MOORE v. HARRODS PALLET COMPANY LLC
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff's 32 Motion for Attorney's Fees and entering judgment in favor of Plaintiff Johnny Moore. The Court finds that Moore should be awarded $14,961.87: attorneys fees in the amount of $6,675.00, costs in the amount of $606.87, and lost wages in the amount of $7,680.00. Accordingly, Defendant Harrods Pallet Company, LLC is ORDERED to pay Moore $14,961.87 in UNITED STATES CURRENCY. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 1/25/2019. (kat)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
JOHNNY MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARROD’S PALLET COMPANY LLC,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17-CV-85 (MTT)
ORDER
On December 13, 2018, a bench trial was held to resolve the claims brought by
Plaintiff Johnny Moore against Defendant Harrod’s Pallet Company, LLC. Doc. 29.
Because the Defendant failed to appear at the trial, only Moore presented his case. Id.
At the conclusion of Moore’s case, the Court ordered Moore to file proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law and a motion for attorney’s fees. Id. Moore complied. Doc.
32. For the following reasons, judgment is entered in favor of Moore, and his motion for
attorney’s fees (Doc. 32) is GRANTED.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 28, 2017, Moore filed his complaint against his previous employer,
Defendant Harrod’s Pallet Company, alleging that the Defendant fired him because of
his age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Doc. 1. The summons to
the Defendant was returned executed on March 20. Doc. 4. The Defendant failed to
plead or otherwise defend against the suit. Moore filed a motion for entry of default,
which was granted by the Clerk of Court, and proceeded to file a motion for default
judgment. Docs. 5; 6. The Court denied his motion for default judgment for failing to
allege a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and ordered
Moore to show cause as to why his case should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Docs. 7; 8.
On July 5, 2017, Moore filed his response and a motion to amend his complaint,
which the Court granted. Docs. 11; 12; 13. After filing his complaint alleging a violation
of the ADEA, rather than the Civil Rights Act, Moore served the Defendant. Docs. 14;
15; 16. The Defendant, again, failed to plead or otherwise defend against the suit.
At Moore’s request, the Court convened a bench trial on December 13, 2018.
Doc. 29. Only Moore appeared and presented evidence. Id. At the conclusion of the
trial, the Court did not issue a judgment and ordered Moore’s counsel to submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Moore’s counsel complied. Doc. 32.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact based on Moore’s evidence
presented at trial:
1.
Moore was hired by the Defendant in February 2016 as a lumber inspector. Doc.
31 at 4:24-5:3, 5:14-21.
2.
Moore was sixty-six years old when he was hired by the Defendant. Id. at 5:4-6.
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3.
The Defendant manufactured pallets from raw lumber and shipped those pallets
in and out of the State of Georgia. Id. at 5:7-13.
4.
The Defendant employed between forty and sixty people. Id. at 5:24-6:1.
5.
Moore was paid $8.00 per hour while working for the Defendant. Id. at 6:2-4.
6.
Moore never received any disciplinary or performance warnings from the
Defendant while employed by the Defendant. Id. at 10:22-11:1.
7.
The owner of the Defendant company was Donald Harrod. Id. at 6:16-21.
8.
Moore was terminated in February 2016 after Harrod asked Moore at work how
old he was, Moore told him, and Harrod told Moore that Moore was “too old to be back
there with the younger guys.” Id. at 5:5-17, 7:9-11.
9.
Moore remained unemployed for six months until August 2016. Id. at 10:16-21,
11:14-22.
10.
Moore filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
immediately after he was terminated in February 2016. Id. at 7:17-9:16; Doc. 30-1.
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11.
The EEOC issued Moore a Notice of Right to Sue on December 6, 2016. Doc.
14 ¶ 8.
12.
Moore timely filed this action against the Defendant. Id. ¶ 9.
13.
Moore requested back pay, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees. Doc. 31 at
12:12-22.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court makes the following conclusions of law:
1.
The ADEA defines a covered employee as an individual “who [is] at least 40
years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 631. Moore is a covered former employee under the ADEA
because he was sixty-six years old when he was hired and ultimately fired by the
Defendant. Doc. 31 at 5:4-6.
2.
The ADEA defines an “employer” liable under the statute as “a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year.” 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). The Defendant is a covered employer because it employed
between forty and sixty people. Doc. 31 at 5:24-6:1.
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3.
The ADEA prohibits covered employers from terminating a covered employee
because of the employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). At trial, a plaintiff bringing an
ADEA claim must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the “but-for”
cause of the employer’s adverse employment action through direct or circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory intent. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 164, 180
(2009) (citations omitted); Alphsin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th
Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Moore showed through a preponderance of the evidence
at trial that the Defendant violated the ADEA when it fired him because he was “too old.”
Doc. 31 at 5:5-17, 7:9-11.
