RIDLEY v. CONLEY
Filing
10
ORDER GRANTING 7 , 8 , and 9 which are collectively construed as a Motion for Reconsideration, and VACATING 4 Order; DENYING 6 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis on Appeal. COA DENIED. While Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or to set aside is GRANTED, and the May 26, 2016, Order VACATED, the present habeas application shall still be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for those reasons stated herein. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 8/23/2016. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
EDWARD TYRONE RIDLEY,
Petitioner
VS.
Warden CONLEY,
Respondent.
________________________________
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL NO. 5:16-CV-0172-MTT-MSH
ORDER
Petitioner Edward Tyrone Ridley filed an application for federal habeas corpus
relief in this Court to challenge the possible conditions of his future probation or parole.1
After conducting a preliminary review of Petitioner’s application, the Court found that
Petitioner both lacked standing to challenge conditions not yet imposed and failed to
properly exhaust his claims in the state courts prior to filing. See Order, May 26, 2016,
ECF No. 4. His petition was thus dismissed and judgment was entered on May 26, 2016.
Petitioner has now filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal (ECF No. 6) and
three responses to the Court’s order of dismissal (ECF No. 7, 8, 9), which are collectively
construed as a motion for reconsideration or relief from judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
1 In the caption of his pleading (ECF No. 1), Petitioner referenced “42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1982,
1981, 1985; 1331; 9-5-1.” The pleading, however, was construed as an application for habeas
relief based both on Petitioners use of a habeas form and the type of relief sought. If Petitioner
wishes to bring a civil rights claim, he must file a separate action.
I.
Motion for Reconsideration
In his post-judgment filings, Petitioner claims that the Court clearly erred in
dismissing his application for lack of standing. He then clarifies his claims by further
explaining the events giving rise to his petition. According to the pleadings, Petitioner
was convicted in Bay County, Florida, in 1995 of “attempted sexual battery . . . with no
likely injury”; and a subsequent judicial determination by that court in 1997 placed him on
the Florida sex offender registry.2 Petitioner later moved to Georgia and was convicted of
“failure to register” as a sex offender under O.C.G.A. 42-1-12 by the Crisp County
Superior Court. Petitioner states, however, that he was not provided due process prior to
either the 1997 determination by the Florida court or his being subject to Georgia’s sex
offender registry.
Petitioner believes that he has been wrongfully convicted of violating the Georgia
laws regarding the registration of sex offenders, as those laws do not apply to him, and that
he thus also cannot be lawfully subjected to the parole and probation terms imposed on sex
offenders upon his future release. Petitioner was apparently granted probation on January
27, 2016, under the restrictive conditions for sex offenders after his Crisp County
conviction, but according to Petitioner, those terms were “violated” on February 5, 2016;
and he is now completing the remainder of his sentence in Washington State Prison.
2 Petitioner states that he was placed on the Florida sex offender registry, under § 993.0435, Fla.
Stat., in October 1997 after an erroneous judicial determination that he had been convicted of a
prior repetitive felony under § 800.04(5), Fla. Stat. Petitioner does not appear to now bring a
claim with respect to either Florida judgment. However, if Petitioner does wish to challenge the
validity of a conviction or judgment by the State of Florida, that application must be filed in a
Florida court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claim. Id.
2
Petitioner has also recently filed a state habeas action in the Washington County Superior
Court, Case No. 16-cv-213, regarding the February of 2016 probation revocation and is
scheduled for a hearing in that case on August 31, 2016.
Based on his post-judgment filings, it appears that the Court initially misunderstood
the extent of Petitioner’s claims. He now petitions the Court to vacate (1) his Crisp
County conviction for violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 (as he believes that he does not
satisfy the requirements for application of the statute) and/or (2) the revocation of his
probation in 2016.
As previously understood, Petitioner also seeks a judicial
determination as to whether the Georgia sex offender statutes are properly applied to him
and thus a finding as to whether he is subject to the terms and conditions of parole imposed
on sex offenders when he is released. Petitioner states that his release is imminent –
occurring either when he is successful in his state habeas action on August 31, 2016, or on
his maximum release date, November 11, 2016.
In light of this, the Court agrees that Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration should
be granted. The newly alleged facts are, however, still not sufficient to save Petitioner’s
claims from sua sponte dismissal. It is plain on the face of his pleadings that Petitioner
has not yet exhausted state remedies with respect to his 2016 probation revocation (as he
has plainly shown that his state habeas case relevant to that conviction is still active). See
Objection, ECF No. 9, at 2. That claim is thus not yet ripe for federal review and must be
dismissed without prejudice to Petitioner’s right to refile after he has fully exhausted his
state remedies. See also Gore v. Crews, 720 F.3d 811, 815 (11th Cir. 2013) (“If a
3
petitioner fails to exhaust his state remedies, a district court must dismiss the petition
without prejudice to allow for such exhaustion.”). Petitioner’s habeas claim as to his
Crisp County conviction is also properly dismissed without prejudice as that claim is
duplicative of one already pending in federal court. See Curtis v. Citibank, N.A, 226 F.3d
133, 138 (2nd Cir. 2000) (“court may stay or dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another
federal court suit”).
Inasmuch, Petitioner has an active habeas case in this Court
challenging the validity of his Crisp County conviction for failure to register, Ridley v.
Conley, 1:16-cv-108 (LJA).
The Court also again finds that Petitioner is not now entitled to a judicial
determination under § 2254 regarding the terms and conditions of a probation or parole that
have not yet been imposed.
The essence of Petitioner’s claims, as to both of his
convictions, is that he should not be subject to the probation and parole conditions imposed
upon sex offenders in Georgia because Crisp County erred in finding that he was a sex
offender under Georgia law, specifically § 42-1-12. A favorable ruling on Petitioner’s
probation claim – i.e., a finding that Petitioner is not subject to the requirements and
limitations imposed on sex offenders in Georgia – would thus necessarily invalidate or at
least call into question Petitioner’s Crisp County conviction for failure to register and
would require findings on issues currently before a state court in another habeas action.
The proper vehicle for raising Petitioner’s claims is thus not a new action, but his other
pending habeas actions, supra.
Therefore, while Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and/or to set aside, see Fed.
4
R. Civ. P. 65, will be GRANTED, and the May 26, 2016, Order VACATED, the present
habeas application shall still be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for those
reasons stated herein. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 (requiring a summary dismissal of
habeas claim when it “plainly appears from the face of the petition that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court.”).
II.
Denial of a Certificate of Appealability
A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a
district court’s denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Before he may appeal, the
district court must first issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”). See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1); 28 U.S.C. §2254, Rule 11(a). To merit a COA in this case, Petitioner must
show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both (1) the merits of an underlying
claim and (2) the procedural issues he seeks to raise. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Petitioner has not satisfied either requirement. No
reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether Petitioner has states a valid claim for the
denial of a constitutional right or find it debatable whether the Court was correct in its
procedural rulings. A COA is therefore DENIED. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d
895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (approving denial of COA before movant filed a notice of appeal).
III.
Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis on Appeal
Finally, Petitioner has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal from
the dismissal. The motion is DENIED. Petitioner has neither filed a notice of appeal nor
been granted a COA. The Motion is thus MOOT.
5
SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of August, 2016.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?