HARRISON et al v. LEGACY HOUSING LP et al
Filing
33
ORDER granting 28 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE C ASHLEY ROYAL on 3/30/18 (lap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
DAVID SHANNON HARRISON and :
COURTNEY GABRIELLE HARRISON,:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
CIVIL ACTION
v.
:
No. 5:16‐CV‐199 (CAR)
:
LEGACY HOUSING, LP, GPLH, LC :
and JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1‐3,:
:
Defendants.
:
:
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff David Shannon Harrison filed this premises liability action seeking
damages for injuries he sustained after he fell off of a ladder inside a warehouse owned
by Defendant Legacy Housing, LP, GPLH, LC (“Legacy”). His wife, Plaintiff Courtney
Gabrielle Harrison, asserts a related loss of consortium claim. Presently before the Court
is Legacy’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Having carefully considered the parties’
arguments, the record, and applicable law, the Court finds no genuine issues of material
fact exist as to Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, Legacy’s Motion [Doc. 28] is GRANTED.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant “shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”1 Not
1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
all factual disputes render summary judgment inappropriate; only a genuine issue of
material fact will defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.2 This
means that summary judgment may be granted if there is insufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party or, in other words, if
reasonable minds could not differ as to the verdict.3
On summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and all justifiable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; the Court may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.4 The moving party “always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact” and that entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law.5 If the
moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to
respond by setting forth specific evidence in the record and articulating the precise
manner in which that evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact or that the moving
party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.6 This evidence must consist of
2 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247‐48 (1986).
3 See id. at 249‐52.
4 See id. at 254‐55; Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 1992).
5 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324‐26.
2
more than mere conclusory allegations or legal conclusions.7
“Where [ ] evidence is circumstantial, a court may grant summary judgment when
it concludes that no reasonable jury may infer from the assumed facts the conclusion upon
which the non‐movant’s claim rests.”8 “A court need not permit a case to go to a jury [ ]
when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non‐movant
relies, are ‘implausible.’”9
Under Georgia law, “[i]n routine cases of premises of liability, i.e., the negligence of
the defendant and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s lack of ordinary care for personal safety
are generally not susceptible of summary adjudication, and summary judgment is granted
only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed.”10 However, proof of a fall on
one’s premises, without more, does not give rise to liability.11 There must be some fault on
the part of the premises owner.12
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of this Motion, the material facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the non‐movant, are as follows:
Defendant Legacy Housing, LP (“Legacy”) is a mobile‐home manufacturing
7 Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991).
8 Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1986).
9 Id.
10 Food Lion, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. App. 574, 577‐78 (2008) (citing Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga.
App. 735, 746 (1997)).
11 Christensen v. Overseas Partners Capital, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 827 (2001).
12 See Tanner v. Larango, 232 Ga. App. 599 (1998).
3
business based in Fort Worth, Texas. In September 2015, Legacy purchased property and
buildings in Eatonton, Georgia formerly owned by Horton Homes, a mobile‐home
manufacturing business that shut down in 2015. In addition to manufacturing mobile
homes, Horton Homes also operated a molding and laminating division of its company
called “Horton Components.” The laminating process is a necessary component of
manufacturing a mobile home.13 Howard Sneed was the production manager for Horton
Components, and Mark Johnson was a salesman for Horton Components. Both Mr.
Sneed and Mr. Johnson lost their jobs when Horton Homes went out of business. Legacy
did not acquire Horton’s molding and laminating division or its laminating equipment in
the purchase of Horton Homes.
