶ IX. “Official functions” includes discretionary acts
within the scope of a state officer’s authority. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 753,
452 S.E.2d 476, 483 (1994). As the Court noted in its prior order, the officers were
“undoubtedly acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when they
disallow[ed] participation in the Eid feast,” so official immunity is applicable here. Doc.
78 at 13. As the doctrine of official immunity has been developed by the state supreme
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court, it does not bar suits against state officers in their individual capacities for
injunctive or declaratory relief for constitutional violations. Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 443–44,
801 S.E.2d at 891. However, official immunity does bar suits for damages against
officers in their individual capacities, unless those officers acted with actual malice or
intent to cause injury. Id.; Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, ¶ IX. 2
Sterling has not shown the officers acted with actual malice or intent to cause
injury in prohibiting the Eid feast, so his claim against the officers in their individual
capacities for damages for violations of Georgia law is barred by official immunity. In
the time since he filed his complaint regarding the Eid feast, Sterling has been
transferred to another prison. Docs. 1; 12; 56. Because of that transfer, his requests
for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,
399 (11th Cir. 1986); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985); McKinnon
v. Talladega County, 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984); Whitehead v. Lavoie, 176
Ga. App. 666, 667, 337 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1985). For these reasons, the Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Sterling’s claims under the Georgia Constitution.
Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 59) is GRANTED in
part, as to the Plaintiff’s claims under the Georgia Constitution. Those claims are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of December, 2018.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 Under Georgia’s Tort Claims Act, official immunity, at least in tort cases, “is cast in seemingly broader
terms than official immunity under the Constitution.” Lathrop, 309 Ga. at 443, 801 S.E.2d at 891 n.31.
Because the constitutional provision on official immunity applies to bar any claims against the officers for
damages, there is no need to reach the questions of the GTCA’s applicability or the scope of the GTCA’s
official immunity.
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