4.
To determine that the defendant terminated the plaintiff because of the plaintiff]’s
age, the factfinder must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
would not have terminated the plaintiff had the plaintiff been younger, but everything
else had been the same. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 178 (2009)
(citation omitted); see Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1203-04
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the “mixed motive” defense is not available in ADEA
cases). Moore never received any disciplinary or performance warnings from the
Defendant while employed by the Defendant. Doc. 31 at 10:22-11:1. The evidence
produced at trial shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Moore was fired by the
Defendant only because of his age. Id. at 5:5-17, 7:9-11.
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IV. DAMAGES
When a plaintiff prevails on an age discrimination claim, he is entitled to certain
damages under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under the ADEA, employees may
recover lost wages, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Id.
Moore has requested $7,680.00 in lost wages. Doc. 31 at 12:12-19. Employees
who win age discrimination cases may recover wages they lost as a result of the
employer’s discriminatory act by showing that they were injured as a result. See Nance
v. Maxwell Fed. Credit Union, 186 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 1999). Moore was paid
$8.00 per hour and was unemployed for six months. Doc. 31 at 12:12-19. Thus, the
Defendant is liable to Moore for $7,680.00 ($8.00 per hour at forty hours per week for
twenty-four weeks, or six months) in lost wages.
Moore has also requested an additional $7,680.00 in liquidated damages. Id.
Congress intended to punish employers who act “willfully” when violating the ADEA by
allowing plaintiffs to recover liquidated damages. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 125 (1985). However, liquidated damages awarded may not exceed back
pay. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945). To prove entitlement to
liquidated damages, a plaintiff must establish that the employer knew its conduct was
prohibited or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited by the
ADEA. Formby v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 904 F.2d 627, 632 (11th Cir. 1990).
Moore made no such showing here and is thus not entitled to liquidated damages.
Moore has also requested attorney’s fees and expenses. Successful ADEA
plaintiffs who are awarded damages may, upon proper proof, recover reasonable
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attorney’s fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Salvatori v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
190 F.3d 1244, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999). Moore’s counsel has submitted proper proof,
including an affidavit summarizing his legal experience and reasonableness of his
hourly billing rate (Doc. 32-1); a detailed record of the legal tasks performed for this
case with the hourly billing rate (Doc. 32-2); and a detailed record of the costs incurred
for this case (Doc. 32-3).
“The starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). This number is called the “lodestar,” and “there is a strong presumption
that the lodestar is the reasonable sum the attorneys deserve.” Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted). The district court should exclude “hours that were not
reasonably expended,” such as work that was “excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
In determining whether a lodestar is reasonable, the district court should consider
twelve factors enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.: (1) the time
and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty; (3) the skill required to perform the
legal service properly; (4) the opportunity cost of the attorney’s inability to work on other
cases as a result of accepting this one; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8)
the amount of money at issue and the results obtained; (9) the experience and ability of
the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
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professional relationship with the client and (12) attorney’s fee awards in similar cases.
488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by Blancher v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989); see also Blancher, 489 U.S. at 92 (“Johnson’s ‘list of 12’
thus provides a useful catalog of the many factors to be considered in assessing the
reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees.”). Downward adjustment of the lodestar
is “merited only if the prevailing party was partially successful in its efforts,” a
determination the district court makes on a case-by-case basis. Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1150 (11th Cir. 1993).
By failing to appear at trial and file any response to Moore’s complaints and
motions for default judgment, the Defendant has not contested the availability of
attorney’s fees, the costs incurred by Moore, the time expended by Moore’s counsel,
Moore’s counsel’s rate of $250 per hour, or any of the other Johnson factors. The Court
finds the 26.70 hours of time expended by Moore’s counsel was necessary and his
hourly rate of $250 to be reasonable given his experience. Docs. 32-1; 32-2. Thus,
Moore is entitled to recover attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,675.00. The court also
finds the total ancillary costs for Moore’s litigation to be reasonable and necessary.
Thus, Moore is entitled to recover $606.87 in costs, which includes $400.00 for the court
filing fee, $25.47 in mailing costs, $101.66 in process server fees, $19.99 in print and
copy charges, $5.00 in parking, and $54.75 for a copy of the trial transcript. Doc. 32-3.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Johnny
Moore, and his motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 32) is GRANTED. The Court finds that
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Moore should be awarded $14,961.87: attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,675.00
(26.70 at $250.00 per hour), costs in the amount of $606.87, and lost wages in the
amount of $7,680.00 ($8.00 per hour at forty hours per week for twenty-four weeks, or
six months). Accordingly, Defendant Harrod’s Pallet Company, LLC is ORDERED to
pay Moore $14,961.87 in UNITED STATES CURRENCY.
SO ORDERED, this 25th day of January, 2019.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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