After Legacy acquired the deed to Horton Homes’ manufacturing facilities in late
2015, Mr. Sneed called Curtis Hodgson, one of Legacy’s co‐owners, to inquire about
Legacy’s interest in setting up a molding and laminating division in one of its newly‐
acquired warehouses in Eatonton. Sneed hoped he and Johnson could continue the
laminating work they had done with Horton Homes.14 Sneed’s intent was to start a
partnership with Legacy, not to be employed by Legacy.15 In late December, Sneed and
Johnson flew to Texas and met with Mr. Hodgson to discuss a potential business
13 Hodgson Depo., p. 17 [Doc. 28‐2]. Hodgson describes the lamination process as follows: “You
put a cover on sheetrock and luan and some other forms of building materials that makes it look
like wallpaper for sheetrock, or makes it look like word for – for molding. And that cover can be
paper or vinyl. And it glues and wraps that cover onto the building materials.” Id.
14 Sneed Depo., pp. 17‐18 [Doc. 28‐3].
15 Id. at p. 19.
4
arrangement with Legacy. Because Mr. Johnson had opened his own picture frame
business, Johnson and Hodgson mutually agreed Johnson would not be a part of the
potential business relationship. However, Sneed and Hodgson continued discussions.
At that time, Legacy outsourced the molding and laminating for its mobile homes
to third parties. Sneed proposed a business relationship whereby Legacy would provide
the working capital and space for Sneed to establish his own laminating company, and
Sneed would pay rent for the building and provide laminating materials for Legacy’s
mobile homes at a discounted price. The parties anticipated Legacy being a major
customer of the laminating business but not the only customer. At that time, Sneed and
Hodgson were not contemplating the laminating business being a division of Legacy or
Sneed being an employee of Legacy.16 However, it is clear the business proposal
anticipated Legacy buying the laminating equipment necessary for Sneed to start the
business, and Legacy would benefit by receiving rent and discounted prices.
After their meeting in December, Sneed and Hodgson talked “once every week or
so” about the equipment Sneed needed to start the laminating business. In late January
2016, Sneed began visiting the site of the potential laminating plant, a warehouse owned
by Legacy known as the “green building.” Horton Homes had used the green building to
store carpet and electrical supplies on two long rows of shelving racks inside the
building. Each shelving unit was approximately twelve feet tall with four levels of
16 Hodgson Depo., p. 34 [Doc. 28‐2].
5
shelves.
On January 20, 2016, Sneed emailed Hodgson about his desire to take down some
of the shelving in the green building to get a better view of the space. Sneed wrote,
“when do you think I can bring someone in to help me tear down racks, build walls and
other miscellaneous stuff that needs to be done[?]”17 Mr. Hodgson replied, “[w]e can give
you a [L]egacy employee any time you need one. Ask [M]ick or [F]rank.”18
Although Johnson was no longer involved as a potential business partner with
Legacy and Sneed in setting up and operating the laminating plant, Johnson continued to
monitor the development of the laminating business with Sneed.
Plaintiff David Harrison19 and Johnson have been best friends for 30 years, and
Plaintiff and Sneed knew of each other.20 Plaintiff had heard “there was talk of [Johnson]
and [Sneed] opening a new plant, doing work like they had done at Horton Components
– laminate and stuff like that.”21 Plaintiff understood Sneed was partnering with Legacy,
and Plaintiff had conversations with Johnson about “getting in on the ground level” of
their business because he “knew there was some money to be made.”22
On Wednesday, January 20th—the same day Sneed emailed Hodgson asking
when he could bring someone in to help tear down the shelving units—Plaintiff, who
