WOODY v. BRYSON et al

Filing 29

ORDER adopting 25 Report and Recommendations; granting in part and denying in part 22 Motion to Amend/Correct; and, granting in part and denying in part 16 Motion to Dismiss. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE TILMAN E SELF, III on 6/20/2018. (chc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

JEREMY J. WOODY,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.

v.

5:16-cv-00467-TES-CHW

HOMER BRYSON, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the United States Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation [Doc. 25] on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 16] and Plaintiff’s
Motion to Amend [Doc. 22]. The Magistrate Judge recommends that both motions be
granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff filed a timely objection [Doc. 26] to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Plaintiff be disallowed from adding the Georgia
Department of Corrections as a defendant; therefore, the Court must review this
recommendation de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff’s current lawsuit asserts claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132
(“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“RA”) against several Georgia

Department of Corrections (“GDOC”) employees. In his Motion to Amend, Plaintiff seeks
to add GDOC as a party. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court disallow this
amendment because suits against state officials in their official capacities are deemed
suits against the state itself, and there is therefore “no need in this context to add the
Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) as a formal defendant.” [Doc. 25 at 14]. In
his objection, Plaintiff seems to argue that GDOC is the proper defendant for his ADA
and RA claims, rather than its individual employees in their official capacities.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, the law recognizes no difference between suits
against state officials in their official capacities and suits against the state itself. See, e.g.,
Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1264 n.16 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated and superseded on other
grounds by 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n an official-capacity suit for injunctive relief,
the real party in interest is the government entity. Thus, a suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is in effect against a ‘public entity’ and is authorized by [the
ADA].”); Clifton v. Georgia Merit System, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(finding that the plaintiff’s ADA claims against state officials “in their official capacity are
indistinguishable from the plaintiff’s claims against [Georgia Merit System].”); Barnes v.
Zaccari, No. 1:08-CV-0077-CAP, 2008 WL 11339923, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2008) (“[A]
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is in effect against a ‘public entity’
and is authorized by [the ADA].”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s suit is effectively against the

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Georgia Department of Corrections since it is currently being brought against that entity’s
employees in their official capacities, and there is no need to add the entity as a defendant.
In light of these findings, the Court agrees with and ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 25] over Plaintiff’s objection and MAKES IT
THE ORDER OF THE COURT. Therefore, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES
IN PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 16]. The Court also GRANTS IN PART
AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend [Doc. 22]. Plaintiff may amend his
Complaint to only state claims against Defendants Perry and Berry in their official
capacities for alleged ADA and RA violations that occurred during Plaintiff’s
incarceration at Central State Prison. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are dismissed. The
Court reopens discovery for a period of 90 days from the date of this order.
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of June, 2018.

S/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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