OWENS v. HARMON et al

Filing 19

ORDER DENYING 16 Jury Demand filed by JAMES OWENS, III which the Court has construed as a MOTION for reconsideration and MOTION for injunctive relief. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 1/8/2018. (tlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

JAMES OWENS, III
Plaintiff,
v.
Deputy JEROME HARMON, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO. 5:17-CV-174(MTT)

ORDER
The Plaintiff has filed a two-page document with the Court. Doc. 16. Excluding
headings, the document reads as follows in its entirety:
I have tried to send out several letters with my responds [sic]
but Houston County Detention Facility has h[i]ndered me
from proceeding by not sending all of my mail out because I
am a[n] indigent inmate also by not giving me the materials
that I need when I qualified as a[n] indigent inmate
th[erefore] I have been trying diligently to represent myself to
the best of my ability I have [no] counsel representing me
and I object to the dismissal of any of the defendants in this
case the jail has refused to forward any evidence because of
my confinement at the Houston County Detention Center
also th[ere] is a limitation to the information and also
objection to Attorney O’Quinn and Cronin bring up my
criminal charges in this civil case and also his statement is
false my mother never talked with him nor gave him any
information about my mental health issues and I would like
to proceed with a speedy jury trial and not wait for any
criminal termination.
Relief:
I would like for each defendant to be suspended without pay
[until] the trial is finished also I would like to receive 20,000
in cash from each defendant and I would like to be removed
from this jail so I won’t be harassed or punished for the filing

of this lawsuit nor discriminated against or retaliated against
I feel that I’m in danger at Houston County Detention Center
the jailers are out to get me[.]
Id. The Court must liberally construe the filings of the Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro
se. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Mays v.
United States, 817 F.3d 728, 731 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Given Mays’s motion to vacate
and supplemental notice were filed pro se, we construe them liberally.” (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, the Court construes the document as a motion for
reconsideration of its order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that
several Defendants be dismissed from the case without prejudice (Doc. 14) and a
motion for injunctive relief. See Doc. 16 (stating “I object to the dismissal of any
defendants in this case” and requesting that the Defendants be suspended without pay,
the Defendants be ordered to pay the Plaintiff $20,000, and the Plaintiff be released
from jail).
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.6, “Motions for Reconsideration shall not be filed as a
matter of routine practice.” M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.6. “Reconsideration is appropriate only if
the movant demonstrates (1) that there has been an intervening change in the law, (2)
that new evidence has been discovered which was not previously available to the
parties in the exercise of due diligence, or (3) that the court made a clear error of law.”
Bingham v. Nelson, 2010 WL 339806, at *1 (M.D. Ga.) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Although the Plaintiff states an objection “to the dismissal of any
defendants in this case,” he has not set forth any argument that such dismissal was
wrong because of an intervening change in law, newly discovered evidence not

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previously available, or clear error. Doc. 16 at 1. Also, the Plaintiff had the opportunity
to object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation but failed to do so; he waited to
contest the dismissal of some of the Defendants until two and a half months after the
Recommendation and nearly a month after the order adopting the Recommendation.
Compare Doc. 7 (Recommendation, dated August 31, 2017), with Doc. 14 (order
adopting Recommendation, dated October 16), with Doc. 16 (Plaintiff’s motion, dated
November 13). The motion for reconsideration must be denied.
As to the motion for injunctive relief, a preliminary injunction is a drastic remedy
and is only appropriate if a party demonstrates that (1) there is a substantial likelihood
he will succeed on the merits of his claim for injunctive relief, (2) relief is necessary to
prevent irreparable injury, (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that would be
caused to the non-moving party, and (4) granting relief would not be averse to the public
interest. Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (11th Cir.
2001) (citation omitted). The Plaintiff has failed to show a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, the necessity of his requested relief to prevent irreparable injury,
that his threatened injury outweighs harm caused to the non-moving party, or that
granting relief would not be averse to the public. The motion for injunctive relief
therefore also must be denied.
Finally, to the extent the Plaintiff contests evidence that he anticipates opposing
counsel will attempt to use at trial, he will have an opportunity to move to exclude such
evidence closer to trial. At this time, resolution of such a dispute is premature.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and motion for injunctive
relief (Doc. 16) is DENIED.

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SO ORDERED, this 8th day of January, 2018.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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