17 Hodgson Depo., Ex. 7 [Doc. 28‐2].
18 Id.
19 The Court will hereinafter refer to Plaintiff David Harrison as “Plaintiff.”
20 Plaintiff Depo., p. 43 [Doc. 28‐5].
21 Plaintiff Depo., pp. 46‐47.
22 Plaintiff Depo., pp. 49‐50.
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had earlier been hunting with Johnson, rode with Johnson to the green building to see
what Sneed was working on and “to listen and observe.”23 “I think [the business] was all
in such an infancy stage [ ] of what [Sneed and Johnson] wanted to do, they were
throwing out where to put this [laminating] machinery and where to put that machinery,
how to set [the building] up . . . for the laminate molding operation that was being talked
about.”24 While Plaintiff was at the warehouse, Sneed discussed taking down the
shelving; Sneed “just said [the shelving] needed to be taken down, no plans.”25 Plaintiff
and Johnson stayed no more than an hour and then left.26
The next evening, Thursday January 21st, Johnson told Plaintiff during a
telephone conversation that Sneed had secured a forklift to take down the shelving in the
green building. “So somewhere in the conversation between me [Plaintiff] and [Johnson]
it was decided to go out there [the next day] to help [Sneed] take down the shelving.”27
Johnson “just asked me [Plaintiff] what I was doing on Friday. I told him I had to take
care of some business. He said, well, [Sneed] has got the equipment up there to take the
shelving down. Let’s go up there and help him out.”28 Plaintiff told Johnson when he “got
through doing [some] business, [Plaintiff] would meet up with him and help him out.”29
23 Id. at p. 53.
24 Id. at pp. 55; 59.
25 Id. at p. 65.
26 Id. at p. 60.
27 Id. at p. 66.
28 Id. at p. 67.
29 Id. at p. 69.
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Plaintiff made no arrangements with Sneed to help dismantle the shelving.30
On Friday, January 22nd, Plaintiff finished his personal business, ate some lunch,
and drove to the green building. When he arrived around noon, Johnson and Sneed were
already in the building working on dismantling the shelving. Johnson and Sneed “told
[Plaintiff] what the game plan was as far as taking the shelving down and what they
were doing.”31 The shelving consisted of vertical and horizontal slats. The vertical slats
were bolted to the floor at the bottom. To dismantle the units, the men used a hammer to
“pop” out the horizontal slats first and then remove the vertical slats. After the horizontal
slats were removed, the vertical slats would fall over even though they were still bolted
to the ground. Johnson and Sneed showed Plaintiff how to “pop[ ] the locks off of each
end [of the shelving unit], hitting it with a hammer, knocking it off.”32 After showing
Plaintiff how to remove the shelving, Johnson and Sneed left for about 30 minutes to eat
some lunch. Plaintiff remained in the building dismantling the shelves.
After Johnson and Sneed returned to the building from lunch, the three men
continued dismantling the shelves for an hour to an hour‐and‐a‐half without incident.
After dismantling the shelves that could be reached by hand, Sneed and Johnson used a
forklift to dismantle the higher shelves. Because operating the forklift was a two‐man
operation, Plaintiff did not use the forklift. Instead, Plaintiff saw an industrial ladder
30 Id. at p. 70.
31 Id. at p. 73.
32 Id.
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with a platform next to the shelving unit and used it to access the higher shelves.33 No
one directed Plaintiff to use the ladder. Indeed, it is undisputed neither Sneed nor
Johnson knew the ladder was in the warehouse or had used the ladder. Sneed and
Johnson dismantled one end of the shelving unit using the forklift, while Plaintiff
dismantled the opposite end of the shelving unit standing on the ladder’s platform,
working their way toward the middle of the unit.
As they met in the middle taking down the last section of the shelving unit, the
vertical slat shifted, “snapped back,” and hit the top of the ladder upon which Plaintiff
stood causing it to topple over.34 As the ladder toppled, Plaintiff fell to the floor, and the
lower part of the ladder hit Plaintiff’s legs, causing serious injuries.
It is undisputed no Legacy employee or owner knew Sneed, Johnson, or Plaintiff
was on the premises dismantling shelves on January 22, 2016, when the accident
occurred. After the accident occurred, Sneed attempted to reach Hodgson by telephone,
but he was unable to reach him. Sneed sent an email to Hodgson informing him of the
accident.
