BARFIELD v. LEWIS et al
ORDER ADOPTING as modified 8 Report and Recommendations and DENYING 26 Motion for Extension of Time to File OBJECTION. The Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against Defendants Cannon, Chatman, Lewis, and Sellers are DISMISSED without prejudice, the Plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice, and the Plaintiff's 3 motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 2/13/2018. (tlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
Dr. SHARON LEWIS, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17-CV-240 (MTT)
United States Magistrate Judge Charles H. Weigle has screened this Section
1983 case pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Doc. 8. The Magistrate Judge
ordered the following claims to go forward and the following Defendants to be served:
the access to courts claims against Defendants Cannon, Chatman, Powell, Sellers, and
Young; the deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against Defendants Adair,
Burnside, and Gore; and the retaliation claims against Defendants Gore and Powell. Id.
The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing without prejudice the Plaintiff’s medical
deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Cannon, Chatman, Lewis, and
Sellers, and denying the Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order. Id. The
Order and Recommendation, filed on January 18, 2018, instructed the parties that their
objections to the Recommendation were due within 14 days after being served with a
copy of the Recommendation and that “[t]he parties may seek an extension of time in
which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the
deadline for filing written objections.” Id. at 15-16.
Now, the Plaintiff moves for “an order extending time to file his objections . . . and
any and all further proceedings for a TWELVE (12) month period of time, which would
extend all filing times to Jan. 28th, 2019.” Doc. 26 at 1. Because the Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his filings. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728,
731 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Given Mays’s motion to vacate and supplemental notice were
filed pro se, we construe them liberally.” (citation omitted)). Liberally construed, the
Plaintiff argues that the extension is necessary because (1) he has been moved around
within his prison twice recently, which has separated him from “prison jail-house lawyer
Mr. Hjalmar Rodriguez,” whose assistance is necessary because the Plaintiff “is an
illiterate person very lacking in education and legal knowledge;” (2) the Defendants
have threatened to withhold his mail and will intentionally interfere with his legal
proceedings; and (3) a twelve-month extension will give the Plaintiff “time to find a
legally trained person in law to assist the Plaintiff.” Id. at 1-5.
A twelve-month extension is unreasonable on its face. The Plaintiff argues that
his illiteracy and lack of education renders him completely reliant on others, but he filed
this motion, which is thoughtfully organized and cites legal authority, without assistance
and after his separation from Mr. Rodriguez. See Doc. 26 at 6 (the Plaintiff’s signature
on the motion for extension of time). Further, the Plaintiff’s claims arise from
straightforward factual allegations, and his filings will be construed liberally by the Court.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s stated reasons for needing an extension are not persuasive.
The Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time is also futile. The Court has made
a de novo determination of the portions of the Recommendation which recommend
rulings against the Plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.”). The Magistrate Judge has ordered most of the Plaintiff’s claims to proceed for
factual development, so the only portions of the Recommendation which the Plaintiff
may contest are the recommendations to (1) dismiss without prejudice his claims for
deliberate indifference to medical needs against Defendants Cannon, Chatman, Lewis,
and Sellers; and (2) denial of his motion for a temporary restraining order. See
generally Doc. 8.
The Court finds that both recommendations are due to be adopted, even on de
novo review and liberally construing the Plaintiff’s filings. The Plaintiff’s complaint does
not state allegations that would make Defendants Cannon, Chatman, Lewis, or
Sellers—none of whom are alleged to have personally participated in medical decisionmaking on behalf of the Plaintiff—liable for deliberate indifference to medical needs. As
for the temporary restraining order, the Plaintiff’s pleadings and attached exhibits simply
do not show enough to establish a “substantial likelihood of ultimate success on the
merits.” Doc. 8 at 14 (quoting Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Accordingly, at this time, any objection to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations
would be futile, as the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations against the Plaintiff all
survive the Court’s de novo review. Further, because the case is proceeding, the
Plaintiff can move to amend his complaint to add these dismissed claims if he adds
pleading sufficient to survive preliminary screening, and he can renew his motion for a
temporary restraining order as the record develops.
The Magistrate Judge also states the following regarding the Plaintiff’s
supplemental state law claims: “Because federal jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims remains an unsettled issue, it would be unnecessary and inappropriate to reach
the merits of such claims at this early stage in this case.” Doc. 8 at 14. The Court
disagrees. To the extent the Plaintiff attempts to raise state law negligence or
malpractice claims related to his medical treatment, he has attached no expert affidavit
and has not alleged that he has complied with Georgia’s ante-litem notice requirements
for tort claims against a state government entity and its officers or employees. See,
e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (requiring plaintiffs in professional malpractice cases to file an
expert affidavit setting forth an act or omission providing the basis of the claim);
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a) (requiring plaintiffs to provide written notice to the state before
pursuing state law tort claims against the state). The Plaintiff has therefore failed to
state a claim for which relief may be granted, and these claims should also be screened
out. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring courts to dismiss cases brought by pro se
plaintiffs if the court determines that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted). The Court therefore accepts most of the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge and ADOPTS the Recommendation as
modified, so that the state law claims are also dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against
Defendants Cannon, Chatman, Lewis, and Sellers are DISMISSED without prejudice,
the Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice, and the Plaintiff’s
motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 13th day of February, 2018.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?