Sometime in February 2016, it “was becoming clear” to Hodgson that Legacy
would be the dominant customer, if not the only customer, of the laminating plant.35
Moreover, Legacy realized Sneed “by himself didn’t have the ability to cultivate an
33 Id. at p. 78.
34 Id. at pp. 94, 95.
35 Hodgson Depo., p. 48 [Doc. 28‐2].
9
outside customer base.”36 Thus, Legacy decided to own and operate the laminating
business as a division of its company and have Sneed manage the business rather than
run it as his own business.37 In March 2016, Legacy hired Sneed as the manager of its
laminating division. In July 2016, Legacy hired Johnson as the sales manager. Plaintiff did
not apply for any job with Legacy and is not employed by Legacy.
Plaintiffs filed this premises liability suit against Defendant Legacy, and Legacy
seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims.
DISCUSSION
To establish negligence under Georgia law, Plaintiff must show (1) a legal duty; (2)
a breach of this duty; (3) an injury; and (4) a causal connection between the breach and the
injury. 38 “The threshold issue in any cause of action for negligence is whether, and to what
extent, the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care. Whether a duty exists upon which
liability can be based is a question of law. In the absence of a legally cognizable duty, there
can be no fault or negligence.”39
As the owner of the warehouse where Plaintiff was injured, Legacy’s duty to
Plaintiff depends upon Plaintiff’s legal status on Legacy’s premises as an invitee, licensee,
volunteer, or trespasser. Generally, a person is an invitee when “an owner or occupier of
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See Martin v. Ledbetter, 342 Ga. App. 208, 211 (2017) (citation omitted).
39 Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
10
land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads [him or her] to come upon his
premises for any lawful purpose.”40 A landowner is liable to an invitee “for injuries caused
by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.”41 In
contrast, a licensee is a person who “(1) [i]s neither a customer, a servant, nor a trespasser;
(2) [d]oes not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises; and (3) [i]s
permitted, expressly or impliedly, to go on the premises merely for his own interest,
convenience, or gratification.”42 “The owner of the premises is liable to a licensee only for
willful or wanton injury.”43 A “trespasser is one who, though peacefully or by mistake,
wrongfully enters upon property owned or occupied by another.”44 An owner “owes no
duty to keep the premises safe for a trespasser present without his knowledge, even if the
owner or occupier generally knows that it is customary for trespassers to enter his
property. Once the trespasser’s presence becomes known, the only duty is to refrain from
willfully and wantonly injuring him.”45 Finally, a volunteer is one who “voluntarily
undertakes to perform service,” and an owner “does not owe him any duty, except that
which he owes to a trespasser[.]”46
40 O.C.G.A. § 51‐3‐1.
41 Id.
42 O.C.G.A. § 51‐3‐2(a).
43 Id.
44 Barber v. Steele, 133 Ga. App. 290, 292 (1972).
45 Id.
46 Southern Ry. Co. v. Duke, 16 Ga. App. 673 (1915).
11
Defendant Legacy argues Plaintiff was a trespasser, volunteer, or, at best, a licensee
on its premises; thus, Legacy only owed him a duty not to willfully or wantonly injure
him, and no evidence shows Legacy did so. Plaintiff counters he was an invitee lawfully
on Legacy’s business premises because Sneed, as Legacy’s agent, recruited him to help
remove shelving in furtherance of Legacy and Sneed’s business together. Thus, Defendant
owed Plaintiff a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe, and Sneed’s
breach of that duty may be imputed to Legacy as Sneed’s principal. The Court is
unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments. As explained below, no employment or agency
relationship existed between Sneed and Defendant Legacy when Plaintiff was injured, and
even if an agency relationship did exist, Sneed acted outside of the scope of any authority
Defendant gave him to enlist Plaintiff’s help to remove the shelving. Thus, Plaintiff was at
most a licensee on Defendant’s premises; as a licensee, Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty
not to willfully or wantonly injure him, and no evidence supports a finding Legacy had
any such willful or wanton intent. Finally, the Court finds even if Plaintiff was an invitee
on Legacy’s premises at the invitation of Sneed acting as Legacy’s agent, no evidence
shows Sneed breached any duty owed to Plaintiff.
Agency Relationship
To determine Plaintiff’s legal status, and thus what duties Legacy owed to Plaintiff,
the Court must first examine the relationship between Legacy and Plaintiff, which in turn
hinges on the relationship between Sneed and Legacy. Plaintiff contends Sneed acted as an
12
agent in the scope of Legacy’s business when he recruited Plaintiff and supervised the
removal of the commercial shelving units from Legacy’s warehouse. Legacy, however,
contends Sneed was working on the property in the scope of his personal business and
had no agency relationship with Legacy. Thus, the threshold issue becomes whether
sufficient evidence exists to show a genuine issue of material fact that Sneed was an agent
of Legacy and not merely engaging in a personal endeavor.
Under Georgia law, an agency relationship can arise in three distinct ways:
expressly, by implication, or through subsequent ratification by the principal of the agent’s
conduct.47 Where an agency relationship does exist, an agent’s knowledge is imputed to
the principal pursuant to Georgia law. “The principal shall be bound by all acts of the
agent within the scope of his authority[.]”48 Plaintiffs argue Sneed, as Legacy’s actual,
apparent, or, at minimum, agent by ratification, orchestrated and supervised the removal
of the commercial shelving units in Legacy’s warehouse. The evidence, however, fails to
support such an assertion.
Actual Agency
To determine whether an actual agency relationship exists, Georgia cases have used
two tests: the traditional or “true” test of whether a person is a servant or an independent
47 O.C.G.A. § 10‐6‐1 (“The relations of principal and agent arises wherever one person, expressly or
by implication, authorizes another to act for him or subsequently ratifies the acts of another in his
behalf.”).
48 O.C.G.A. § 10‐6‐51.
13
contractor and a test using the list of ten factors set forth in the Restatement of Agency.49
The traditional test examines whether the principal “has the right to direct the time, the
manner, the methods, and the means of execution of the work, as contrasted with the right
to insisting upon results according to specifications of the contract.”50 The test using the
ten factors set forth in the Restatement of Agency examines “(1) the extent of control
which, by agreement, the employer may exercise over the details of the work; (2) whether
or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (3) whether or not
the work to be performed is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist who needs no supervision; (4) the skill required in the particular occupation; (5)
whether the employer supplies the tools and the place of work for the one employed; (6)
the length of time for which the person is employed; (7) the method of payment, whether
by the time or by the job; (8) whether or not the work to be performed is a part of the
regular business of the employer; (9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating
an agency relationship; and (10) whether the employer is or is not in business.”51
Under either test, the evidence fails to support an actual agency relationship
between Sneed and Legacy at the time Plaintiff was injured. On January 22, 2016, when
the accident occurred, the record is clear Sneed was neither employed by Legacy nor in
partnership with Legacy. All evidence shows Sneed and Legacy were in discussions about
49 Keefe v. Carpet & Upholstery Cleaning by Houndstooth, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 439, 440 (1994).
50 Id. (citations omitted).
51 Moss v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 135 Ga. App. 904, 906 (1975).
14
a potential partnership with Sneed operating the laminating business and Legacy funding
the operation to receive a discount on laminate. The evidence is also clear Sneed sought to
dismantle the shelves for his benefit to get a better view of the space for the laminating
equipment. Legacy did not control the time, manner, methods, or means of executing the
work. Sneed had managed Horton Homes’ laminating division for 20 years, and thus had
the knowledge and skill to determine how to configure the warehouse space. Legacy had
no experience in the laminating business, as it contracted its laminating to third parties.
No evidence suggests Legacy had any control over the details of dismantling the shelves
or that the work needed to be performed under its supervision. It is undisputed Legacy
did not pay Sneed, Johnson, or Plaintiff for the work. Most importantly, it is undisputed
Legacy had no knowledge Sneed, Johnson, and Plaintiff were dismantling the shelves on
January 22nd.
Apparent Agency
In addition, no apparent agency relationship existed between Sneed and Legacy.
Absent an express agreement, apparent authority exists “when the statements or conduct
of the alleged principal reasonably cause the third party to believe that the principal
consents to have the act done on his behalf by the purported agent.”52 Thus, apparent
authority is created when a principal’s actions make it reasonable for a third party to
52 Dunn v. Venture Bldg. Group, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 500, 503 (2007) (citations omitted).
15
believe the agent has authority to bind the principal. 53 Reasonable reliance is reliance
justifiably exercised by a third party of “ordinary prudence conversant with business
usages and the nature of the particular business.”54 Apparent authority must be based on
the principal’s conduct, not the agent’s conduct.55
Absolutely no evidence exists from which a jury could find Legacy engaged in any
conduct to cause Plaintiff to reasonably believe Sneed had Legacy’s authority to induce or
allow Plaintiff to dismantle the shelves. Plaintiff had no contact with Legacy whatsoever.
Plaintiff simply testified he thought Sneed had Legacy’s authority to be on the premises.
However, apparent authority does not depend on what a “third party chooses to think an
agent has the right to do, or even upon what the agent says he can do, but must be based
on acts of the principal which have led the third party to believe reasonably the agent had
such authority.”56 No evidence supports such a finding in this case.
Agency by Ratification
Finally, no agency relationship by ratification existed between Sneed and Legacy.
“An agency relationship can . . . be created by ratification, when a principal subsequently
ratifies the acts of another in his behalf. For ratification to be effective, the principal must
know of the agent’s unauthorized act and, with full knowledge of all the material facts,
53 Addley et al. v. Beizer, 205 Ga. App 714, 718 (1992).
54 Id. at 717 (citation omitted).
55 Id.
56 Dunn, 283 Ga. App. at 503.
16
accept and retain the benefits of the unauthorized act.”57 “A ratification by the principal
shall relate back to the act ratified and shall take effect as if originally authorized.”58 Here,
Plaintiff has failed to show any evidence Legacy knew Sneed recruited Plaintiff or even
that Plaintiff worked on the shelving. “[R]atification necessarily implies complete
knowledge of all the material facts relating to the transaction.”59
Scope of Authority
Even if this Court assumes a reasonable jury could find an agency relationship
existed between Sneed and Legacy, the evidence unequivocally establishes Sneed acted
outside the scope of his authority in allegedly inducing and allowing Plaintiff to dismantle
the shelves. It is axiomatic that a principal is liable for the torts of his agent if committed
within the scope of the principal’s business. “Every person shall be liable for torts
committed by his wife, his child, or his servant by his command or in the prosecution and
within the scope of his business, whether the same are committed by negligence or
voluntarily.”60 However, where an agent acts for his own personal benefit, his negligence
will not be imputed to his principal.61
57 J’Carpc, LLC v. Wilkins, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
58 O.C.G.A. § 10‐6‐52.
59 Hyer v. Citizens & S. Nat. Bank in Macon, 188 Ga. App. 452, 453 (1988).
60 O.C.G.A. § 51‐2‐2.
61 See, e.g., Hobbs v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 497 Ga. App. 243, 245 (1998) (“In determining the
liability of the master for the negligent or willful acts of a servant, the test of liability is, not
whether the act was done during the existence of the employment, but whether it was done within
the scope of the actual transaction of the master’s business for accomplishing the ends of his
employment. If a servant steps aside from his master’s business to do an act entirely disconnected
17
Here, even assuming a reasonable jury could find Sneed acted as Legacy’s agent in
allowing Plaintiff to dismantle the shelves, Sneed’s actions were plainly for his own
benefit. Legacy did not authorize Sneed to hire, retain, induce, or permit anyone other
than a Legacy employee to help him dismantle the shelves. Sneed asked Hodgson, “when
do you think I can bring someone in to help me tear down racks, build walls and other
miscellaneous stuff that need to be done[?].”62 To which, Hodgson replied, “[w]e can give
you a [L]egacy employee any time you need one. Ask [M]ick or [F]rank.”63 Not only did
Legacy not authorize Sneed to bring in anyone other than a Legacy employee to help
dismantle the shelves, no one at Legacy knew Sneed was dismantling the shelves the day
Plaintiff was injured.64 Thus, even if Sneed was acting as Legacy’s agent, he plainly acted
outside the scope of his authority in inducing Plaintiff to help take down shelves, and thus
Legacy cannot be held vicariously liable for any of Sneed’s alleged negligence.
Plaintiff’s Legal Status
Because no evidence shows Plaintiff, Johnson, and Sneed were on the property to
conduct business with Legacy, but rather were there for Sneed’s convenience, Plaintiff
from it, and injury to another results from a doing of the act, the servant may be liable, but the
master is not liable.”).
62 Hodgson Depo., Ex. 7 [Doc. 28‐2].
63 Id.
64 Sneed Depo., p. 60 [Doc. 28‐3]. Sneed testified that although the Legacy CEO was in a different
building about a half of a mile from the warehouse where Plaintiff was injured, “nobody [at
Legacy] knew we was at that plant.”].
18
may be considered, at most, a licensee on Legacy’s premises.65 Indeed Plaintiff’s status as a
licensee is supported by the fact no evidence supports any finding Legacy knew or
reasonably should have known that Plaintiff and Johnson were on its property at all.66 The
purpose of Plaintiff’s visit was merely to help Sneed. Plaintiff admits, “Why did I do it
[dismantle the shelves]? I mean, a friend had asked me to do it. It was in hopes of getting a
job in the future maybe.”67
“The duty an owner owes to a licensee arises after the owner becomes aware of or
should anticipate the presence of the licensee near the peril.”68 Here, the evidence is
undisputed Legacy had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s presence on its property. Moreover, no
evidence supports a finding Legacy should have reasonably anticipated Plaintiff’s
presence on its premises. On the contrary, evidence shows Hodgson told Sneed to ask for a
Legacy employee to help him take down the shelves. Although the evidence reasonably
supports a finding Legacy should have reasonably anticipated Sneed’s presence in its
warhouse, no evidence supports a finding Legacy should have anticipated Plaintiff’s
presence. Sneed did not inform Legacy he intended to invite Plaintiff or any other person,
65 See Jones v. Barrow, 304 Ga. App. 337, 339 (2010).
66 Id.; Jarrell v. JDC & Assoc., LLC, 296 Ga. App. 523, 525 (2009) (“In the instant case, [plaintiff] may
be considered, at best, a licensee as there was no evidence that the property owner even knew that
he was on the property.”); Matlack v. Cobb Elec. Membership Corp., 289 Ga. App. 632, 634 (2008)
(“Here, [the plaintiff] may be considered, at best, a licensee, as there is no suggestion that either
[the occupier or owner] knew [the plaintiff] was on the property, much less that either benefitted
from his presence.”).
67 Pl. Depo., p. 76 [Doc. 28‐5].
68 Bartlett v. Maffett, 247 Ga. App. 749, 750 (2001) (citation omitted).
19
and Legacy did not give Sneed permission to bring other persons to the property.
Moreover, it is undisputed Plaintiff had no present business relationship with Legacy. The
record is clear the only person Legacy reasonably should have been aware of in its
warehouse was Sneed. Thus, Plaintiff was at most a licensee.
Legacy’s Duty
An owner’s “duty to a licensee is not to injure the licensee wantonly or willfully.”69
“Wanton conduct has been described as that which is so reckless or so charged with
indifference to the consequences as to be the equivalent in spirit to the actual intent to do
harm or inflict injury.”70 Intent to injure is not an essential element of showing willful or
wanton conduct.71 “[W]illful or wanton conduct may also be shown where a landowner or
occupier fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent injuring a person who is actually known
to be, or may reasonably be expected to be, within the range of a dangerous act being done
or a hidden peril on one’s premises.”72
Here, there is not a scintilla of evidence Legacy acted willfully or wantonly to injure
Plaintiff or anyone else. Legacy did not know Sneed, Johnson, and Plaintiff were on its
premises dismantling the shelves. Legacy did not authorize Sneed to enlist a non‐Legacy
employee like Plaintiff to help him dismantle the shelves. Legacy had no knowledge of the
69 Jarrell, 296 Ga. App. at 523.
70 Trulove v. Jones, 271 Ga. App. 681 (2005).
71 Ellis v. Hadnott, 282 Ga. App. 584, 585 (2006).
72 Matlack v. Cobb Elec. Membership Corp., 289 Ga. App. 632, 634 (2008) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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ladder’s existence. Moreover, no evidence indicates Legacy failed to exercise ordinary care
to prevent injury to Plaintiff whom Legacy knew was “within the range of a dangerous
activity on its premises.”73 Nor could any reasonable jury determine Legacy reasonably
expected Plaintiff to be in its warehouse dismantling shelves. “The mere ownership of
land or buildings does not render one liable for injuries sustained by persons who have
entered thereon or therein; the owner is not an insurer of such persons, even when he has
invited them to enter. Nor is there any presumption of negligence on the part of an owner
or occupier merely upon a showing that an injury has been sustained by one rightfully on
the premises.”74
Sneed’s Breach of Duty
Finally, even if the evidence here supported a finding that Sneed invited Plaintiff to
Legacy’s premises within his scope of authority as Legacy’s agent, and thus Plaintiff was
an invitee on Legacy’s premises, no evidence supports a finding Sneed breached any duty
owed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues Sneed breached his duty to warn Plaintiff of the danger
that the vertical slats may fall and knock the ladder over. However, no evidence shows
Sneed had superior knowledge of such danger or that any such danger was foreseeable.
“The true ground of premises liability is a landowner’s superior knowledge of [a] perilous
condition and the danger therefrom to persons coming upon the property; it is when the
73 Id.
74 Speaks v. Rouse Co. of Georgia, 172 Ga. App. 9, 11 (1984).
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perilous condition is known to the owner and not known to the person injured that a
recovery is permitted.”75 “In order for [Legacy] to prevail on summary judgment, [it] ha[s]
the burden to negate the existence of superior knowledge on [its] part, with all doubts and
conflicts being resolved in plaintiff’s favor.”76 Legacy meets this burden.
Plaintiff argues Sneed had superior knowledge that the vertical slats would fall, and
he should have known a falling vertical slat would topple the ladder Plaintiff was using.
In support of his argument, Plaintiff points to testimony in which Sneed admits the
vertical slats of the shelving would fall over when the horizontal slats were removed, and
once the horizontal slats were removed, he used the forklift to support the vertical slats.77
However, Plaintiff had equal knowledge that the vertical slats would fall. Before his fall,
Plaintiff had dismantled two or three sections of the shelving and noticed that “once you
took the [horizontal] shelving down, you could push them over and [the vertical slats]
would fall over.”78 Moreover, no evidence shows Sneed could have foreseen a falling
vertical slat would topple the ladder. The fact Sneed used the forklift to support the
vertical slats does not indicate he should have known the ladder could not support the
vertical slats. The record contains no evidence showing Sneed had any more knowledge
regarding the force of a falling vertical slat than Plaintiff did. Indeed, Plaintiff had
75 Glenn v. Gibbs, 323 Ga. App. 18, 25 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
76 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
77 Sneed Depo., pp. 46, 52 [Doc. 28‐3].
78 Id. at p. 87.
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successfully used the ladder to dismantle two or three sections before the fall. It is
undisputed Sneed did not know the ladder was in the warehouse, had never used the
ladder in the past, and did not direct Plaintiff to use the ladder. Thus, no evidence
supports a finding that Sneed had superior knowledge of the dangers to Plaintiff
associated with dismantling the shelves or should have foreseen that a falling vertical slat
would topple the industrial ladder Plaintiff stood upon.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28] is
hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 30th day of March, 2018.
S/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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